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THESIS

**TRANSATLANTIC LINKS
- A CONTINUING NECESSITY
OR JUST AN OPTION? -**

by

Ansgar Rieks

June, 1996

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TRANSATLANTIC LINKS
- A CONTINUING NECESSITY OR JUST AN OPTION? -

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

After the Cold War the transatlantic link between Europe and America is no longer self-explanatory. The allies focus increasingly on internal problems and prosperity of their own countries. Traditional alliances and partnerships seem to play a diminished role. However, this dividing trend is countered by a number of new problems, uncertainty about the future, and a worldwide interrelation in many facets of political, economic, social, and technological life. The state is no longer able to solve problems within an isolationist approach. From this perspective, partners have to be found. Because of their common history, common belief and value system, and common ideological basis, Europe and America are natural partners. On this common ground a multidimensional transatlantic partnership should be established. Structures of this partnership rely on traditional organizations like NATO, additionally however, transatlantic links have to be modernized and broadened. Both partners, America and Europe, will have advantages from this. Both, however, will have to make contributions: the Americans by being prepared to take the lead, the Europeans by overcoming their traditional antagonisms, by taking over burdens and responsibilities, and by developing a European identity.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism the old familiar coordinates for half a century, internal priorities of nearly all states, and the world community have changed. The assertion of United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher that no region in the world is more important for America than the Asian-Pacific, underlines a general trend to new priorities. These goals are to stabilize the United States economy, to 'bring one's own house in order' and, in general, to create an increased capability for international competition in all necessary areas.

American interests, when dealing with Russia, are derived from power politics of two big powers, no longer from socio-politico relations between two blocs. This causes a strong tendency for a new 'unilateralism' or 'bilateralism', leaving out former partners, friends and allies. Whether this tendency can be channeled into a new strategic relationship also with Europe, for example under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), remains to be seen. It depends on the relationship between Europe and America.

Economic trends and the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) with a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) underlines that there is some possibility that Europe will achieve a degree of stability and power to be a possible strategic partner for the United States. However, it should not be

an exclusively European duty to accomplish this. It is the whole community of Western states that matters. Europe and America have together a duty of leading the world to a common future. The Atlantic community has been very important in the past, and should continue to be it in the future.

‘Internal’ reasons are not less important than ‘external’, when discussing an intensified transatlantic partnership. Domestic consensus for foreign policy and, in general, for engaging ‘abroad’ is essential. Until today, neither the United States nor the states of the European Union were able to create such a consensus about their role in the world. In this situation, orientation is difficult and the temptation to find solutions in a new bilateral ‘balance of power’ diplomacy is strong.

In the new security environment with uncertainties not only about the question where the real power lies, but also about who will be a future friend or foe, it is necessary to search for commonality, for equal belief and for value systems. On this basis, ‘old’ partnerships can be renewed and modernized, ‘new’ ones can be built.

Europe needs America. It lacks military means to project power to parts of the world, to protect itself, and to engage decisively in wars like the former Yugoslav conflict. It is on the way towards a closer Union, but still having not yet decided the complete goal and the way to reach this goal. Nevertheless, Western Europe will get new security partners from Central and Eastern Europe, while at the same time having to cope with the uncertain, but still big and powerful

neighbor Russia. America is necessary to give the basis for Europe on which its future can be built.

America equally needs Europe. Pointing out the common heritage, it is possible to find a reference for internal problems which seems to become overwhelming important in the near future. The United States will have European partners, if not 'the' European partner, it needs 'partners in leadership' and a community which 'raise its eyes to other parts of the world', economically, politically, and, under certain circumstances, militarily. America, thus, has something to gain from such a partnership. The major advantage for the transatlantic link is, that it combines political hardware with a long since developed 'spirit of commonality'.

Established transatlantic structures are no longer instruments that do of themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of politicians, economists, and citizens. Therefore, it is necessary to engage actively, to name the problems, to try to find solutions, and to explain to the people why all this has to be done and why it has a real pay-off. This means, Europe has to come to grips with forming its identity of becoming an equal partner for the United States. America has to overcome isolationist and unilateralist tendencies and to lead where it is needed. Common institutions must be established. These are the 'necessities' for future efficient transatlantic links.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic link is indispensable for security and stability in Europe. As Europe undergoes radical change, it is now of all times that the continent needs the continuing commitment of the USA in particular to maintain its inner balance. The vitality of the transatlantic link is also in the interest of North America, as this link enables it to deal with global challenges in cooperation with a Europe that is a stable and predictable partner capable of taking action.¹

The above describes the German position when discussing the transatlantic link. It is asserted that 'Europe needs America' and, with the same emphasis, 'America needs Europe'. An analysis of the above, however, leads to more questions than affirmations. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism the familiar coordinates for half a century, internal priorities of nearly all states, and the world community have changed. The familiar Europe-centric map, with a divided Pacific (often incompletely shown) and the two poles, America in the West and Russia in the East, is no longer valid.² The assertion of United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher that no region in the world is more important for America than the Asian-Pacific, underlines a general trend to new priorities.³ These goals are to stabilize the United States economy, to 'bring one's own house in order' and, in general, to create an increased capability for international competition in all necessary areas.

Thus, beneath the concentration on Asia and its rising economic importance, an American - Russian special relationship is stressed. Despite political and military changes, Russia remains a great power, because of its size, population, and its nuclear arsenal. American interests, when dealing with Russia, are derived from the power politics of two big powers, no longer from socio-political relations between two blocs. This causes a strong tendency for a new 'bilateralism', leaving out former partners, friends and allies. In

¹ German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, No. 421, p. 52.

² see: V. Rühle, Die pazifische und atlantische Dimension gemeinsamer Sicherheit, speech at Stanford University, Feb 27 1995.

³ see: O. Mager, Alter Kontinent wichtig, in: Information für die Truppe, 10/94, p. 51.

the long run, both sides will accept the other's political interests, as long as world politics not again become a zero-sum game.⁴ Whether this tendency can be channeled into a new strategic relationship with Europe, for example under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), remains to be seen.

It depends, and this closes the circle, on the relationship between Europe and America. Economic trends and the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) with a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) underlines that there is some possibility that Europe⁵ will achieve a degree of stability and power sufficient to be a possible strategic partner for the United States. Europe as a 'global player', no longer as a 'protectorate', will be America's equal partner. This goal is only possible if all European partner nations have the same degree of security,⁶ especially the Partnership for Peace states which are becoming the 'new partners'. Thus, beneath the development of a 'European global actor', the definition of a new relation with Russia, and the strengthening of the transatlantic link, the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the framework of Western organizations, alliances, and institutions is essential.⁷

However, it should not be an exclusively European duty to accomplish this. It is the whole community of Western states that matters. „There has been an erosion of the belief that the West, as the richest and most modern portion of human society, has a special responsibility for the world as a whole“.⁸ This erosion has to be tackled by the

⁴ see: B. von Plate, Russland in einer europäischen Sicherheitsordnung, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 95, p. 25.

⁵ To be precise, 'Europe' has to be defined. The development of a 'Common Europe' normally is seen within the development of the European Union (EU). However, many European states are not, or not yet, members of the EU. Furthermore is the development of 'Europe' dependent on the future of other organizations, for example NATO, OSCE etc. Thus, in the following the expression 'Europe' has to be set equal with 'Western Europe' which means, if not further defined, the 'European Union'. In the same way, 'America' mostly means 'The United States of America'. If Canada or other states of the continent are involved, it will be noticed in the text.

⁶ see: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Rühle bezeichnet die Ost-Erweiterung der NATO als unumkehrbar, Apr 21 1995, S. 1.

⁷ see: V. Rühle, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, speech at the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, Bonn, 11. Mai 1995, p. 6.

⁸ M. Woollacott, The great Atlantic drift away, in: The Guardian, Feb 10 1995.

leading states. Europe and America together have a duty to lead the world to a common future. The Atlantic community has been very important in the past, and should continue to be it in the future. The obvious loss of purpose must be repaired by organizational and political means. 'Internal' reasons are not less important than 'external', when discussing an intensified transatlantic partnership. Domestic consensus on foreign policy and, in general, for engaging 'abroad' is essential. Until now, neither the United States nor the states of the European Union were able to create such a consensus about their role in the world. In this situation, orientation is difficult and the temptation to find solutions in a new bilateral 'balance of power' diplomacy is strong.

However, this does not solve any problems.⁹ President Woodrow Wilson's address to Congress in 1917 is still valuable: „The world must be made safe for democracy“.¹⁰ The international system of the twenty-first century, marked by 'fragmentation' and 'globalization', is a real challenge for all statesmen. None of the most important countries which must build a new world order have any experience with a multistate system as is probably emerging.¹¹ And, because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are especially crucial. These choices should reflect the preference of multilateralism versus unilateralism, of engagement versus disengagement, of promoting democracy versus realpolitik, of a world leadership responsibility versus isolationism and concentration on internal problems, and, last but not least, of a strategic partnership between America and Europe versus economic and strategic rivalry.¹²

In addition to a historical survey of the United States' involvement in Europe, the following thesis gives an overview of current security problems after the Cold War. A chapter about the common United States - European belief system will create the basis on which the transatlantic link is examined from both perspectives, the European and the

⁹ see: U. Nerlich, *Deutschland als ungewöhnliches Land?*, in: *Politique Etrangère*, 1/95, S. 4.

¹⁰ Woodrow Wilson, address to the Congress, asking for a declaration of war, April 2, 1917.

¹¹ see: H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 26.

¹² see: H. Mey, *Die USA und Deutschland*, Studie des Institut für Strategische Analysen, Feb 1993, p. 13 and 15.

American. Internal problems on both sides are also taken into consideration to create a complete picture of the topical question. It would, however, overload this paper, if all facets were scrutinized. Thus as an overview, the main opinions and ideas of the actual political international discussions are mentioned. However, it is possible to develop logically a picture which leads to a future of 'modernized transatlantic links', which present the fundamental proposal of the author for the international security of the world in the future.

II. THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE - HISTORICAL SURVEY

If one can indeed learn from history is an ongoing academic discussion. Assumptions range from a linear development without any repetition and real unpredictability of what the future will bring, to a cyclic approach in which basic developments will repeat themselves (at least generally) and in which one can 'learn from history'. Modern technology, especially the development of chaos theory, shows that in a feedback system such as history minimal differences of the 'input' can produce extreme differences of the 'output'. From this standpoint history cannot be cyclical. Historical study, thus, should be more directed to train political and ethical judgment than to try to predict the future because the „signal characteristic of the successful strategist at all times is empathy“.¹³ Because „the effort of historical understanding cultivates qualities of tolerance, objectivity, and dispassionate judgment“,¹⁴ the next chapter gives especially a brief overview of the stationing of United States troops in Europe. Although this does not reflect a complete history of the transatlantic relations and allows only a limited perspective into the recent past, it is important to review this aspect because the stationing of troops in Europe represents the major hint for ongoing developments in the security realm.

After 1815 the Napoleonic threat to Europe disappeared, and a few years later European colonialism in the Americas came to an effective end. Isolationism became the American condition. Continental expansion and economic development were America's priorities, while a 'Pax Britannica' sheltered the continent.¹⁵ The young United States successfully kept its distance from Europe during the nineteenth century, although in their unification wars, especially against France, the Germans asked for American naval

¹³ see: D. Moran, History Lessons, in: The National Interest, Fall 1991, p. 83.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 86.

¹⁵ see: S.P. Huntington, America's changing strategic interests, in: Survival, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, Jan/Feb 1991, p. 4.

assistance.¹⁶ After the victory over Spain in 1898, the United States emerged as a minor colonial power and a major actor on the world scene. It replaced its small, dispersed Navy with a „massive battle fleet second to none, designed to win command of the seas in any conflict and thus make possible the projection of American power into Eurasia“.¹⁷ During the first three years of the first World War, from 1914 to 1917, Berlin and Washington clashed on three major issues: the question of Wilsonian peace meditation, the attempts of the German government to influence conditions inside the United States by a far-flung campaign of propaganda and sabotage, and the conduct of German submarine warfare.¹⁸ When the latter, against numerous warnings from the German ambassador in Washington, was extended to 'unlimited' submarine warfare, Wilson was persuaded to join the war on the side of the Entente. „Ironically, it was therefore the issue of the freedom of the seas, agreed upon in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Frederick the Great's Prussia in 1785, that became one of the major reasons for America's declaration of war against Germany“.¹⁹ The United States went 'abroad' to Europe to fight for the idea of freedom, democracy, and the rule of the law. Woodrow Wilson's missionary ideas made John Quincy Adams' address invalid:²⁰

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.

¹⁶ see: F. Trommler, J. Mc Veigh, *America and the Germans*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1985, p. 5.

¹⁷ Huntington, p. 4.
Although this may have been claimed, there is no real question of British superiority before 1922.

¹⁸ see: Trommler/Veigh, p. 8.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, address on July 4, 1821, in: Walter LaFeber, ed., *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire*, Times Books, Chicago, 1965, cited in H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 35.

The United States entered the war in its own national interest, disdaining the concept of the balance of power and considering the practice of Realpolitik immoral. Wilson's idealistic vision of a 'community of power' implied democracy, collective security, and self-determination.²¹ The proposal was a world order in which resistance to aggression would be based on moral rather than geopolitical judgments. Though America's allies had little faith in this new dispensation, they felt too weak to challenge it. What they did, however, was to ensure that adjustments were made, in order to keep Germany down and to prevent a further increase of German power, and thus they countered the prevailing principle of self-determination.

France's attempts to create an independent Rhineland, a „strong movement for the annexation of the Saar coal district and even the whole west bank of the Rhine underlined this approach“.²² As far as the Rhineland was concerned, the allies at last agreed on a demilitarized zone on the right bank as a provisional reparations guarantee. Another problem was that American people were neither ready for a military commitment in defense of the Treaty of Versailles, nor to accept the role of global police force. Thus, even the American occupation force in Germany was hotly debated. Arguments for a quick withdrawal were that the occupation would seriously weaken home defenses, that the small force requested by Wilson (less than a division) would be of no moral or physical value in the Rhineland, and that American soldiers in Europe desired almost universally to return home.²³

The Rhineland Agreement finally approved the occupation and the German reparation payments. The Treaty of Versailles ended the war officially. Nevertheless, the discussions about the troop contribution went on until the United States finally failed to ratify the Treaty. In this situation it was evident that the United States either must come into Europe 'with both feet' or pull out before a probable clash with France. Pierrepont Noyes described the situation as follows:

²¹ see: Ibid., p. 221.

²² see: K.L. Nelson, *Victors divided*, University of California Press, 1975, p. 72.

²³ Ibid. p. 96.

As things stand, the American occupation has become, at best, a needless financial burden to Germany and an irrelevant factor in the securing of reparations. At the worst, it has become a cover for French activities aimed at separating the left bank of the Rhine or at seizing the Ruhr.²⁴

The German attitude towards the United States troops was friendly. Faith in the possibility of political and economic assistance was substantial, and this optimism helped to give an almost favorable view of the American occupation. In the United States this was seen from another perspective. In a presidential election which Wilson himself considered a 'solemn referendum on the treaty' the American people gave the majority vote to Warren G. Harding, who had repudiated the Wilson interpretation of international collaboration. For him it was not the duty of the United States to attempt „to purge the Old World of the accumulated ills of rivalry and greed“. ²⁵ In 1921 the United States signed a separate peace with Germany. The continued existence of the occupation, however, was supported especially by two developments. The first was the economic recession of the early 1920s, which brought businessmen and farmers a renewed appreciation of European markets and a willingness to stabilize them. The second development was the growth of public pride in the endeavor, even among pronounced isolationists. This pride is demonstrated by the President's remark in 1921 „that he feared, there would be a bad mess all the time in Europe if it were not for the mollifying and harmonizing influences which are wielded by spokesmen for this Republic“. ²⁶

American exclusion from the distribution of funds by France and Great Britain ignited the discussion again. It distilled the question to its most basic form: Was the American occupation in Germany worth preserving if only for the sake of peace in Europe? The year 1923 brought lastly the final stage, resulting in France seizing the Ruhrgebiet to enforce reparations payments, after the United States withdrew from the Rhineland in January. The result was that America was again isolationist. France would

²⁴ Ibid. p. 138.

²⁵ C.+M. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, Macmillan, New York, 1927-42, Vol. II, p. 674, cited in: J.B. Whitton, *The Second Chance*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1944, p. 11.

²⁶ K. Nelson, *Victors Divided*, p. 189.

now have to play policemen all over Europe to preserve peace. Had America in the 1920s intervened with a 'Marshall plan', Europe's development might have been more peaceful. Great Britain, however would have been forced to hand over its claim to political leadership in the 'Old World' to the United States. The first phase of American intervention in Europe thus failed. By the early 1930s, even Wilsonians abandoned the League of Nations as a lost cause.²⁷ Isolationism led to renew the 'Fortress America' which, in effect, put American foreign policy in a straitjacket during the critical years before and during the Second World War.

The debate between interventionists and isolationists during the first years of the Second World War was fierce. Only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 settled that debate. For the first time in modern history it became obvious that American territory was not an unreachable sanctuary. However, America entered the war not only to retaliate against the attack and to prevent German hegemony in Europe. Faced with the challenges above, President Roosevelt supplemented Wilson's liberal globalism by a military globalism.

The peculiar dialectic in American world power politics - the global definition of one's own national interests in connection with the enemy's claimed bid for world domination - is not a phenomenon of the post-1945 era but can clearly be discerned in the period between 1937 and 1941.²⁸

For President Roosevelt the task was to combine the United States national interests with its obligations to a civilization of which America is part, against an immoral and anti-Western Nazi government.²⁹ That meant, however, that the critical task was also to commit the United States to postwar international structures before peace could return the nation to its old habits. Above all, Roosevelt saw the United Nations (UN) as „the only device that could keep the United States from slipping back into isolationism“.³⁰ Active

²⁷ see: A. Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 3.

²⁸ F. Trommler, J. Veigh, America and the Germans, p. 42.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁰ A. Schlesinger, Back to the Womb?, p. 4.

membership in the United Nations was underlined by a moral argument: „We cannot“, as Secretary Hull had pointed out, „move in and out of international cooperation, and in and out of participation in the responsibilities of a member of the family of nations, without paying the cost of such a policy“.³¹ Nevertheless, after the war America 'brought the boys home' at a breathtaking speed. Nearly ninety percent were withdrawn by March 1946.³² Yet, there were three reasons which justified the presence of American forces in Europe: the fear of the Soviet threat, the necessity to make France accept the rearmament of Germany, and the hope that Western Europe finally would develop politically, economically and militarily, so as to be able to care for itself.

It was clearly seen that, if avoidance of war is the test of its validity, isolationism has been completely ineffective. America had fought in both world wars. Furthermore, might not the necessary armaments for an 'armed isolationism' „doom the American people to a permanent war economy which could not fail to jeopardize social progress in this [American] country“.³³ And last but not least, would an Anglo-American alliance, as an alternative to American international leadership, result in the formation of rival blocs and alliances, so that the world would be involved once more in the kind of political, economic and military competition which had so often produced major wars.³⁴

Whether, in retrospect, the stationing of American troops on European soil has to be seen in the context of 'pacifying Europe', 'carrying through America's great power politics', or whether Europe was the United States' 'empire by invitation' ³⁵ has to be discussed. It is a fact that within a few years, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and other security pacts led to a troop deployment that bound the United States to

³¹ G.A. Craig, *American Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, in: J.B. Whitton, *The Second Chance*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1944, p. 25.

³² see: W. Fechner, *Abzug, aber kein Abschied*, in: *Europäische Wehrkunde*, WWR 11/90, p. 640.

³³ G.A. Craig, *American Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, p. 24.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 28.

³⁵ see: W. Krieger, *Die Ursprünge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europa, 1945-1951*, in: *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Arbeitspapier*, Mai 1988, p. 9.

the outside world in a way „isolationists, in their most pessimistic moments, could hardly have envisaged“.³⁶ Although America did not have the intention to engage extensively and indefinitely,³⁷ this was clearly not possible from the very beginning. The scale and capability of Soviet forces made close cooperation with West European democracies, and forward deployment on a more than symbolic scale necessary. Strategic plans to defend Europe in forward positions,³⁸ and to conduct logistical support, were developed quickly.

The essential change in American policy towards the West was established after Secretary of State Byrnes declared in September 1946 that United States' occupation forces would stay in Germany unless other occupation forces would leave it,³⁹ and after America demonstrated military engagement in Europe during the Berlin Crisis, which exceeded the 'normal' occupation tasks. Containment was no longer a goal, but an openly declared policy. The announcement of the Marshall Plan and the positive economic development in Germany established that German economic recovery would count in American eyes as a positive step towards national rehabilitation. „Germany was entrusted with a positive mission of production. In its wake would come the country's recovery of sovereignty“.⁴⁰ Thus, for postwar Germany, the influence of the United States obviously became fundamental, as military protector, economic investor, and ideological model.

³⁶ see: A. Schlesinger, *Back to the Womb?*, p. 5.

³⁷ see: W. Krieger, *Die Ursprünge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europa, 1945-1951*, p. 12.

³⁸ The assessment whether Europe could be defended only from a line 'behind the Pyrenees and from the British Islands', from a bridgehead in the Benelux countries, at the Rhine, or on German territory changed over the years and was reflected in the formulation of the NATO strategies. Especially Germany had, of course, in all the years since the Second World War urged that its territory should not be abandoned without defense efforts. Also the French President Auriol declared in 1948 that „war with Soviet Russia would mean civil war in France, since the Communist Party would rise in conjunction with the enemy. Moreover, war with Russia would be even worse than with Germany and might involve the destruction of the whole elite of the Nation, so that after two years nothing valuable might be left.“ (cited in: W. Krieger, *Die Ursprünge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europa, 1945-1951*, p. 36).

³⁹ see: *Documents on Germany 1944-1985*, ed: Department of State, Washington DC 1985, pp. 91-99.

⁴⁰ F. Trommler, J. Mc Veigh, *America and the Germans*, p. 67.

Each of these roles made possible the other two. This was, not at least, the reason why the Cold War quickly led to integration, first of the three Western zones and later of the Federal Republic into the Western economic and military alliance system. This meant, however, also a German rearmament, which was heavily discussed internally in Germany, and between the United States, Great Britain and France. The fears of a new German militarism and nationalism were strong, and only the theory of a 'double containment' (the containment of the Soviet Union at arm's length, and of Germany 'with an embrace') as well as German military self-restraint, could push the pendulum towards a German integration. The West German army was the prerequisite for the American forward deployment. It contributed to a burdensharing that enabled America to limit its contribution and fulfill various tasks in its worldwide containment of Communism. However, until the outbreak of the Korean War, the increase in European defense capabilities made only little progress while the United States concentrated on the consolidation of its nuclear arsenal. Until the late '60s, a maximal number of roughly seven-thousand American nuclear warheads were stationed in Europe. Due to various alliance decisions, the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and NATO's decisions of 1991⁴¹, the number decreased thereafter.

The Korean War clearly demonstrated to parts of the American population that the forward stationing of American troops in Europe was not a favor but in their own national interest. Thus, despite efforts in Congress from time to time to reduce the American military commitment to NATO, every president since Truman opposed the idea, until the Soviet Union began to dissolve. Nevertheless, burden sharing was permanently discussed. First, there was a widespread disagreement among the allies on the nature of the 'burden' to be shared as well as over the best means of sustaining order and security.

⁴¹ NATO's NPG approved a substantial reduction in the sole type of U.S. weapons to remain in Europe: gravity bombs for delivery by U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft, with approximately 700 to be retained.

President Bush had decided to eliminate all U.S. nuclear artillery shells and warheads for short-range ballistic missiles and to withdraw all nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines as well as nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft.

see: D. Yost, U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, slides used during the course NS 3720, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, Autumn 1995.

If our allies cannot be made to appreciate either the extent to which 'out-of-area' issues impinge upon American regional security or the nature of Soviet involvement in Third World conflict, the United States will find it necessary to develop unilaterally a force posture appropriate to its national security needs and priorities.⁴²

Thus, it was not astonishing that between 1966 and 1974 Senator Mansfield, under the influence of the Vietnam experience, brought in the 'Mansfield Resolutions' to reduce the United States' overseas engagement by half. The offset agreements (Devisenausgleichsabkommen) with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS) of 1982 helped to avoid such reductions.⁴³ During the late 1980s, the American House of Representatives revitalized the topic. The Defense Burdensharing Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, under the lead of Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, published a report in 1988 in which the forward stationing of American troops was seen as a further cornerstone of the United States' Military Strategy. It was also asked, however, the European allies, in the long run, should prepare to defend European territory without massive American support, because 'this engagement could not be guaranteed forever'.⁴⁴ Beneath the official reason, the American aim was to increase European conventional defense capabilities, so that the European allies could contribute 'their fair share'⁴⁵ and to heighten the nuclear threshold in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. However, the European NATO members saw their security interests best maintained by the threat to use nuclear weapons in the early stages of a

⁴² J.K. Davis, U.S. global Strategy and Alliance Relationships, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 96. Especially, this statement has to be seen in the context of the Reagan years.

⁴³ The WHNS agreement was completed as a result of the Stoessel Demarche which demanded increased logistical support, participation at the stationing costs of U.S. troops. (For further details see: OTL Rieck, Lastenteilung (Burdensharing) im Bündnis, Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 7.11.88, aktualisierte Fassung, Jan. 1989, p. 7.

⁴⁴ OTL Rieck, Lastenteilung (Burdensharing im Bündnis), p. 9.

⁴⁵ see: W.R. Van Cleave, The Military Sinews of a Global Strategy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, p. 170.

conventional war and were, thus, not eager to increase their conventional share, especially due to the fear of American disengagement from Europe.⁴⁶

On 19 November 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed by the leaders of the then twenty-two governments from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This treaty induced the collective and individual reduction, limitation and restriction of conventional weapons in Europe.⁴⁷ In the framework of the treaty the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to have no more than 195,000 troops stationed in Europe. The further détente, the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Pact, and NATO's new cooperative structures with the East⁴⁸ made it possible that, beginning in 1996, the force levels of present American troops in Europe would fall to about 100,000. Although this means that two of three United States military installations in Europe will be closed, the presence of North American conventional and United States nuclear forces in Europe will remain vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America.⁴⁹

„Forward deployed U.S. forces in Europe underpin our [America's] commitments to NATO, support the U.S. role in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide response capability“,⁵⁰ while at the same time the United States places greater reliance on their European allies to take increased responsibility for meeting collective regional defense requirements.⁵¹ This does not mean that in the long run American troops will be unnecessary or that other NATO countries will pay roughly seventy-five percent of the American stationing costs, as demanded by the House of

⁴⁶ see: W.F. Hanrieder, *German-American Relations in the Postwar Decades*, in: F. Trommler, J. Mc Veigh, *America and the Germans*, p. 112 and 114.

⁴⁷ for details see: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *White Paper 1994*, p. 71.

⁴⁸ especially the establishment of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP).

⁴⁹ see: *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Rome 1991.

⁵⁰ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, June 1995, p. 29.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 31.

Representatives in 1994,⁵² or seventy-five percent of the nonsalaried cost of United States troops in Europe after a transitional period of four years, as demanded in 1995.⁵³ Yet, beneath the American advantages of having an 'allied' forward stationing area for worldwide deployments and a reliable security partner, the necessity for an American contribution is clearly seen also by the Europeans. A European Union with a common foreign and security policy and the means to establish a credible European force, will take still some years, if not decades. For fifty years Americans have contributed to freedom and peace in Western Europe. Europeans should be thankful.

America gave its hand when it's mattered most. We will never forget: John F. Kennedy's „Ich bin ein Berliner !“, Ronald Reagan's „Reißt diese Mauer nieder !“, [and] President Clinton's „Wir werden immer an Eurer Seite stehen !“.⁵⁴

⁵² see: O. Mager, *Alter Kontinent wichtig*, in: *Information für die Truppe*, 10/94, p. 55.

⁵³ see: Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Amendment offered by Mr. Shays, June 14 1995, pp. H5955-H5962.
See additionally, Congressional Record, Senate, Amendment offered by Mr. Harkin, Aug 4 1995, pp. S11403-S11470.

⁵⁴ K. Kinkel, speech at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Apr 19 1995, p. 4.
The 1994 Frank Amendment called for reducing authorized end strength for NATO Europe unless host nations paid 75 percent of nonpersonnel costs (on the model of the agreement with Tokyo). Without a compliance of the NATO allies, America would cut strength to 25,000 personnel in Europe. For further details see: D.S. Yost, *The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence*, in: *JFQ*, Summer 1995, p. 74.

III. THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Between 1989 and 1991 a tectonic shift in world politics led to the abandonment of long standing assumptions about security relationships. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the demise of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the dismantling of the military confrontation in Europe occurred with a rapidity and decisiveness that was wholly unexpected. Not surprisingly, therefore, the emphasis has been on the geopolitical changes that took place.⁵⁵ Significant as these changes have been, they had enormous impacts not only on the view of a changing world, but also on the paradigmatic views of states themselves. While the identification, as the adversary of the Communist threat, as the major guarantor of peace, freedom and stability of the Western world, and the 'owner' of the mission of democracy and free markets, was no longer self-explanatory, America slid into an identity crisis. Economical frustrations and political doubts about the framework of American policy contributed to an overall assessment that America's troubles were overwhelming and had to be solved soon. The German-American philosopher Hans Jonas explained that the responsibility of the present generation is far greater than that of former ones.⁵⁶ The decisions of the present generation will determine whether life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness can be further extended. However, with the West no longer mobilized on the front lines of a grand ideological crusade, it seems to be only logical that nations turn inward to solve domestic problems, many of which were neglected during the Cold War. This „places the United States in the same position it faced after the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and World War I. Suddenly,

⁵⁵ see: M. Brenner, W.F. Schlör, P. Williams, German and American Foreign and Security Policies: Strategic Convergence or Divergence?, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studien, Nr. 98/1994, Dec 1994, p. 9.

⁵⁶ see: H.D. Genscher, Speech at the Georgetown University, May 26 1990, in: W. Weidenfeld, Partnerschaft im Wandel, Tätigkeitsbericht des Koordinators für die deutsch-amerikanische zwischengesellschaftliche, kultur- und informationspolitische Zusammenarbeit, Auswärtiges Amt Bonn, 1991, p. 78.

the country has no serious enemies and faces no military threat from abroad. In similar situations in the past, American unity has waned“.⁵⁷

The danger is clear: A paradigm shift towards isolationism and a concentration as far as possible on domestic politics only, or will challenge not only the outside world, but also the United States' national security itself. European states, at the same time, do not contribute much to the 'old' community. While Germany is concentrating on its unification, France seeks to regain its world power status, and Great Britain practices its 'muddling through' policy. In responding to new problems under new circumstances, national governments will almost certainly have to create far more effective patterns of collaboration.

However, to be a partner is not enough. Common learning and problem solving make it necessary that all parties have the same fundamental belief system, equal political and moral concepts, and, if possible, the same historical roots. Only these societies can be a reference to each other. Thus Europe and America are 'natural' partners.⁵⁸ Christianity and Enlightenment have produced a mix of culture and civilization, from which the models of Western society are derived.⁵⁹ Especially for America, it appears to be a characteristic that the nation „cannot be effective in its military and foreign policy unless it believes that both its security interests and its commitment to certain moral principles require the nation to act“.⁶⁰ This provides the basis on which interests and responsibilities of the individual can be brought together to develop a 'responsible society'.⁶¹ A legal constitution cannot present the only link for society. Because many decisions have emotional elements, there must be an emotional link. This link is essentially created by communal spirit, common

⁵⁷ B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 37.

⁵⁸ see: K. Kinkel, German-American Friendship - The Transatlantic Agenda 2000, speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Apr 19 1995, in: German Information Center, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, p. 2.

⁵⁹ see: G. Diehl, Die Deutschen Interessen, in: Politische Meinung, Sep 1994, p. 4.

⁶⁰ R.W. Tucker, Nation or Empire? The Debate over American Foreign Policy, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1968, p. 16.

⁶¹ see: C. Böhr, Aufbruch zur Verantwortungsgesellschaft, in: Die Welt, Apr 19 1995.

history, values, and ethnic identity.⁶² Thus, the American-European community is a mean to create the stability and freedom for the Western world.

However, „American nationality and the national feeling associated with it were from the beginning linked not to national origin, religion, or even language, but to abstract ideals of liberty, human rights, representative government, and the equality of all human beings“.⁶³ The point of America was not to preserve old cultures, but to forge a new American culture. Lincoln was never a hero only for those of English ancestry, Jackson never only for Scotch-Irish, and Douglass never only for blacks. Thus, it can be questioned whether American 'Eurocentrism' has a legitimacy. For example, American leaders rejected the European idea that the morality of states should be judged by different criteria than the morality of individuals. According to Jefferson, there existed:

... but one system of ethics for men and for nations - to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements under all circumstances, to be open and generous, promoting in the long run even the interests of both.⁶⁴

The division between the United States and Europe can easily be seen in the fact that America, until the turn of the twentieth century, favored democratic governments wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. The Monroe Doctrine went the next step by declaring that Europe must not become entangled in American affairs.⁶⁵ Even America's entry into the First World War was for goals which bore little relation to the world order Europe had known for some three centuries and for which it had presumably entered the war.

⁶² see: W. Schäuble, Das Nationale als Mittel zum europäischen Zweck, Interview in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec 28 1994.

⁶³ B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, p. 37.

⁶⁴ in: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 32.

⁶⁵ see: H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 35.

America disdained the concept of the balance of power and considered the practice of Realpolitik immoral. America's criteria for international order were democracy, collective security, and self-determination - none of which had undergirded any previous European settlement. ... Proclaiming a radical departure from the precepts and experiences of the Old World, Wilson's idea of world order derived from America's faith in the essentially peaceful nature of man and an underlying harmony of the world. ... European leaders had no categories of thought to encompass such views.⁶⁶

There are also demographic reasons. Until the 1950s more than two thirds of all immigrants to America were from Europe or Canada; in the 1980s this percentage had decreased to less than thirteen percent.⁶⁷

Yet, the dominant American ideals, characterized not only by a passion for individual, liberty but also by a profound belief in an eternal and unchanging moral law, and by a sense of national mission as a beacon light of freedom among the nations of the earth, are deeply rooted in the Hebraic-Christian and the Greco-Roman traditions, which have shaped the whole Western civilization.⁶⁸ After a great wave of change in Western moral thought evolved with Christianity during the Dark Ages and medieval times, modern ethics were developed. Beneath preparing men and women for heaven, morality had two important secular purposes: First, to fit everyone to some degree within society by defining standards of behavior, and second, to bring structure, dignity, and meaning to peoples' lives.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the paradigm change wrought by the Protestant Reformation redefined Western Civilization. The values of individualism, secularism, patriotism, capitalism, and rationalism in turn produced the Enlightenment, of which the United States of America is a product. Throughout its history these five values have defined the national interests of the United States, which has defended them with a

⁶⁶ Ibid. , p. 221-222.

⁶⁷ see: M. Reinhold, USA und Deutschland im Einigungsprozess und nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, in: Rissener Rundbrief, Hamburg, 4-5/1995, p. 137.

⁶⁸ see: G.F. Thomas, American Ideals and the Peace, in: J.B. Whitton, The Second Chance, Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 199.

⁶⁹ see: T. Hauser, F. Macchiarola, Confronting America's Moral Crisis, Hastings House Book Publishers, New York, 1995, p. 15-16.

combination of active and structural means. „The American creed had its antecedents, and these antecedents lay primarily in a British inheritance as recast by a century and a half of colonial experience“.⁷⁰ Although today more and more Asian-Confucianist, Buddhist, and Islamic acts are being played on it, the stage is still European-Christian.⁷¹ Some people may regret that white male Protestants have played so large a role in shaping United States' culture, and that nearly eighty percent of Americans are of European descent; but one cannot erase history. Even European crimes, Hitlerism and Stalinism, cannot alter the fact that Europe was the birthplace of the United States.

When in 1783 the American war of independence ended, America had found its identity. Jefferson's famous Declaration of Independence of 1776 not only strengthened America in its war against Great Britain, it was also a model for many European political and constitutional ideas. Obviously, Jefferson's inalienable rights still have a great attraction today.⁷² The European-American community therefore is not, and has never been, a one-way street. The constitutional principles on which the United States are founded have shown a remarkable ability to work their way into many states and cultures, some vastly different from their own.

Because America and Europe share the same cultural traditions and have the same historical roots, common values can serve as a basis for a new common identity, for example for a political partnership. The Europeans know that America's participation in the European processes is already part of the European security culture. The Americans for their part must develop an understanding of the steady progress in European political integration and unification.⁷³ Experience both within and outside Europe shows that democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule

⁷⁰ A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, Norton & Company, New York, 1993, p. 27.

⁷¹ W. Weidenfeld, Speech in Munich, Oct 11 1991, in: W. Weidenfeld, *Partnerschaft im Wandel*, 1990/91, p. 105.

⁷² see: J.D. Bindenagel, *Amerikanische Außenpolitik - Grundlagen und Perspektiven*, speech at the University of Bonn, May 17 1995, in: U.S. Information Service, *Amerika Dienst*, May 24 1995, p. 19.

⁷³ see: V. Rühle, *Europe and America - the Future of the Transatlantic Community*, speech at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, May 3 1994, p. 15.

of law are among the best guarantees of peaceful, predictable and cooperative behavior between states. This was the provision of the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement in 1975. „As it turned out, reformers in Eastern Europe used basket III as a rallying point in their fights to free their countries from Soviet domination“.⁷⁴

In recent years, the Atlantic Community has often been seen as a common destiny, based on several pillars. Among these are especially democracy, market economy and free trade, security and defense, and the common cultural heritage.⁷⁵ The latter pillar does not mean that tolerance and openness against other cultures are excluded. Respect for individual differences is crucial to prevent further tragedies, like the former Yugoslavia. However, there is a striking contrast between Western norms and the reality of profound disagreement among nations and regimes, particularly those from the Islamic, Confucian, and Hindu worlds.⁷⁶ Consider the different reactions to the case of Salman Rushdie: what the West saw as an intolerable attack on individual freedom the Middle East saw as a proper punishment for an evildoer who had violated the mores of his group. Individualism itself is looked on with abhorrence and dread by collectivist cultures, in which loyalty to the group overrides personal goals. „The Western commitment to human rights has unquestionably been intermittent and imperfect. Yet the ideal remains - and movement toward it has been real, if sporadic“.⁷⁷

The United States - European community has a good chance to build a system of mutual understanding, problem solving, and economical development, based on common values, which can be the blueprint for other societies and for international cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary that both remember their common belief system and put it in the foreground of their policies. This requires courage to stick to moral goals, and to be

⁷⁴ see: H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 759.

⁷⁵ see: M. Rifkind, *Die Notwendigkeit einer Atlantischen Gemeinschaft als eines deutlicheren Ausdrucks der engen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten*, in: NATO Brief, Nr. 2, März/April 1995, p. 12.

⁷⁶ see: D.C. Hendrickson, *The Recovery of Internationalism*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct 1994, p. 32.

⁷⁷ A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, p. 129.

reference and partner to each other. The task is to combine due appreciation for the diversity of nations and societies with due emphasis on the great unifying Western ideas of individual freedom, political democracy, and human rights.⁷⁸ In these times, values matter most.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 138.

IV. SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

After the Cold War the West is confronted with different, and highly demanding, challenges. 'Victory over Communism' and reduced physical threats, as the last chapter has shown, does not mean that Western ideals and values are of lesser meaning.⁷⁹ Since the world is developing much faster than a decade ago, it is necessary to care about old and new risks and new sources of conflict. One must realize two facts: First, that man is ambivalent and equally capable of peace and conflict (the fundamental Christian view of man); and second, in many parts of the world, violence and war are regarded as normal and acceptable means of conducting policy. The risks emanate mainly from the tremendous restructuring process that is now going on in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is a fragile state still looking for its identity, and the outcome of developments there is most uncertain. Only some of these problems can be countered with military capabilities. Most of them must be met with political means. In general, only a comprehensive view of all political, social, economic, ecological, and military aspects can give suitable means to maintain or restore stability and security. It is also necessary to develop an ability to deal with the causes of tension and conflict before they turn into military hostilities. Conflict prevention and crisis management must be given first priority in the security planning. The employment of military force is justified only as a means of last resort. However, a credible defense capability will continue to be the basis of Western security and the main task of Western Armed Forces in the future.

Today 'instabilities' are the dominant structures of rising conflicts. These instabilities derive from the changes that have appeared in the post-Cold War security environment and are still going on in the international system. They can be generally grouped under three main headings.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ see: W.J. Crowe, Jr., *Eine neue Sicherheitsarchitektur für Europa*, speech at the European-Atlantic Group, London, May 24 1995, p. 2.

⁸⁰ for further details see: S.P. Huntington, *America's changing strategic interests*, in: *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, no. 1, Jan/Feb 1991, p. 5.

First, there are systematic changes in the structures of domestic and international politics, like the emergence of a truly global economy, the declining importance and power of the nation state, and the intensification of national and ethnic identities. These systematic changes have shifted the relevance and usefulness of different power resources, with military power declining and economic power increasing in importance.

Second, changes occur in the distribution of power in the international system. The relative economic decline of America versus Japan, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the consolidation of its position as the pre-eminent power in an emerging European Union, and the rise of locally dominant powers in many Third World Regions, are such changes. The world is changing from a loose bipolar system to a multipolar system with one (increasingly ambivalent) superpower left, a system perhaps best described as 'uni-multipolar'.

Finally, there are changes in the relations among countries. It is no longer possible to characterize all nations as 'allies', 'antagonists', or 'neutrals'. Future international relations will be more volatile, with ad hoc coalitions on particular issues probably more important than permanent alliances.

„All in all, the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities“.⁸¹ This fact leads not only to the difficulty of how to prepare one's own country for further challenges and how to preserve national security. It is also difficult to define partnerships, alliances, and coalitions, if they exceed a single objective. A new transatlantic partnership thus has to be built on difficult ground. History suggests that multipolar systems have tended to become Hobbesian, with the 'military' trump-card to be used for vital interests. So the world, and especially the American-European West is at a crossroads. Whether a 'Balance of Power System', or a 'Multipolar System', or something else will evolve, is still unclear. However, this future system is determined by today's actions! When at the turn of the decade President Bush thought of a 'new world order' he was right. What he was not able to foresee at that time was that

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 7.

this order could not be 'created' but had to be 'developed'. Our time now is determined by 'Evolution' rather than 'Revolution'. Why do political changes make so painfully slow progress? Because, beneath rational reasons, man is guided by particular short range self interests, personal needs, feelings and sentiments. However, ideas and convictions are not put into reality by themselves. Those who formulate political goals without giving the prerequisites for their realization do not change the current situation but create frustration. Thus, it is important that political initiatives are combined with the desires of the people so they become 'common' initiatives. This takes away the common and general fear of change.⁸²

A. MULTIDIMENSIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Security after the Cold War cannot be discussed without reference to the former Soviet Union and its successor states, especially Russia. Although Russia has still an enormous military potential, it has little functioning infrastructure, no prerequisites for the market economy, and nearly no experience in democracy. This instability potential has to be considered as one of the most dangerous for the current world situation. Thus, it will be further described in a chapter of its own.⁸³

The new challenges one faces after the dissolution of the East-West antagonism are multidimensional. Their spectrum ranges from domestic, social, ethnic, religious, ecological, military, and economic crises to interstate rivalries. When German foreign minister Kinkel in April 1995 underlined that a shift of emphasis from political to economical questions is happening, he accommodated German diplomats to an altered situation of 'economic precedence'.⁸⁴ This leads to the assumption that military means, for

⁸² see: B. Könitzer, Wir müssen der Menschheit die Angst vor Reformen nehmen, in: Die Welt, Sep 8 1995.

⁸³ see: chapter 4.2.

⁸⁴ see: Deutsche Presseagentur, Kinkel: Außenpolitik künftig verstärkt unter Wirtschaftsaspekt, Apr 1 1995.

example, might be part of an economic mission or, at best in the long run, the marketplace will replace the battlefield. Beside the question whether military means support economic goals, the above example points out that „security is indivisible and that security of each ... country is inextricably linked to the security of all states“.⁸⁵ Also security in one area is linked to all others. 'National security' is determined by a lot of risk factors of different nature. To investigate all these factors and to propose solutions would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the primary dangers for the Euro-Atlantic security can be summarized as follows:

It is first a division of the world along different lines. These lines endanger a 'world community'. First, the world is dividing into 'Market Democracies', 'Transitional States', and 'Troubled States'.⁸⁶ While the Market Democracies comprise a growing community of free and prosperous - or at least rapidly developing - nations, Transitional States, working towards democracy and free markets, still risk sliding back into political chaos and economic decline; the Troubled States are plagued with ethnic and religious extremism and are often slipping into anarchy, threatening to become rogue states. Added to this prosperity gap are demographic, economic, and ecological developments of global significance.⁸⁷ These elements in addition to weak political parties, a leaden bureaucracy that discourages foreign investment, no functioning military or police, may lead to an „anarchic implosion of criminal violence, ... to Yugoslavia-like countries without mini states to replace the whole.⁸⁸ Thus, a two-track division of the world is in sight. While 'zones of turmoil' are defined by degenerating nation states with legitimization deficits, the growth of fundamentalist and religious movements, ethnological conflicts, and enormous environmental problems,⁸⁹ 'zones of peace', defined by wealth and democracy can extend

⁸⁵ Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, Paris, Nov 19 1990, cited in: A.D. Rotfeld, W. Stützle, Germany and Europe in Transition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 217.

⁸⁶ see: H. Binnendijk, P. Clawson, New Strategic Priorities, based on: survey of the National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1995, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1995.

⁸⁷ see: German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, p. 30.

⁸⁸ R.D. Kaplan, The coming Anarchy, in: The Atlantic Monthly, Feb 1994, p. 49.

themselves, if they are free of political pressure like the East-West confrontation. They can be seen as an attraction point. Though these 'zones of peace' cannot prevent „zones of turmoil and development from having coups and revolutions, civil and international wars, and international massacres and bloody repressions“, ⁹⁰ it is often argued that nothing can threaten them because they are economically and militarily powerful. Furthermore, they do not go to war with each other because it brings no gain for them. The destruction of a war causes such damage, even to their own country, that even a great victory could not balance the costs. However, the interdependence of the world will not allow the 'zones of peace' to stay untouched by the outside world.

First, no economic bloc, as for example the North American Free Trade Agreement, is autark in itself. The dependencies on raw materials and energy sources which are mostly found outside the 'safe' world areas and the need for markets and secure sea lines of communications obviously make clear that real dividing lines do not exist. Blocs not only can contribute to reducing global trade barriers and improving world political cooperation, they must do so, to survive and to prevent the danger of tensions, possibly escalating into conflict.

Second, information technology makes it impossible to be isolationist.⁹¹ The extension of this trend does not only suggest that 'information-based' warfare will become more widespread, but also 'information warfare' itself. Industrial and technological espionage cannot be stopped by state borders.

Third, a source of new crises is the re-emerging of nationalism in some areas of the world. Instabilities in Russia, other parts of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the European neighbor regions of the Mediterranean and the Middle East give reason for concern. Poverty, having no life perspective and inhuman living conditions,

⁸⁹ Kaplan describes 'the environment' as the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. See: R.D. Kaplan, *The coming Anarchy*, p. 58.

⁹⁰ M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, *The Real World Order*, Chatham House Publishers, Inc., Chatham, New Jersey, 1993, p. 7.

⁹¹ The modern missile and aircraft technology supports the argument that isolationism is no longer possible.

extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terror, and a proliferation of new states, many with disputed borders, as well as reemerging national minorities claiming autonomy or independence, with ethnic cleansing as a result, create uncontrollable and unlimited migration. If there is nothing to lose, why not search for a new home in the West, where even the lowest living standard is better than your present one... From Africa, for example, because of its geographical neighborhood, the migration wave would spill over into Europe. Political, economical and probably military conflicts could be the result, when especially today's moderating states of Africa, like Saudi-Arabia, Marokko, Algeria, and Egypt or of the Middle East, like Iran which tries to establish its role as a regional great power⁹², would increase their weapon arsenal because of now smoldering rivalries, subversive activities and religious indoctrination, further drug trafficking, and resource as well as water problems.⁹³ For African nations it will be impossible to tackle such situations alone. The Western World would have to intervene, whether on humanitarian reasons or because of pure Realpolitik. Especially European interests, thus, should therefore lie in creating a stable peace order not only 'in' Europe but 'for' Europe. A trend towards a policy concentrating on internal matters only, or the decision to spend money and efforts exclusively in the former Soviet Union, would in the long run probably make the situation even worse than today and further the overall dangerous environment.⁹⁴

Finally, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means a threat to international peace and security. Despite many efforts, the establishment of NATO's Senior Group and Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the same time, priorities to continue to strengthen

⁹² see: M. Zepperitz, Lagebeurteilung aus deutscher Sicht, in: Europäische Sicherheit, 1/95, p. 28.

⁹³ for a detailed description of the North-African scenario see: IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik, Nordafrika auf dem Wege zum radikalen Islamismus? - Bedeutung für die NATO-Mitglieder, Bonn, IAP 3/95, p. 8-9.

⁹⁴ see: E.H. Tilford, Jr., World View: The 1995 Strategic Assessment, Strategic Studies Institut, U.S. Army War College, Feb 10 1995, p. 29.

export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the Australian Group and the Zaggar Committee, the danger of the spread of weapons and technology is still not averted. Especially for the Islamic world, the ownership of nuclear weapons is a question of great psychological significance. All too often the idea that every important religion has its own nuclear arsenal can be found.⁹⁵ The pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is imagined, will give Islamism social-political equality. The general question is, whether the 'new nuclear danger', as former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin put it, is really one of the most relevant threats to Western security, or whether those threats to European and American territory and Armed Forces in 'Out-of-Area Missions' are overestimated.⁹⁶ Whatever the assessment will be, to be threatened by these weapons has a great psychological impact.

The use of nuclear weapons is more likely than ever: fanatics are unafraid of dying, drug cartels have no territory to defend. The classical principles of nuclear deterrence, which presuppose a fear of reprisals, no longer hold good in the case of such people. Making a rudimentary nuclear weapon is now within the reach of a group which has a few hundred million dollars. A massive missile attack against Europe becomes more possible when in the year 2000 more than nine countries of the Third World own ballistic missiles with a range of more than three-thousand kilometers, as Western Secret Services have estimated.⁹⁷ It is quite obvious that proliferation is one of the most important reason why isolationism and probably unilateralism, seen from a security standpoint, is no longer possible.

Today nearly every region of the world is transforming: the East from Communism and planned economy to (hopefully) democracy and market economy, the West from the

⁹⁵ The Islamic historian Mohammed Yacine points out that for the Christians, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and South Africa own these weapons, for the Jews it is Israel, for Hinduism it is India, for Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism these states are China and India. For further details see: C. Range, Die nordafrikanische Mittelmeerküste im Umbruch, in: Information für die Truppe, IFDT 10/94, p. 60-61.

⁹⁶ see: J. Krause, Proliferation Risks and their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?, in: Survival, Vol. 37, no 2, Summer 1995, p. 135.

⁹⁷ see: A. Hofmann, Die Raketenbedrohung aus der Dritten Welt, in: Focus 5/95, p. 38.

Cold War to a changed and 'modernized' economy, security and society, and the South from a development area to a place with guaranteed economic, and probably also political, standards.⁹⁸ It will take a great effort and will be impossible for one nation alone to overcome, to solve and to manage these 'transformation crises'.

One cannot intervene everywhere. „In spite of all the verbal excitement on the subject we must leave many of the world's problems and peoples to themselves, especially when they reject outside intervention, as it would not help to solve the conflict or problem anyway“.⁹⁹ It is vital therefore to concentrate on what is most important and to act to provide convincing evidence of reliability. On the other hand it is also necessary to act multilaterally, in connection with others. Due to its welfare, its moral basis and its power, but also because it is affected by strategic developments, the Western World and especially the Transatlantic Community has a special responsibility. Human rights can only grow in a democratic and economically healthy surrounding.¹⁰⁰ Thus, concentrated and common efforts are necessary for preventive actions.

We live in a time of ongoing and global change. We are not experiencing the end of history, but we do see a change accompanied by heavy tremors with historical dimensions. We cannot foresee the length of time it will take for this change to take place, nor can we predict its final results. History teaches us that in such a time of change it is most important to have a vision, a goal to aim for. ... The United States is now the only world power still capable of unrestricted global action. Although the United States would much prefer to solve its own domestic problems at this time, it cannot do so because, as the world's leading power, it cannot turn a blind eye to our crisis shaken world. ... But America needs partners. Even the United States can act only in coalitions. In today's world, no one can go it alone.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ see: E. Lubkemeier, Globale Herausforderungen deutscher Sicherheit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Feb 3 1995, p. 27-30.

⁹⁹ G. Diehl, Safeguarding German Interests, in: German Comments, Nr. 36, Oct 1994, p. 13.

¹⁰⁰ Butros-Ghali, speech at the Day of Human Rights, Dec 10 1994, cited in: P. Siemonitsch, UN-Krise und kein Ende, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, Dec 27 1994.

¹⁰¹ K. Naumann, German Security Policy and Future Tasks of the Bundeswehr, speech at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, Oct 21 1994, p. 2-3.

B. RUSSIA - PROBLEM AND CHANCE

With its 150 million population, one eighth of the landmass spread over nine time-zones, Russia, as long as it exists, will always be a great presence on the world stage. In this decade it has lost its western empire; yet the Russian destiny will, for good or bad, remain combined with that of Europe. Since the Seven-years War, at least since the Congress of Vienna, Europe lived 'under the eyes' of Russia. East Europe, moreover, was in Russian hand. Thus, it is obvious that its relationship to the 'West' in these days is dominated by the intention to maintain its status as a 'player' in international politics, especially since East and Central Europe are going to participate in European-Atlantic security organizations. Being a superpower today is a matter of de-ideologized greatness, after pan-slavism of the nineteenth century and world-communism of the twentieth century have become obviously part of the past. However, bitterness and humiliation mingles with this greatness.¹⁰² The fate of twenty-five million Russians, living in regions which are partly characterized by 'chaos', trouble the Russian soul. Russian foreign policy thus reaches back to the 19th century.

Three scenarios are imaginable for the future: first and best, a new democratic and stable tsarism¹⁰³ with close control of the army and a slow but stable increasing economy, second and worse, an anarchical situation in which a split of Russia into five or six provinces is probable and the army is controlled by nobody, taking the function of an arbiter, and third, the power struggle between political groups, an up and down of reforms and political blockades, which, however, keep the hope alive that all will end in the first scenario. It is difficult to give probabilities for the different scenarios. Neither the Russian society, nor any other state has an interest in a destabilization. Interests, however, do not always determine history. Thus, many look with sorrows to the multiple crises, in which Russia is involved. There is only minimal good news from the Russian economy, doubts

¹⁰² see: M. Stürmer, *Das verwundete Imperium*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Jan 28 1994.

¹⁰³ 'democratic tsarism' is defined, in this meaning, as a 'democracy under a strong leader', with a powerful President, who, however, is elected by free vote.

about the fulfillment of disarmament treaties, and a Russian military doctrine which gives with the idea of a 'near abroad' more questions than answers. It is therefore not astonishing that Western politicians take the situation as 'serious', seeing Russia 'at the crossroads'.¹⁰⁴ Russia makes its neighbors, and former Warsaw Pact allies, fear, that their newly gained independence is endangered. They look back to the Georgian example where President Schewardnadse did not want to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) until he saw that Moscow supported anti-governmental troops in his country. Soon after Georgia entered the CIS it won the (civil) war.¹⁰⁵

For Moscow strategists the world has turned by a bit more than ninety degrees. After the threats from the North and the West have vanished, it is the South and the South-West which destabilizes the country from outside. Russia is interested in stability for this region, but it has often acted very undiplomatically, with limited and indecisive means. Furthermore it has contributed to an estrangement to the West¹⁰⁶ by the war in Chechnya. This war has had another effect: Russian society is increasingly divided into bitterly opposed groups of 'hawks' and 'doves', with the doves seeming to be an increasingly frustrated minority. „The almost universal reluctance to use force that was so typical of the last years of Soviet rule, has disappeared. ... Moscow is back and ready to stand tall“.¹⁰⁷

Russia has neither the nerve, nor the capabilities to have a clear-cut and active global foreign policy. A legitimate question therefore is: Can Russia survive?¹⁰⁸ Or do its four centrifugal forces - lack of agreement about the legitimacy of Russia's current

¹⁰⁴ see: F. Weckbachmara, B. Schmid, Rußland am Scheideweg - Rüge warnt vor Katastrophe, Interview with V. Rüge, in: Bild am Sonntag, May 1 1995.

¹⁰⁵ see: R. Clement, Nichts geht gegen Rußland, in: Das Parlament, Oct 7 1994.

¹⁰⁶ see: U. Engelbrecht, Moskaus strategisches Dilemma, in: Generalanzeiger Bonn, Apr 4 1995.

¹⁰⁷ P. Felgenhauer, Russia, the Use of Force, and the Security of the Near Abroad, in: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The IISS 37th Annual Conference, Vienna, Sep 6-9 1995, Committee 5, p. 24-25.

¹⁰⁸ see: J.E. Stern, Moscow Meltdown, Can Russia Survive?, in: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1994, p. 40-65.

borders; conflicting economic objectives among different regions of the Federation; competing claims for legitimacy on the part of federal and regional leaders; and the unpredictable allegiance of army units - tear it apart? What should be the West's actions to support a 'positive' development?

One has to look to the internal situation, to Russia's domestic political scene first, to answer these questions. State structures still are military. The defense ministry is ruled exclusively by generals, military structures from the former Soviet Union, like the Ministry for Railroad Troops and the Ministry for Exceptional Situations, make clear that the transition to a democracy of 'Western style' is not yet finished. The military has a broad power basis and much influence.¹⁰⁹ This would not necessarily be dangerous if the military worked under close political and financial control. But this is not the case. Thus, Russian officers estimate the general situation as 'extremely negative'. The majority prefers the re-establishment of an authoritarian and dictatorial regime. Russia, in their view, needs a political 'strong hand'.¹¹⁰ Thus, the collapse of old conditions in the beginning of the decade by no means guarantees the creation of democracy and of a free market economy. The prerequisite for the resolution of the crisis of state, throughout Russian history, has always been the restoration of the center of power.¹¹¹ Whether the 'coup d'état' of 1993, by which Yeltsin eliminated the Soviets, can be taken as such a restoration, and whether Yeltsin has the loyalty of his population, which in the past was related to the person of the tsar, but not to the institutions of the empire, is not yet clear. This is further blurred by the fact that, with the collapse of the world's first atheist state, the historic religion, Orthodoxy, has emerged as the central cultural force in the country's new national self-consciousness.¹¹² Links between the former Soviet Secret Service (KGB) and members of

¹⁰⁹ It is probably not a pure chance that President Yeltsin and Defense Minister Gratschow have a residence in the same house in Moscow today.

¹¹⁰ see: A. Braun, *Sehnsucht nach der starken Hand*, in: *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, Nov 18 1994.

¹¹¹ see: G. Simon, *Political Culture in Russia*, in: *Aussenpolitik*, III/95, p. 244.

¹¹² see: J.H. Billington, *The Case for Orthodoxy*, in: *The New Republic*, May 30 1994, p. 25.

the ruling synod of the Church during the last quarter-century of communism have created different views about this trend.

One sees the role of the Church in society. One sees the Russian Church providing a unifying national identity for a rejuvenated traditional state. The other sees the Church providing the moral basis for building a responsible society independent of state structures. ... What kind of Church is Russia's road leading? ... Which East shall we become - the East of Xerxes or of Christ?¹¹³

The internal situation, furthermore, is determined by a still underdeveloped mentality of ownership. Under Communism everything had belonged to everyone and no-one. Gains and losses are thus relatively unimportant. Despite aroused forces of self-organization and interest groups, it is necessary for a spirit of entrepreneurship to evolve in order to bring up a stable middle class which can stabilize the economy. Additionally, „a basic democratic consensus has not materialized which recognizes the status quo as it has developed since 1991, which views democratic elections as the only permissible means of establishing legitimacy“.¹¹⁴ The attitude that politics is superordinate to law is widespread so that tax evasion and corruption are seen as „illegal but correct“.¹¹⁵

This attitude can also be found in the military. Russia's financial crisis, furthered by the Chechnya operation, which has diverted as much as four billion dollars in defense funds away from more needy accounts like housing, social services and routine operations and maintenance, led to an enormous erosion. That Moscow bus drivers now earn more than trained fighter pilots, speaks for itself.¹¹⁶ Loyalty to a government 'far away in Moscow' under such conditions is decreasing, even among officers. Poor training conditions, education, lack of spare parts and only very few procurements contribute to a crisis of which the amount and the outcome is not foreseeable. Since little more than half

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹⁴ G. Simon, *Political Culture in Russia*, p. 250.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 252.

¹¹⁶ see: B.S. Lambeth, *Russia's Wounded Military*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, March/April 1995, p. 91.

the combat aircraft of the Soviet air force remained within the boundaries of Russia, eighty percent of all repair facilities for armored fighting vehicles were 'lost', and many units have reduced their personnel to about fifty percent¹¹⁷, the overall assessment is that Russia today could not mount a large-scale cross-border operation against a well-equipped opponent. It is thus even questionable whether Russia's armed forces can fulfill all five main tasks and functions that the new military doctrine defines: reconnaissance and warning, to maintain strategic nuclear forces, to maintain a military potential for a defense against a regional aggression, to guarantee strategic development possibilities of Russian armed forces, and to secure the national borders, especially in the air and under water. Beneath general deep structural changes, the emphasis lies especially on the extension of 'mobile troops' and 'internal troops' with the aim of suppressing unrest and stabilizing Russia within its borders. Especially in this realm, it is interesting to notice that Russia's military leaders have been unwavering in their insistence that their sole mission is to defend against external aggression, not to influence political maneuvering or police domestic unrest.¹¹⁸ Thus, prevailing military doctrine grants permission to the Russian armed forces to launch an offensive across border to repel aggression; to 'protect national interests', human or minority rights; and to prevent a Balkan-like conflagration, an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons¹¹⁹, even in the 'near abroad' outside Russian territory, might be counterproductive to the wish of Russia's defense leaders „to be accepted into the world community as a normal power“.¹²⁰ This fact, together with financial bargaining, may have the effect of a politicizing the military.

While in the July 1990 London Declaration NATO governments agreed to 'reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons' and make them 'truly weapons of last resort', nuclear

¹¹⁷ see: H. Tiller, *Russischer Bär auf wackligen Beinen?*, in: *Information für die Truppe*, IFDT 10/94, p. 34.

¹¹⁸ see: B.S. Lambeth, *Russia's wounded Military*, p. 93.

¹¹⁹ see: F. Hill, P. Jewett, *Back in the USSR*, Report of the Ethnic Conflict Project, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, J.F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Jan. 1994, p. 9.

¹²⁰ see: B.S. Lambeth, *Russia's wounded Military*, p. 94.

forces in Russia are seen today as „one of the few ways Russia has left to claim superpower status and prestige. ... Some Russian discussions of military doctrine display a tendency to see nuclear weapons as a substitute for the high-technology conventional weapons [of the West which are] beyond Russia's economic grasp for the foreseeable future“.¹²¹ It is not only the likelihood of irresponsible behavior with nuclear weapons and materials that can create worldwide fears, it is also a „renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons among the elements of a new, more aggressive strategic posture toward the West by hard-line politicians and military leaders“,¹²² together with the official renunciation of the no-first-use policy.¹²³

For Russia, however, the maintenance of a great power status is crucial. Already Stalin's intentions had been that the „Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence“.¹²⁴ Having failed to achieve this, Russia's actual analysis and perception of the world situation is determined by increasing fears about its encirclement by the West, which is, in the opinion of some Russian political and military leaders, willing to use military power for creating pressure on other states. NATO's expansion is viewed with great suspicion, and creates a reason that Russia searches for new strategic partners, for example Iran, and falls into a dangerous isolationism against the West. „The issue is not that committing the East Europeans to NATO creates a threat to Russia; it is the fact that Russia is pushed out - excluded“.¹²⁵ Interestingly, it wants to be excluded, however not alone. „Russia is different, Yeltsin said, the national character of

¹²¹ D. S. Yost, Europe and Nuclear Deterrence, in: *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 103.

¹²² T. Hitchens, A. Zhigulsky, Hard-Line Russians tout Nukes to match West, in: *Defense News*, Vol. 10, No. 46, Nov 20-26 1995, p. 1.

¹²³ see: S.A. Cambone, P.J. Garrity, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy, in: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 80-83.

¹²⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, Washington: USGPO, 1961, p. 845, cited in: J. Laloy, Western Europe in the Soviet Perspective, in: C. Bertram, ed., *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s*, London, Macmillan, 1980, p. 42.

¹²⁵ G.A. Geyer, Russia's Security Intentions, in: *Washington Times*, Oct 3 1995, p. 14.

the Russian people is not like that of other Europeans".¹²⁶ Russia still shares virtually no principles of security and few personal values with the West, much less the concerns of a NATO or a European Union.¹²⁷ It is troubled, however, by the fact that some of its former allies do it, especially those with common borders with Western Europe. Thus, one can ask the question, whether Russia is still the 'partner of the West'?!¹²⁸ Two contrary answers are possible. The first is a careful 'no', the second is an enthusiastic 'yes'. Both answers have consequences on the future relationship of the Transatlantic Community with Russia.

A 'careful no' is caused by the fact that Russia wants to play an important role in world politics, but that it has not yet decided which one. There are tendencies towards a restoration of the Soviet Union or even of a monarchy. Others imagine Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia as a combined community, or favor the idea of a smaller but fitter, and possibly international independent Russia which would be called an 'Eurasian' country with a mainly Asian orientation, which could function as a bridge between Europe and Asia.¹²⁹ After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had tried to connect with the West on the basis of international political and economical cooperation. The Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin declared friendship, NATO and the European Union opened their doors for a close partnership and gave Russia 'credit', in a monetary and political sense.

Today however, Moscow uses its inner weakness (as the former Soviet Union its military strength) to get further concessions. The former demand for an equality has become a demand for a 'special partnership' on Russian terms. A right to veto NATO's expansion, a free hand in dealing with the 'near abroad', and even the 're-integration of the ex-Soviet region' are examples for recent Russian discussion. Otherwise, as President Yeltsin announced at the December 1994 Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security

¹²⁶ M. Jakobson, Collective Security in Europe Today, in: The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, p. 60.

¹²⁷ see: G.A. Geyer, Russia's Security Intentions, p. 14.

¹²⁸ see: H. Kremp, Ist Rußland noch der Partner des Westens?, in: Die Welt, Dec 13 1994.

¹²⁹ see: Neue Züricher Zeitung, Deutliches Großmachtstreben Jelzins, Moskaus Außenpolitik wieder in alten Gleisen, Feb 7 1995.

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a renewed policy of 'blocs' would arise within a 'Cold Peace'. Moscow tries to re-establish its former power status as far as its own power makes it possible and the 'outer world' allows it.¹³⁰ It should be considered that „Russia [in recent years] has broken every international human rights commitment by its unprecedented brutality. ... The war in Chechnya has revived the world's worst fears of Russia ... and has trashed whatever residual potential Russia had for a leadership role in the world. Boris Yeltsin has made Russia into a pariah state“. ¹³¹ The war in Chechnya has not only made clear the political structure of the Russian Federation, and shown the lack of governmental competence¹³², but also that Western definitions of 'Internal Matters' and 'Human Rights' are not shared by Russian politicians and soldiers. The 1975 Helsinki final act, on the one hand, reflects the growing recognition that the way states treat their citizens is not just the business of that state, but rather it is a factor in each state's relations with other states. On the other hand, the Charter for a New Europe, signed at the Paris Summit of 1990 by the Soviet Union, rejects the use of force for the resolution of disputes and establishes respect for human rights, democratic government and economic liberty as the standards for behavior.

Even tacit Western acceptance of a new Russian domination over its former colonies will amount to recognition of a new Yalta dividing line between East and West, and it will condemn those countries to a status of limited sovereignty for the foreseeable future. Such a situation will encourage aggressive Russian nationalists to press for renewed hegemony over other former satellites - and for an expanded Russian 'sphere of influence' in Eastern Europe.¹³³

It is thus necessary for the West to make clear that it is not prepared to establish a close partnership with a country that destabilizes, threatens its neighbors by its actions,

¹³⁰ see: L. Rühl, Abwendung von Europa, in: Die Welt, May 2 1995.

¹³¹ J.J. Maresca, Be firm with Russia about Standards of Governance, in: International Herald Tribune, Feb 16 1995.

¹³² see: H. Vogel, Optionen westlicher Politik nach der Tschetschenien-Krise, in: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Nr. 8/95, Jan 1995, p. 5.

¹³³ J.J. Maresca, Chechnya is not simply an 'Internal Matter', in: The Wall Street Journal, Dec 27 1994.

and makes developments within Russia increasingly unpredictable. „An arm's length approach makes sense“.¹³⁴ It is not acceptable that Russia today goes on in its colonial, communist or imperialistic 'tradition'. Russian promises about political should become internalized obligation, rather than mere bargaining chips. Otherwise credit arrangements must be suspended and NATO cannot proceed with a 'Partnership for Peace' without betraying itself. Whether economic and financial help should in the future be combined with further progress of Russian democratic development can be discussed from different perspectives.¹³⁵ However, 'business as usual' is obviously the wrong way. Western politics should not fall into a renewed 'containment' but should make clear that certain standards are the 'indiscussable and non-negotiable prerequisites to become' a partner.

The 'enthusiastic yes' that Russia is (still) the partner of the West and tries to maintain and further this status points out that internal difficulties and problems cause a wrong picture to the outer world. Showing strength against the West, thus, is explained by the need to weaken nationalistic forces and a Russian attempt to earn as much as possible in return for an already no longer preventable NATO expansion. Furthermore Russia's dissolution is not seen as a possible „European Solution“¹³⁶ to territorial questions in the East. From this perspective the intervention in Chechnya is at least explainable. Furthermore it is stressed that there is no doubt that Russia, despite its very difficult political and economical situation, has managed to conduct free elections under a new constitution, has established a free press, has accepted and promoted far-reaching disarmament agreements and occasionally contributes to international peace and stability as a real Western partner, for example in Yugoslavia.¹³⁷ Because a stable and reform-

¹³⁴ see: M. Almond, Chechnya: A Wake-up Call for the West, in: The Wall Street Journal, Dec 20 1994.

¹³⁵ An analysis is given by: H. Vogel, Optionen westlicher Politik nach der Tschetschenien-Krise, p. 4-5.

¹³⁶ L. Rühl, Separatismus allein ist kein Garant für Völkerfreiheit, in: Die Welt, Jan 27 1995.

¹³⁷ see: V. Rühle, Europas Sicherheit und die Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, speech at the Sicherheitspolitische Informationstagung der Clausewith-Gesellschaft at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Aug 18 1995, in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Sichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 9, Sep 1995, p. 45.

oriented Russia is essential for European and worldwide security, it is indispensable to support the development, economically, technically, and politically,¹³⁸ as a 'transfer of stability' to the East.

The end of the Cold War makes it not only possible but also highly desirable to achieve reconciliation and, yes, friendship, around a grand policy of stabilization of the entire Eurasian landmass.¹³⁹

International Relations Theory teaches that lack of a partner's predictability often can be overcome by more evidence of confidence and decreased suspicion.¹⁴⁰ Thus, it might be the right way to connect Russia closely to the West by a political and economical partnership with the European Union, a security partnership with NATO, and a secure place at the G7, then G8 conferences. When the European Union foreign ministers during their March 1995 Carcassonne meeting proposed a non-aggression agreement between NATO and Russia to reassure Moscow that the alliance's enlargement to the East poses no threat to Russian security, it was a first step towards this goal. The relationship with Russia should be characterized, on the one hand, by a close consultation network, for example about topics like proliferation, technological cooperation, crisis-management, and possibilities of common peace-keeping,¹⁴¹ and, in general, about sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters, especially having a European dimension, political consultations on issues of common concern, and co-operation in a range of security-related issues.¹⁴² On the other hand, certain basic principles and a strategy for the

¹³⁸ see: K. Feldmeyer, Fragen zur NATO-Erweiterung, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Apr 28 1995.

¹³⁹ P. Lellouche, A Message to Russia about Principles for a New Partnership, in: International Herald Tribune, Apr 21 1995.

¹⁴⁰ see: I.F. Maximytschew, Argwohn muß abgebaut werden, in: Die Welt, Sep 6 1994.

¹⁴¹ see: R. Seiters, Eine Partnerschaft mit der NATO liegt im Interesse Rußlands, in: Die Welt, Apr 21 1995.

¹⁴² see: Areas for pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO/Russia dialogue and cooperation, distributed at the May 1995 Noordwijk meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

relationship should be defined, among these especially more support for Russia's political parties, bureaucracy, interest groups, media, and the judiciary.¹⁴³

A close transatlantic partnership on the basis of NATO, as well as between the nation states, is essential to support a strategy for Russia. Only if the West is on 'common track' will it be possible to conduct an effective policy. Neither a 'historic alliance' between France and Russia (Foreign Minister Kosyrew during his November 1994 visit in Paris¹⁴⁴), nor a United States-Russia bilateralism,¹⁴⁵ nor a great and extensive celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory over Germany, with the effect of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's praise for Stalin's wartime leadership,¹⁴⁶ contributes to such a strategy. It should lie in Western self-interest to find a common policy to overcome Russian problems and to use the still existing chance of a 'Strategic Partnership' with Russia for a stabilization of world's peace and welfare.

¹⁴³ see: R.D. Blackwill, Warum Europa und Amerika zusammenstehen müssen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Feb 20 1995, p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ see: Neue Züricher Zeitung, Deutliches Großmachtstreben Jelzins, Feb 7 1995, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ see: J.J. Maresca, Chechnya is not simply an 'Internal Matter', in: The Wall Street Journal, Dec 27 1994.

¹⁴⁶ see: M. Binyon, Arms and the Russians - Time for listening to Kozyrew with care, in: The Times, Apr 19 1995, p. 17.

V. EUROPE NEEDS AMERICA

Is the European Union an oxymoron?¹⁴⁷ Is the idea of European common interests, a future 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' and a 'European Security and Defense Identity' an unrealizable vision of a post-World War Two generation? Different European interests can give this impression. There are Federalists¹⁴⁸, Neutrals¹⁴⁹, Atlanticists¹⁵⁰, Nation-State Concentrated¹⁵¹, Undisciplined¹⁵², Great¹⁵³ and Small¹⁵⁴ nations. Some, like France and Italy, feel connected with the Mediterranean region, some, like Germany and Denmark, with Eastern Europe. The reality that for the election of NATO's Secretary General almost every country has individual preferences, speaks for itself.¹⁵⁵ The European idea has changed. With the European Union, Europe has become institutionalized, but the 'heart and soul' seem to have vanished. During the last Europe elections, a poster of the German Social Democrats showed two hands in handcuffs, to demonstrate the threat Europe could bring to the German economy and the state. An almost endless strike in France demonstrated the difficulties of taking only little steps

¹⁴⁷ see: R. Cohen, Why the Yanks are going yet again, in: The New York Times, Nov 26 1995.

¹⁴⁸ Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands.

¹⁴⁹ Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Switzerland.

¹⁵⁰ Germany, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France.

¹⁵¹ France, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden.

¹⁵² Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy.

¹⁵³ Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Britain.

¹⁵⁴ all other European nations.

see: H.P. Oschwald, Lateineuropäische Sünden, in: Focus, 40/1995, p. 333.

¹⁵⁵ at Oct 18 1995 German Press Agency listed the following candidates: Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (DA), Ruud Lubbers (NL), Douglas Hurd (GB), Malcom Rifkind (GB), Thorvald Stoltenberg (NO), Hans van den Broek (NL), Gro Harlem Brundtland (NO). Interestingly none of these candidates was finally elected. see: J. Knigge, Hinter den Kulissen emsige Suche nach neuem NATO-Chef, in: DPA, Brüssel, Oct 18 1995.

towards fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria for the Monetary Union. The estimation is that Italy, taking the same 'adjustments' as France, would socially and politically become destabilized and would fall into a spiral of hate and resentments, comparable to a Weimar situation in the 1932.¹⁵⁶ In summary, one can cite the first German chancellor Bismarck with his famous words: „I have always found the word 'Europe' on the lips of those politicians who wanted something from other powers which they dare not demand in their own names“.¹⁵⁷

Naturally, beneath this negative view, the European idea has a bright side. German monetary compromises and French politico-military changes (for example, its December 1995 step towards reintegration into NATO's Integrated Military Structure) make it possible that both states may become the core of a flourishing European Union. A wave of investments, increased research, and education reform might produce great benefits for the whole region. Intelligent cooperation contracts would help to stabilize Eastern Europe, and maintain the possibility of integration. Europe has a shining scenario too. Furthermore, supporters of the European idea, like German Foreign Minister Kinkel, point out that the alternative would not be the 'status quo' but disintegration and a re-emergence of old rivalries.¹⁵⁸ Thus, it is necessary that the European Union become a major element in the new global constellation, so that it intensifies people's identification with it. A European, visiting South-East Asia or even California, feels very clearly that his personality was built by other influences than those of his hosts. European 'identity', defined through climate, speech, history, religion, literature, poetry, and so on, becomes obvious mostly outside its own cultural circle. This fact is not dependent on the question whether every nation 'has' its own values, as Johann Gottfried Herder thought; whether there are universal values, as it was declared in the Declaration of Independence and

¹⁵⁶ see: H.P. Oschwald, *Lateineuropäische Sünden*, p. 333.

¹⁵⁷ A.J.P. Taylor, *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman*, London, Random House, Arrow Books, 1961, p. 167, cited in: M. Jakobson, *Collective Security in Europe Today*, in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1995, p. 62.

¹⁵⁸ see: K. Kinkel, *Europa muß auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert seine Chancen nutzen*, in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Dec 6 1994.

during the French Revolution; whether cultures and values are artificially invented to create a feeling of communality, as Eric Hobsbawn proposes; or whether Ernest Renan's idea that „the existence of every nation is a daily repeated plebiscite“¹⁵⁹ is right. It is important to pick up ancient values and to combine them with recent historical and social experiences and new ideas, to further develop European culture. A hundred years ago, millions of Hungarians, Slovenians, Croatians, Tchechians, and Ukrainians felt as subjects of Habsburg-Austria. Why should it not be possible that tomorrow they feel like Europeans? It is the 'will' that produces Europe and the ability to compromise.

One will see whether today's statesmen are willing and able to create what our grandfathers only could dream of. As shown above, different countries have different views of Europe. While Great Britain's population sees itself as foremost 'British citizens' (50 percent), for French citizens this percentage is only half as big (25 percent) while especially in Belgium and Germany an extraordinary number of people see themselves as 'Europeans first' (15-20 percent).¹⁶⁰ What might constitute a European identity is still quite unclear although the average man feels some sense of 'dual nationality'.

It is questionable whether this is enough to be a basis on which, for example, a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), or a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be based. The European idea must be seen in historical perspective to explain the differences. Plans for the unification of Europe have appeared in every century since 'Charlemagne'. During the recent past two ideas have been especially important, presented by the French General Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet. „For General de Gaulle the important factor in Europe's evolution was the state and the nation, and their traditional organization, which he thought could be improved. For Jean Monnet, Europe conceived as a potential united power was much more attractive, and he did see this without a decline in the power of the individual state and nation“.¹⁶¹ Providing more

¹⁵⁹ see: P. Glotz, Das Projekt der Moderne - Auf der Suche nach einer gemeinsamen Identität: Verpassen die Europäer eine historische Chance?, in: Das Sonntagsblatt, Nr. 44, Nov 3 1995, p. 20.

¹⁶⁰ see: The Economist, Aug 26 1995, p. 46.

detail, General de Gaulle stressed a Europe of independent states with no supranational authority, independent of the United States. On the other hand, Jean Monnet's Europe was built on the idea of cosmopolitanism, of concrete European institutions, a European Community linked to the United States in a strong partnership, and of a small but open community.¹⁶² That plans like the Pleven Plan, presented in 1950, for a West European confederation in matters of defense, and the European Defense Community, proposed in 1952, failed, and European structures were over long times only developed in the economic realm, can be explained by the differences in the above concepts.

Although the sheer magnitude of the Soviet Union threat gave enough reason for a true supranational integration of Western Europe, it was not enough to overcome basic differences, especially because the United States gave the non-communist states of the West, as some thought, a 'free ride' in defense issues. „Deterring war is cheaper than having to fight one“¹⁶³ was the American argument, taking into consideration the origins of two World Wars. In these days, however, the security landscape has changed. More than ever, due to its economic strength, due to the decreased military threat from the former Soviet Union, due to political, economical, cultural, and communicational worldwide links, and due to new challenges from outside, Europe, and especially the European Union, has to take over at least some more responsibilities. What for America was true after the Second World War, today is comparably true for Europe:

Under the conditions of modern nationalism, national self-interest has hitherto been the principle followed most often in foreign policy by both the majority of the people and their representatives. But the recognition of this fact in the past need not mean the acceptance of it as inevitable for the future. ... The rejection of national egoism does not require the acceptance of national altruism in the sense of devotion to welfare of other nations without regard to one's own, but a relationship of mutuality between the nations.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ J.-B. Duroselle, General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe, in: *The New International Actors: The U.N. and the E.E.C.*, ed. by C.A. Cosgrove and K.J. Twitchett, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 189.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁶³ J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 82.

The latter means that a deepened and enlarged Europe will probably be based on a 'Intergovernmental' approach, rather than on a 'Supranational' one. Especially France and Great Britain are eager to stress that their national parliaments should participate more intensively in European affairs.¹⁶⁵ However, it is also clear for them that the European Union must create a planning and information capacity in some areas, for example for monetary issues and in the area of foreign and defense policy, which stands above the various national agencies, which until now have had a monopoly. The independence of European institutions is essential to avoid a resurgence of „the ghosts of the past, vampire-like awaiting a fresh draught of balance-of-power politics“¹⁶⁶ and to find solutions for trans-national problems and challenges. Unpleasant decisions can only be taken by legitimate organs, not by a European parliament whose members are dependent and enslaved by their national governments at home. The argument that this parliament is generally not able to represent three-hundred and fifty million Europeans and that a majority decision there cannot be sufficient to deploy soldiers,¹⁶⁷ is only of limited value.

Patriotism, one of our shared values, is bound to blossom as our nations enrich each other. Our nations are not being asked to sacrifice their history or their traditions. What they are being asked to do is to build on their synergies for purposes accepted by all. This is the political pact that must unite us.¹⁶⁸

There are no doubts, however, about a necessary differentiation among nations on their way to a European unity. The idea of a European core with concentric circles of a differentiated participation, proposed by the German 'Euro-engineer' Karl Lamers, is an

¹⁶⁴ G.F. Thomas, *American Ideals and the Peace*, in: J.B. Whitton, *The Second Chance*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1944, p. 219-220.

¹⁶⁵ see: G. Nonnenmacher, *Europas Kern*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Dec 1 1994.

¹⁶⁶ A. Shirivastava, *An uncertain Future for the Hard Core*, in: *The Wall Street Journal*, Dec 8 1994.

¹⁶⁷ see argument in: D. Davis, *Gemeinsame Sache mit der Realität machen - Demokratie, Europa und die Nationen*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Jan 17 1995.

¹⁶⁸ see: J. Delors, *European Integration and Security*, in: *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, March/April 1991, p. 106.

operationalization. With the Schengen agreement, a social contract, the Eurocorps, the European economy system, and the monetary union, Europe's core begins to solidify. It is this emerging character which attracts the East European states. Today one can see clearly that the Maastricht Treaty was not „a dangerously misguided initiative at a critical moment in Europe's history“.¹⁶⁹

The security guarantees of America against the 'threats from the East' gave Western Europe in the last fifty years the possibility to concentrate on other issues than its own defense. European economic recovery after the Second World War was only possible because the United States of America helped to bind wartime adversaries together under democratic rules. The 'Pax Americana' was the prerequisite for European cooperation. After the fall of Communism the question of burden sharing increased again. Moreover the United States' emphasis lay no longer only on financial agreements, material support, and the possibility to station American troops on foreign soil with adequate 'Host Nation Support', but stressed more and more a 'responsibility sharing'. This means that the European Allies, especially those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), shall take over more political and military responsibilities of their own.

A European pillar of NATO became a necessity. On the other hand, responsibility sharing is not possible without an idea of a common 'European Security and Defense Identity' and, if possible, a 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' in the framework of the European Union. For the first time, the June 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen pointed out that „the creation of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity“.¹⁷⁰ The link between efforts to strengthen the security and the creation of a political union, including the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy were seen quite clearly, in the sense that the latter was already under way and had to be brought into a greater

¹⁶⁹ D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 1.

¹⁷⁰ D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 347.

international framework. However, most of the steps towards this goal are still to be done. There is not yet a clear picture on the horizon, although in 1996 (Maastricht II) the European Union wants to define goals, purposes and especially the next initiatives to be taken.

The 'muddling through' towards a still unknown ground is, of course, not caused by inactivity, lack of ideas, or barriers laid down the way by the United States. It is caused by different political attitudes and intentions. Germans prefer a European Integration as a step towards a more intensive and equal partnership with America.¹⁷¹ Having other elements in mind, a 'collective defense' is also a prerequisite for security and that NATO, not Europe, should take the lead by integrating new partners.¹⁷² The French Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, puts the European Union in the 'driver's seat'. Its logic is that economic integration is more important now than security thinking, so „Central European countries should only become members of NATO through 'evolution', after they have been accepted into the EU and joined its defense arm, the Western European Union“.¹⁷³ The danger for Washington in this approach is that it will play a secondary role in deciding membership but will remain the leader in offering the security guarantee.

NATO's and EU's enlargement, however, should not be a goal for its own purpose. The idea is to spread the blessings of democracy and the market to the East; the new democracies want a home and a community, and the West wants to extend it to them. On the other hand, there are lots of officials and political scientists¹⁷⁴ who argue that Lord Ismay, NATO's first secretary general, is still right with his phrase of why having NATO: „Keep the Russians out [of Europe], the Americans in, and the Germans down“.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ see: R.D. Asmus, Die Deutschen setzen auf Bewährtes: NATO und EU, in: Die Welt, Feb 7 1995.

¹⁷² see: G. Gillessen, Kollektive Sicherheit - adé, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Jan 6 1995.

¹⁷³ M. Kempe, The Answer to Europe's German Question, in: The Wall Street Journal, Sep 16 1994.

¹⁷⁴ and even at U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, this approach is still taught as today's most important reason for NATO. Especially for discussing the last point, see: U. Nerlich, Deutschland als gewöhnliches Land?, in: Politique Etrangère 1/1995.

Without doubt, the second argument can be supported. Without America, the stabilization of Eastern Europe is not manageable. Europe needs the strategic backing through a transatlantic partnership, which includes the whole spectrum of political, economical and military questions. These three pillars will be necessary in the future.¹⁷⁶ As the former German Defense Minister Georg Leber put it: „There is neither a political nor a military nor a psychological substitute for the American commitment [in Western Europe]“.¹⁷⁷ The development of a European identity, thus, must not let the United States become a strange and alien power. Europe needs America, and America is a European power! „Any attempt to disregard that fact amounts to an invitation to disaster.“¹⁷⁸ Only a partnership on such a basis, can develop a 'shared responsibility' for international peace and order.

Transatlantic solidarity is essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the strengthening of an undivided, free and democratic Europe. The shared principle of free trade, broad economic interchange and an ever growing flow of goods, services, technologies as well as ideas makes the transatlantic relationship an effective framework for cooperation and the development of free economies. A broad network of bilateral relations as well as daily cooperation in international organizations and other international gatherings are an indication of the global nature of those links.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ see: J. Joffe, Is there life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall 1995, p. 25.

¹⁷⁶ see: V. Rühle, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, speech at the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, May 11 1995, p. 17-18.

¹⁷⁷ cited in: J. Joffe, Is there life after Victory?, p. 81.

¹⁷⁸ R. Cohen, Why the Yanks are going. Yet again., in: The New York Times, Nov 26 1995.

¹⁷⁹ Western European Union, Common Reflection on the new European Security Conditions, discussed at the May 1995 Council, Lissabon, passage II.1.2.

A. EUROPEAN SECURITY

As Timothy Garton Ash puts it, „the basic reason we need the EU and NATO is not to make our countries richer and more powerful, but to try to save Europe from war - both the wars that Europe is still capable of generating, and from the wars that threaten from the dangerous world around“.¹⁸⁰ In today's world it is necessary to act 'in concert, not in chaos'. This is the reason why a new security order based on approaches like 'let Europe take care of itself' or 'Return to the Balance of Power System' do not work.¹⁸¹ The security landscape in Europe presents an inconsistent picture. It is undergoing a process of fundamental change, moving towards cooperation and integration. Processes of progressive integration, however, are opposed by centrifugal tendencies whose impact is going as far as to cause the fragmentation of state entities in the east and the south-east of the continent, as already shown in chapter four. However, there are special trends and challenges for Europe. One is, that East European governments may return to former Communist structures and behavior, and a close political and military cooperation with Russia. In Belorussia, for example, the Soviet 'Day of Revolution' was re-established as a national holiday, and there can be found a great disappointment about Western inactivity to help the country.¹⁸² In Bulgaria the new ex-Communist government has already returned to former closeness and harsh tones, while the military cooperation with Russia regains momentum in a quality 'as in the old days'.¹⁸³ In Russia itself Communists get more and more electoral votes so that President Yeltsin in December 1995 proposed the building of a presidential council as the only mean to keep the major power centers and Russia's foreign policy in their own hands. These are only three examples which show that Europe has to deal with new (and old) problems at its own regional surrounding.

¹⁸⁰ see: T.G. Ash, Security is the vital Issue in Europe, in: The Times, Apr 18 1995.

¹⁸¹ see: W.E. Odom, NATO's Expansion - Why the Critics are wrong, in: The National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 40-43.

¹⁸² see: A. Dubatow, Weißrußland sucht die Anlehnung an Moskau, in: Die Welt, Apr 15 1995.

¹⁸³ see: W. Koydl, Alte Herren versuchen die Wende rückwärts - Bulgariens exkommunistische Regierung orientiert sich wieder stärker an Moskau, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Apr 18 1995.

Furthermore, it is no longer possible to reach stability in Europe without looking to the outskirts. One has to take into consideration, for example, unstable regions around the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and in the new tension triangle Turkey-Iran-Caucasus. The 'clarity of purpose' of the Cold War is vanishing.

For obvious reasons, the possibility of an extremist regime in North Africa acquiring ballistic missiles is something that haunts Spain and Italy far more vividly than it troubles Norway. ... Non-communist Russia remains an uncomfortable neighbor for Norway and a tough regional rival for Turkey, but in the absence of any global East-West confrontation, both Oslo and Ankara are finding it much harder than before to win understanding of these concerns from their NATO partner.¹⁸⁴

It is therefore not astonishing that even the United States Secretary of Defense Perry urges NATO's members to focus on the Mediterranean region.¹⁸⁵ North Africa's and the Middle East's supply of oil and gas are crucial to Europe's survival, and as long as immigration from these areas into the European Union and weapons proliferation are seen as vital dangers to Western security, one has to engage in this region and help it towards a political, financial and economic stabilization. The center of European Union's interest therefore should be a clear assessment of what it is capable of doing. This assessment has different dimensions: regional ones between the European Union's southern area and the new partners in Scandinavia; political ones, among the larger states, and between them and their smaller partners; and financial ones, between an enormous spiral of debts¹⁸⁶ and spending necessities, on the one hand, and between national budgetary sovereignty and European economic and monetary integration, on the other.

Interests of the actual members of the European Union and defense organizations in Europe are often articulated by those who want to become members. They want to join 'Europe' mainly for two simple reasons: „because it is a rich man's club in which fellow

¹⁸⁴ see: Financial Times, *Allies of Circumstance*, Nov 24 1994.

¹⁸⁵ see: W.J. Perry, *Remarks at the Munich Conference of Security Policy*, Feb 5 1995, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ An overview of debts in the Western world is given in: A. Zänker, *Die Schuldenfalle*, in: *Die Welt*, Jan 18 1995.

members possess huge funds for investment, and because they want to be part of some kind of security grouping“¹⁸⁷ which guarantees them a security background in which economic development and welfare can grow. In most cases the European Union is seen as an organization which provides welfare, and NATO is seen, correctly, as a system of collective defense which provides security. However, although politico-military interests of the European Union are neither formulated, coordinated nor prioritized between the different member states and/or European Union coordination bodies, one can identify vital, essential and general interests which are closely linked to security issues. European security interests, to be pointed out, are the elimination or reduction of the risks and uncertainties that threaten one or more of the following aspects.¹⁸⁸

- territorial integrity, political independence and the freedom of the Union and each member state,
- economic stability, probably endangered by conflicts that could have an adverse effect on sources of raw materials, overseas markets and lines of communication, or which could lead to a massive influx of refugees,
- ecology, probably endangered by consequences of inadequate security in the nuclear domain, and
- democratic structure, social stability and the cultural and political identity of the Union and its member states, probably threatened by massive, uncontrolled immigration or by failure to respect demographic principles or human rights outside the European Union.

¹⁸⁷ N. Malcolm, The Case against Europe, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, Mar/Apr 1995, p. 67.

¹⁸⁸ see: L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, March 1995, p. 14-16.

Common security goals of the Maastricht Treaty (Art. J 1) are thus based on common interests. However, new risks and challenges, especially those created by the transition of a multipolar world system, are becoming equally important and will have a great influence on these interests. Common security interests of the European Union must therefore be formulated under the consideration of its political importance as a future center of global power. This includes specifically the following elements:¹⁸⁹

- to strengthen the new world order by providing the United Nations with capable regional sub-organizations,
- to intensify the contacts to Central and Eastern Europe and the Community of Independent States (CIS),
- to promote democratization, the rule of law and human rights,
- to contain separatism and nationalism,
- to build regional organizations for crisis prevention and crisis management,
- to build up capabilities for peace enforcement, peace keeping, and humanitarian help,
- to enforce disarmament,
- to counter proliferation, crime, and terrorism, and to prevent migration,
- to guarantee a credible defense and deterrence, and to preserve NATO for collective defense issues, with a United States presence in Europe,

¹⁸⁹ see: Seminar für Sicherheitspolitik, Die Europäische Union und ihre Stellung in der Welt - Die Einbringung deutscher sicherheitspolitischer Interessen, Arbeitsgruppe 1, 1995, p. 3-4.

- to make the Western European Union the European pillar of NATO as well as the defense component of the European Union, and to open those organizations for new partners in Europe,
- to support economic stability, further the access to new markets, resources and financial assets, and to further the development of free markets and trade worldwide.

Without going further into detail, it must be pointed out that this operationalization has to be put into the framework of national interests of the European Union members. As shown above, there are different views how to prioritize and achieve these goals. This depends, not only marginally, on whether the emphasis is laid on 'deepening' or 'widening' of the European Union. Members like France want to deepen but not widen the Community. They favor changing the rules; that is, integrating the structure in a way that would make it hard for most aspirant members to become eligible for entry. Britain has come to accept the idea that widening, its preference, probably would not prevent some deepening. The Germans sound as if they are equally keen on extensive deepening and widening, seeing that both elements do not exclude each other.¹⁹⁰ All these attitudes derive from questions about how national identity is brought into consideration when European security is discussed.

By signing the Maastricht treaty, the British government committed the United Kingdom to a „long-term future in which the country's foreign and security policy would progressively be merged with that of the European Union“.¹⁹¹ However, despite major

¹⁹⁰ see: J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New Yorker, Sep 2 1991, p. 90.
When in the following sometimes only France's, Great Britain's and Germany's attitudes are mentioned, this is done because today they can be seen as the most influential members of the European Union.

¹⁹¹ J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing the New Europe, Oxford, Polity Press, 1994, p. 10.
That the British commitment is not yet very intensively can be seen by the fact that Great Britain stopped its complete cooperation with the EU when the organisation banned British beef export after the cow disease BSE was discovered.

changes towards more British influence in European affairs, an undiscussed and unchanged element is its close relationship to the United States. Thus, one way forward might be, „if Whitehall elites came to believe that the best way of retaining the ‘special relationship’ with Washington would be for Britain actually to become what the USA has, for several decades, wanted her to be: a true European partner, and, as such, the main guarantor of continuing harmony between the two sides of the Atlantic“.¹⁹²

Despite recent changes by its new President Chirac, France’s attitude towards Europe by far can be still identified with General de Gaulle’s. Thus, promoting France and Europe, from this perspective can be seen as equal. Defense for France is both „an object of cooperation and an element of sovereignty with which the [European] federal entity, which is our [France’s] long-term objective, will - or should - be endowed“.¹⁹³ France slowly makes steps towards an adjustment, away from a singular national defense towards the building of a strong and reliable West European defense identity. Eduard Balladur had described France’s vision with three fundamental beliefs: Europe must expand, Europe must be reformed, and Europe must go forward, a Europe which is more effective and active, but less bureaucratic and interventionist, a more ‘democratic’ Europe.¹⁹⁴ The policy changes are based on France’s increasing doubts about a European idea without an implementable defense pillar; about West European performance and military capabilities (especially after the Gulf War), about the political cohesion of the European Union itself,¹⁹⁵ and, last but not least, in the French effort to anchor the Federal Republic of Germany in European institutions that make a certain ‘control’ of the newly reunified economic giant possible. Certain fears about Germany’s future role thus promote the development of the European security and defense identity. However, „France has taken

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁹³ R. Dumas, cited in: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 334.

¹⁹⁴ E. Balladur, The Presidency of the European Union, in: *Presidents & Prime Ministers*, Vol. 4, Mar/Apr 1995, p. 11-12.

¹⁹⁵ D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: *Survival*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 344-345.

care to do nothing irreversible, to not compromise the French holy trinity of uncertainty; the foundation of deterrence; of flexibility, the foundation of diplomacy; and of the ambiguity of the internal consensus".¹⁹⁶

Germany focuses its defense policy on five priorities:¹⁹⁷

- Preservation of the freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
- Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for democracy, the rule of the law and prosperity in Europe mean peace and security for Germany, too;
- The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability;
- The familiarization of our neighbors in Eastern Europe with Western structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership and the creation of a new cooperative security order embracing all the states of Europe;
- Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world economic order based on market principles, for the security of the individual states is guaranteed only in a system of global security with peace, justice and well-being for everyone.

Germany's overriding preoccupation in the immediate future has to be with its Eastern neighbors. The need to create political, social and demographic stability and

¹⁹⁶ P. Hassner, *La coopération franco-allemande: Achille immobile à grand pas?*, in: D.S. Yost, *Franco-German Defense Cooperation*, Chapter from S.F. Szabo, Editor, *The Bundeswehr and Western Security*, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 242.

¹⁹⁷ see: German Federal Ministry of Defense, *White Paper 1994*, p. 40.

economic prosperity to allow a peaceful transition of the former Warsaw Pact countries is vital. This must be interpreted more as a 'Zwang nach Osten' (compulsion) than a 'Drang nach Osten' (yearning).¹⁹⁸ Since the German economy actually suffers from structural weaknesses and imbalances which make it incapable of coping alone with this large scale problem, the European imperative becomes inescapable. „It is only a politically stable Union ... which would be capable of generating a viable stabilization plan for the East. At the same time, it is a strong and coherent Union (rather than a weak and aimless one) which the former Warsaw Pact countries wish to join“.¹⁹⁹

This outline for the basic interests of the three major actors of the European Union gives an idea of how different perspectives can be. Additionally, there are a lot of other states which have to be taken into account. It would overload the framework of this thesis to describe their intentions in detail, but it must be recognized that a common understanding of the direction of a European security and defense identity will depend, more than marginally, on all of these countries. They are equally important partners, even if the burden they share with others is not a 'lion's share'. The Integrated Structure of NATO might be a good example of how to integrate partners for future European Union defense and security structures. However, the dominant partners will have to cut an unproportional amount of their dominance, share their decisions, and give up the total amount of responsibility, what seems to be quite easy, but is not without problems, as seen in the Gulf War. Thus, the relationship of European great powers to their 'junior partners' can be compared in some aspects with the one between America and today's Western Europe.

Trends suggest that in the next ten years the European Union will be widened and deepened. It is necessary that the 'deepening' encloses a common framework for dealing with defense questions for two reasons: First, the security of each of the member countries, and therefore of the European Union as a whole, will depend to a great extent on the Union's ability to form a pole of stability, integration and peace. Second, growing

¹⁹⁸ see: J. Howorth, *Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?*, p. 14.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

interdependence and the opening of frontiers leads to the 'natural' and 'logical' acceptance of a European frame of reference because politics follows economical, social and technological trends already under way. This trend towards a European political entity would be incomplete if it would not include the field of security and defense.²⁰⁰

- The European Union and NATO as well as the Western European Union (WEU) have different members. Their enlargement will probably lead, especially in the next years, to a further unequalness of membership. This fact will cause an existence of zones of different security which is neither acceptable for new partners nor for the United States, which fears 'backdoor commitments'. Moreover, any enlargement of the European Union will raise the question of the new member's relationship to the WEU. Thus, an answer needs to be found on how to coordinate enlargement and whether, if the answer is positive, how to create a 'congruence of membership' to avoid different zones of stability.
- In close relation to the question of different zones of security one can ask, how the Western European Union should fit into the security landscape of the future. Will it become an organic part of the European Union or will it remain autonomous. If the latter development takes place, additionally one has to define the relation between NATO, the European Union and the Western European Union.
- Reviewing the actual trends of the defense spending of the European Union countries, one can see that they will not be able to create full military capabilities to deal autonomously with collective defense of European Union territory and/or peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, as well as other missions (e.g. humanitarian) in the near future. Thus, the United States will play a continuing, probably major role in European security and defense. Trends

²⁰⁰ For a more detailed analysis see: L.Martin & J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, pp. 12,13 and 23.

towards unilateralism and selective involvements, especially if vital interests of the United States are not at stake, lead to the questions of how America will participate and how it will be integrated into a European security arrangement.

- Europe's security is shaped by Russia's instability, the economic difficulties of all Central and Eastern European states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by the dispersion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and the dissemination of knowledge in the field of weapons and the means to deliver these weapons. Local conflicts and claims of minorities in search for an identity, and, as shown above, an arc of crisis at Europe's southern flank with shaken social structures, which could give conflicts an irrational character, have additionally to be taken into consideration. In general, it is more or less impossible to make a clear threat assessment, as it was during the Cold War.

Extrapolations of how problems can be solved in the future are more than difficult because probabilities of threats have to be multiplied with probabilities of European development. Everyone knows that probability calculus in this case leads to a most uncertain prognosis. Thus, it is time for the European Union to develop its own security and defense identity in the framework of a common foreign and security policy. This makes the future less dependent on trends and uncertainties.

B. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

„Once you have economic union, a central bank, and a single currency, you have integration“.²⁰¹ This was the assumption on which the idea of the European Community (EC) was based after initial attempts to build a European Defense Community failed in 1954 when the French National Assembly vetoed the treaty. That, however, a political

²⁰¹ J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New Yorker, Sep 2 1991, p. 96.

union could not be born as a single-dimensional element became more and more clear. Thus, France, for example, accepted community with its ancient rival, Germany, in NATO and WEU. It did this not least because „the United States and Great Britain at last extended tangible assurances against the dread consequences of West Germany's resurgence ... and the WEU's terms bound every member to automatic intervention against aggression from any quarter whatsoever“.²⁰² Moreover, the economic interests were not as homogenous as had been assumed.²⁰³ 'Defense' and 'security', independently important, were not the only additional topics which must be included. The idea of a European defense and security identity was born to strengthen the integrative 'pull' of the European Community.

To a certain extent, the Franco-German 'team' played a leadership role, although they tended to agree more on institution building than on hard-core security policies. Especially in recent years, there is a demand for cohesiveness because a much broader range of issues is at stake. These issues pose a much greater challenge to the decision-making capacity of the European Union than in the past. The problems are not only with the fixed timeframe for a deeper integration as set by the 1996 Maastricht summit, but that scarce resources increasingly force states to form coalitions and alliances, and to introduce some division of labor which can be best done in an integrative political framework.²⁰⁴ Most likely this is why more than eighty percent of the European Union citizens favor a common defense policy, and seventy percent a common foreign policy.²⁰⁵ The open question, however, is whether the problem of diversity can be solved. From this derives the problem that coalitions of the capable and the willing are often much smaller than the membership of certain institutions. The development of a common foreign and security policy of the European Union will take some time. Less than before can European security

²⁰² J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: Foreign Policy, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 70-71.

²⁰³ e.g. the North-South split and different economic concepts (neo-mercantilism, neo-liberalism); described more detailed in: P. Schmidt, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI): A brief Analysis from a German Point of View, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Jan 1995, p. 13.

²⁰⁴ see: Ibid., p. 14.

²⁰⁵ see: REUTER, news agency, EU-Bürger für gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik, Jan 26 1995.

be defined by military means alone. The multidimensional approach also has to take into consideration: human and minority rights, economic security, ecological questions, crime and proliferation, as well as a new upcoming nationalism and ethnocentrism. A multidimensional equation normally has a multidimensional solution. Modern technology and computer-based problem solving, however, uses incrementalism. In the area of European security, this seems to be the only way also. The development of a European common foreign and security policy, as a 'big picture' and a 'grand strategy' is unachievable in the near future. It should, therefore, not be taken as a precondition for the creation of a European security and defense identity.²⁰⁶ The latter should rather be a step towards a more intensive political integration which leads, hopefully, to a common foreign and security policy.

Because between life as it is, and life as it should be, lies so enormous a difference that everybody who only cares about what 'should be' and not about what happens in reality, ruins his existence rather than preserves it.²⁰⁷

Finally, the probability of whether a European security and defense identity can be reached is dependent on multiple dimensions and elements. There are promoting and restraining factors which are important to notice.²⁰⁸

Promoting factors:

- Although there are no uncertainties about Germany's integration into a Western European 'society of states' and although Germany, during the last years after its

²⁰⁶ This was the proposal of H. Mey in his article: A European Security and Defense Identity - What Role for the United States?, in: Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, Jul/Sep 1995, p. 315. It would mean to prolong a further integration of the European Union, especially in military and security matters, for at least some decades. NATO is a good example for a 'security and defense identity' without having a common foreign and security policy. However, it was quite easy to create this on the basis of a common threat assessment in a bipolar world ...

²⁰⁷ Macchiavelli, Der Fürst, Kap. XV, (Translation by the author).

²⁰⁸ see: P. Schmidt, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI): A brief Analysis from a German Point of View, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Jan 1995, p. 9-11.

unification, tried most intensively to show that it is a reliable 'Atlantic' and 'European' partner, there are still some states which regard it as necessary to bind and fasten Germany into a network of multinational structures.

- The future of the United States policy towards Europe seems to be more and more unclear. While America underlines its European character (America sees itself as a European power²⁰⁹) and engages selectively in the area, as actually shown in Yugoslavia, a clearly Pacific orientation economically and a domestic orientation generally gain the priority. Such uncertainties raise the question of whether the Europeans should play a greater role in their own security affairs.
- The new threats to modern society are no longer only military threats. Collective defense organizations, for example NATO, are limited in their capabilities to deal with these threats. Conflict prevention and diplomacy with the aim of peaceful solutions are a vital interest to all EU member states. Why not, therefore, coordinate all security related issues within a single European framework?
- Russia, still trusts NATO only marginally, and regards it as a competitor within its sphere of influence. A much lesser critical view is taken against the European Union. Such preferences facilitate the promotion of a European security and defense identity.

Restraining factors:

- In recent years, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United Nations has played an increased role in international politics. Although the crises in the

²⁰⁹ „Die Vereinigten Staaten verstehen sich, wenn es um Europa geht, als eine europäische Macht“. see: J.D. Bindenagel, U.S. ambassador in Germany, Amerikanische Außenpolitik und transatlantische Beziehungen im Umbruch, in: Presse- u. Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Aug 1995, p. 36.

former Yugoslavia and Somalia have shown that there are also major deficiencies with the United Nations, so that some major states have decided to support the United Nations only within certain limits,²¹⁰ established collective security arrangements are promoted more than before.

- It is unlikely that Europe is caught up in a new nationalism. However, domestic issues play an increasingly important role. This promotes an introspection and a new 'sense' for the country. Thus, it will be difficult to gain majorities when national sovereignty must be transferred to international bodies, or when international agreements make compromises necessary.
- Additionally, inner-European divergences necessitate a continued role for the United States as a leader of the 'Western world'. Because America sees itself linked to Europe by NATO, the buildup of a European security and defense identity might be counterproductive, unless other links are established.

For the tremendous task of holding the free world together, the United States needed not only the cement of mutually beneficial trade but also a lot of help from its friends. Upon graduating into the world of giants, the continental [European] nations were expected to contribute more resources and a sense of common purpose to their long time association with the United States.²¹¹

- France's unwillingness to participate in multinational units and its categorical rejection of force deployments on its soil, even after it made first steps towards a reintegration of NATO in December 1995, jeopardizes European security and defense integration.²¹² France's attitude not only complicates the European

²¹⁰ see: United States Presidential Directive No. 25 and similar documents of other countries, developed in the same years.

²¹¹ P. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, St. Martin's Press, New York, 193, p. 171.

²¹² see: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 329.

development, but undermines efforts to retain significant United States military and nuclear presence in Europe, prevents continuing practical interactions between French forces and those of the Allies, and thus, delays the whole process of making practical steps forward towards a European security and defense identity.

In this situation the handling of the political process becomes more and more dependent on decisive major actors. 'Statesmanship' will be necessary to promote the process and to reach the goal of a European security and defense identity. This statesmanship must be based on the fundamental view that foreign policy must be value-oriented and probably guided less by national interests,²¹³ although the defense of citizens remains the first and foremost responsibility of a national government. The question is, whether the 'state' is still capable of fulfilling this task. It is doubtful that today anyone alone can manage the problems which affect his state, not to speak about 'world problems'. Therefore, the nation state remains a fundamental entity, but one „for cooperation in the field of defense“.²¹⁴ Only a coordinated policy can create a 'European Partner' for the United States, can guarantee that the interests of the partners in the European Union and in the Atlantic Alliance largely coincide,²¹⁵ and that discussion about a European security and defense identity becomes less a 'theological dispute' and more a practical discussion about security policy.

²¹³ see: Deutsche Presseagentur, Kinkel nennt Ausbau der EU Hauptziel der deutschen Außenpolitik, Mar 19 1995.

²¹⁴ M. Rifkind, speech to Royal Institute of International Relations, Jan 30 1995, p. 10.

²¹⁵ The assumption of coincidence was made in: G. Diehl, Safeguarding German Interests, in: German Comments, No. 36, Oct 1994, p. 10.

... the European Union [has to] stop behaving in ways which Hedley Bull characterized during the early 1980s as 'civilian power Europe' - a tendency to finesse, defer or disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional security. ... The extent to which West European governments risk to the challenges of the post-cold war world ... will help to determine not only Europe's place in the world, but also Europe's location between what Stanley Hoffmann has referred to as the 'Hobbesian floor' of perpetual warfare and the 'Kantian ceiling' of perpetual peace.²¹⁶

The situation in Bosnia is not a proof of the failing of the Maastricht Treaty, but has created evidence for the urgent necessity of a coordinated foreign, security, and defense policy.

There were some notable attempts at real progress in the field of 'high politics', including the 1976 Tindemans Report, which called for enhanced foreign policy coordination, the 1984 reactivation of the Western European Union, which has become the focal point of the debate about the European Union's defense identity, the 1987 Single European Act, which brought European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the Community's institutional and legal purview, and those portions of the Maastricht Treaty which committed the European Union to a Common Foreign and Security Policy. „These positive developments have nonetheless been eclipsed by the campaign for EU economic integration“.²¹⁷ It was in the fear of a new Weimar and historical experience of how quickly inflation destroys confidence in the reliability of political institutions and ends up endangering democracy, that let the German chancellor Kohl press for European Integration 'at all costs' and 'under no circumstances open for discussion'.²¹⁸ However, also from a 'security standpoint' it is not less important that the European Union is pursuing the prospect of real unity. It has no alternative if it wishes to have a word in matters relating to its own security. The European security and defense identity as a

²¹⁶ D.T. Stuart, Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Feb 4 1994, p. 8.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

²¹⁸ see: A. Cowell, Kohl Presses Case for European Integration, in: The New York Times, Oct 17 1995.

prerequisite for a common foreign and security policy is the next logical step along this path.

Europeans should not get too accustomed to „living with contradictions such as that between declaring European integration a goal and then hesitating to make it reality“.²¹⁹ Therefore it is necessary, only to mention a few states, that Germany no longer uses its past as an alibi, France, due to the fact that, militarily, it has always depended on NATO with only a negligible independence, integrates further, and Great Britain no longer keeps its mixed attitudes, becoming a European partner but arguing that „British soldiers would fight for Britain, but never for Brussels, the European Union's executive headquarters“.²²⁰ The slowest cannot determine the speed of integration; everyone should bring in his strengths, as it is in a real partnership: defense security for monetary security, economic capabilities for military capabilities, diplomatic advantages for geographic advantages, bureaucratic channels for personal ones. Thus it is counterproductive, for example on the side of Sweden, Finland and Austria, to announce officially that, as new European Union members, they do not have any interests in a common security policy.²²¹

In the same inadequate way, Germany with its monetary strength, could insist on not becoming part of the monetary union, just as Britain could take over the American argument that all decisions concerning European security policy should be made in, and implemented through, NATO only.²²² The mentality that Europe should 'add foreign and security policies together' without regard to what they look like, is like mixing all the colors of a paint box. „The result, inevitably, is a muddy shade of brown“.²²³ A 'common' way has to be found! „Therefore, the political integration has to be first, the military

²¹⁹ The Wall Street Journal, Germany's Vision of Europe, Mar 15 1995.

²²⁰ A. Cowell, Kohl Presses Case for European Integration.

²²¹ The announcements were made in combination with a protest against French nuclear testing in autumn 1995. See: E. Bonse, Der zweite Versuch - Der neue EU-Vertrag soll die Union effizienter und demokratischer machen - aber beides nur ein bißchen, in: Das Sonntagsblatt, Nr. 44, Nov 3 1995, p. 22.

²²² see: W.T. Johnsen, T.D. Young, French Policy toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sep 9 1994, p. 18.

²²³ N. Malcolm, The Failings of a Federal Europe, in: The Wall Street Journal, Apr 13 1995.

cannot and must not make the pace, but contribute with no reservations to this process. To avoid disturbances and irritations in regard to the responsibilities of the different alliances and communities, the harmonization of the organizations has to become a first prerequisite".²²⁴ Thus, one key question to be raised at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 is whether the member states are prepared to coordinate political will and translate the result into action. Two debates circumscribe the actual discussions. The first is between those who rely on strengthening the multilateral institutions, like UN and OSCE, and those for whom 'defense', i.e. the capability to use a military option to defend oneself or one's community, and its values and interests is still a necessity. The second debate is between those who believe that concentrating on 'European defense' is a myth, since defense should remain a matter for nations, and those who support a European defense as both a long-term objective and the inescapable result of foreseeable international developments.²²⁵

There is no doubt that the development of the European Union has created an area of stability. Since Europe's security is indivisible it should preserve its inner stability and become a global actor with the aim to guarantee peace and freedom for its members and the whole Europe. From a German point of view, a common European defense thus consequently leads to a European Union wide security guaranty, which can be described by NATO's article 5 or WEU's article V guarantee.²²⁶ What kind of community would we have if there was a cohesion fund for expressing financial solidarity, but no one would come to the aid of another member state if it fell victim to aggression? In other scenarios, no state should be made to deploy its armed forces against its will, as well as individual member states should not prevent a majority from acting jointly.²²⁷ Whatever the outcome of ongoing discussions will be, several principles should be respected:

²²⁴ K. Wiesmann, What kind of military would serve Europe at the best?, speech at Centre d'Etude et de Prospective Stratégique, Paris, Apr 11 1995, p. 6.

²²⁵ see: R. Bussière, A Europe of Security and Defence, in: NATO Review, Sep 1995, p. 31.

²²⁶ see: V. Rühle, speech at the Sicherheitspolitische Informationstagung der Clausewitz-Gesellschaft at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Aug 18 1995, in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 9, Sep 1995, p. 46.

- European states have common historical and cultural roots. From these roots common values, interests and intentions can be derived. Politics of the European Union states should increasingly concentrate on these common basics to make participation in any action, whether military or non-military, easier and more probable. All taken steps must strengthen international cooperation, human rights, and democracy, as well as the rule of the law.

- European security and defense identity's main goal is to preserve peace and stability. This goal can only be fulfilled when preserving a close transatlantic relationship. Solidarity especially with the United States, is essential and indispensable to achieve an overall strategic balance on the European continent. „The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamental important aspect“.²²⁸ However, a de facto United States right of veto on the European capacity to act should not be accepted, nor a limit on the role of the United States in Europe to „intervention in a hypothetical generalized conflict like that envisaged in Article 5 of the Washington treaty“.²²⁹ Europe has to become an equal partner of the United States.

- Structures and decision-making processes should not complicate a European security and defense identity. The danger that the European Union might become a complicated and unfathomable network with uncertain political outcomes has to be countered by structural adjustments and the creation of new competent decision bodies.

²²⁷ see: K. Kinkel, speech to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), Berlin, Oct 12 1995, in: Bonn Bulletin, No. 82, Oct 16 1995, p. 802.

²²⁸ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Jan 10-11 1994, para. 2.

²²⁹ L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 14-16.

- European Union's capabilities should complement and not replace those of NATO. From this derives the principle that both, NATO and European Union, should use basically the same security structures and avoid duplications. The difficulty is, how this can be implemented without drawing unwilling states into military operations, and without making the European Union incapable of conducting any military operations on its own. As a principle, however, non-duplication is essential, due to the unwillingness of all European Union and NATO states to spend a great amount of money on the same purpose in both organizations.

A European security and defense identity is only understandable when it is able to explain the tasks for EU/WEU forces and capabilities²³⁰ in imaginable scenarios. It must be remarked that opinions differ among European Union states. France, for example, tries to keep NATO mostly out of European Union security, while for Great Britain a scenario is hardly imaginable in which NATO, or at least the United States, is not involved. Proposed solutions for the following scenarios are therefore derived from the personal subjective view of the German author.

1. Massive attack against Western Europe or attack on a single NATO country

This scenario is the least likely. It would clearly fall under Article Five of the North Atlantic treaty and would cause collective defense together with the North American allies. The European Union and the Western European Union should not involve themselves in such a case, even not in the prewar crises, because crisis prevention and collective defense would only be successful if NATO speaks 'with one voice', without a division between American and European NATO partners. In the background, however, the Western European Union could coordinate actions and adapt non-NATO partners to the Alliance, which would participate on the side of NATO.

²³⁰ In the following scenarios it is assumed that the WEU will be the subcontractor of the EU in military operations. Forces and capabilities are thus nominated as 'EU/WEU' forces/capabilities.

2. Attack on a European Union country which is not a NATO member

Although formal commitments for NATO members do not exist in this case, at least the European countries, but most likely also the United States, would have a moral obligation for help and support. However, in the event of a military conflict, these moral obligations do not give complete security for the possibly attacked states. Also a Western European Union membership, after an enlargement, for example, would not really help because the WEU is not capable of guaranteeing a collective defense in more than minor conflicts. Today such a collective defense would be only possible by NATO. There are two possibilities to solve this problem: first, one should strive for a final congruence of membership, so that all EU and WEU members are also NATO members. This is obviously not reachable in the near future because former neutral states are not yet willing to join organizations of collective defense. Second, the Combined Joint Task Force Concept (CJTF) could enable the European Union and the Western European Union to fulfill their own collective defense with NATO assets and capabilities. Then, however, Combined Joint Task Forces could not only be earmarked for peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, a concept of command and control must be agreed upon between the different partners. This is still a major obstacle in today's discussion.

3. Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Operations

In cases when NATO's area of responsibility is not involved or non-EU NATO members have no interests in such operations, the European Union and/or Western European Union should have the capability to act alone. Besides humanitarian help and 'Search and Rescue' (SAR), these operations will mostly conduct such UN or OSCE measures which are in the range of the Petersberg duties and for which no NATO assets probably will be necessary.

4. Threat from extreme or fundamentalist countries to European Union non-NATO countries

Especially states in Southern Europe lie in the range to be threatened by radical states. If weapons of mass destruction are involved, it is very likely that NATO and the

United States will engage because the use, or threatening use, of these weapons has not only a great military but also an enormous political impact. However, nuclear deterrence and protection against small scale attacks, even with weapons of mass destruction, is the prerequisite for a credible European security and defense identity. From this, it follows that France and Great Britain, the only European Union nuclear states today, have to 'europeanize' their weapons, despite the fact that nuclear weapons „touch the very core of national sovereignty ... and protect only their possessors“.²³¹ That means that they would give security guarantees to the other European Union states in the same way as the United States has done during the Cold War (also for France and Great Britain). If countries cannot rely on others for nuclear deterrence, then it is probable that they will try to build their own weapons or, at least, get the capabilities for a rapid build-up. This should be avoided.

„To a certain extent, the creation of a European nuclear deterrence posture lies in the logic of the process of the European political integration“.²³² Thus, although the nuclear question still remains on the backburner, this question must be addressed sooner or later, „if the politico-strategic entity of a true European Union is ever to be achieved“.²³³ If the challenge is a limited conventional threat, European Union should be capable of withstanding such attacks and responding on the same level.

This analysis is, of course, far from exhaustive, but gives an idea of the range of actions that the European Union or, until they merge, the Western European Union could and should execute by themselves. However, such forces could not be effectively and autonomously operating „unless the West Europeans substantially improve capabilities that are currently inadequate for major conflicts“.²³⁴

²³¹ J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: Foreign Policy, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 78.

²³² K.-H. Kamp, Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No. 3, Sep 1995, p. 284.

²³³ Ibid., p. 284.

²³⁴ D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 340.

Thus, EU member states would have to commit themselves to providing the necessary military means that would enable the EU/WEU to act in such a manner, by assigning their existing forces (including their nuclear deterrents, operating in a common European framework) to such tasks, and by creating new capabilities such as transport, command structures, and satellite systems.²³⁵

In regard to the transatlantic link, it is thought that Europe should manage the 'lion's share' of its conventional defense if America guarantees its nuclear umbrella over an extended member-territory and fulfills its obligations for help in case deterrence failed. However, European multidimensional weaknesses are major obstacles to overcome: Western societies today simply have no 'stomach' for large-scale military interventions. „Whether this is due to a general weakening of loyalty to the state, hedonistic individualism, or simply the small size of families“,²³⁶ remains to be analyzed. Furthermore, besides missing military capabilities and a still un-operationalized Combined Joint Task Force Concept, it is questionable whether Europe would make use of available capabilities. Internal problems of consensus, a recent concentration on politico-diplomatic interventions or economical sticks-and-carrots policies, and a lacking security identity are the reasons for this.²³⁷ Despite all these weaknesses, however, the aim should not be simply to limit European military tasks to those operations which can be accomplished with today's European military assets. This would mean a 'further free ride' and no real partnership to 'the' security guarantor America could be established. Efforts must be made! Whether the existing structures still fit into the security landscape has to be examined. It is a correct concept to provide European security „during the present turbulent period ... by optimizing the elements of the existing network and improve their cooperation and interoperability“.²³⁸ But for the foreseeable future, this structure is not a

²³⁵ K. Kaiser, Challenges and Contingencies for European Defence Policy, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Jan 30 1995, p. 4.

²³⁶ M. Jakobson, Collective Security in Europe today, in: The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, p. 63.

²³⁷ For a detailed analysis see: M. Jopp, Langer Weg - kühnes Ziel: Gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik, in: Europa Archiv, Vol. 13-14, 1994, p. 398-99.

²³⁸ D. Genschel, Transatlantic Relations and International Security, The Evolution of Civilian and Military Structures, UNIDIR conference, Caen, Sep 22-23 1994, Second Session, p. 10.

God made axiom.²³⁹ It should be self-explaining that unrealistic visions do not help make progress towards a European security and defense identity. But to declare every step onto new ground as not manageable would mean, for example, that today's Eurocorps demonstrates the limits for multinational units, that the WEU member states are, and will be, unable to fulfill any of their military tasks, approved in the Brussels treaty²⁴⁰, and that a common foreign and security policy will never be developed. In the near future, there should be answers to basic questions like these: Whether and how to merge EU and WEU, how to regulate the future cooperation between NATO and EU/WEU, how to include the United States and Canada into European crisis management and defense, whether it would be desirable to have a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe and an American NATO Secretary General,²⁴¹ and which relations to NATO and/or EU/WEU non-member states should be established. In the near future, priority should be given to draw up an inventory of the forces and equipment actually available to the European Union, including constitutional or legal limitations on their use, as done with the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) list for the Petersberg task spectrum. Furthermore a body for proposing military options to the Councils of EU and WEU before deciding on any common action that has a defense element should be established. This body could be the contact point for America. Additionally, a form of interface between the military command and the politico-military authority has to be found. This interface needs to define the actual chain of command and coordinate possible ad hoc coalitions with non-member states.²⁴² The ability to pursue an independent defense policy depends on European Union's capacity to meet

²³⁹ For example, a realistic option for a future European defense is to merge WEU and EU.

²⁴⁰ Especially Article V of the WEU treaty: „If any of the member states should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other member states will, in accordance with the provision of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power“ would mean nothing to any member state, unless 'power' is more than a 'goodwill of the non-capable'.

²⁴¹ There are some very good arguments for this proposal, especially in regard to the development of a ESDI while preserving a strong transatlantic relationship. See: D. Law, Ein Amerikaner als NATO-Generalsekretär, in: Rheinischer Merkur, Sep 9 1994.

²⁴² L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 83.

its equipment and supply requirements from a European defense industry. Maintaining an effective, competitive defense industry will therefore help to establish a credible European security and defense identity.²⁴³ Last, but not least, is multinational-task-sharing a way to avoid gaps in essential military capabilities. It implies a pooling of forces and capabilities from different nations, so that, for example, a combined air transport capability can be build up, while, at the same time and when necessities arise, a national access to these assets will still be possible. It will depend on the further development of the EU-WEU-NATO relationship in which areas these proposals are to be increased. Furthermore, new partners will have an influence on European Union's threat assessment, and therefore necessary capabilities, as well as on the political sphere of a European security and defense identity.

The European Union has to solve political, organizational, and military problems, as shown above, for reaching the goal of a European security and defense identity. The European context with its trends and challenges, as well as the fundamental opportunity to go forward towards new, modern structures, gives the framework for solutions. It is unlikely that established organizations will be dissolved in the very near future. However, transitional arrangements eventually can also produce an outcome in which a radically new security framework across the continent of Europe is established. Futuristic thoughts of a 'United States of Europe', which will be able to allow itself an independence from another big power, underline this approach. In the future years, however, nothing radical like this will occur. One can with some probability predict that NATO will remain the most important forum for defense of European countries, the European Union will, incrementally, develop a European identity in which security and defense have their place, the Western European Union will be further torn between the two functions 'European pillar of NATO' and 'Defense component of the European Union' until it probably merges with the European Union, and the United States will, hopefully, be preserved as a strategic partner. A conclusion for the European security and defense identity, thus, can only be

²⁴³ see: Ibid., p. 22.

that its development will take some time because the goal is not yet clearly, and most important, not yet mutually defined.

C. FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRUCTURES

America's answer, when the idea of a revitalization of the Western European Union as the European pillar of NATO came up in the mid eighties, can only be described as 'indiscreet', 'heavy-handed', and 'hysterical'.²⁴⁴ Its fear was that the credibility of NATO's deterrence against the Warsaw Pact would be undermined. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the danger was clearly assessed that those European powers got the majority who wanted to have since long the United States in a more minor role in Europe. Especially France „trailblazed the notion of WEU as the principle (and increasingly autonomous) military instrument of the European Community/Union ... thereby implicitly leaving a relatively secondary role for NATO in the affairs of Europe“. ²⁴⁵ From 1990 to 1992, Germany reacted with 'Genscherism', promoting, at one and the same time, the restructuring of NATO, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the upgrading of the Western European Union, and the launch of the Franco-German Eurocorps. Although it included elements with which nearly everybody could be pleased, this approach helped in no way to define a future European policy. A comparison between European key partners demonstrates that there are widely divergent conceptions of political ambitions and positions. Great Britain, for example, strives for a limitation of WEU operations on those which can be fulfilled with actual European forces and insists on further independence of EU and WEU. Others fear that a development of Article J 4 of the EU treaty would lead finally to a European system of collective defense, at the same time undermining NATO and the transatlantic security partnership. The group of former

²⁴⁴ see: J. Newhouse, The Diplomatic Round - A collective nervous Breakdown, in: The New Yorker, Sep 2 1991, p. 92. (ylp15)

²⁴⁵ J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing the New Europe, Oxford Polity Press, 1994, p. 24.

'neutral' states, like Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, will make it more difficult to formulate a European defense perspective, in which EU, WEU, NATO, and probably the OSCE have their defined places.²⁴⁶ Thus, all in all one can paint a very negative picture of 'coordinated' future European defense structures.

We sent many good people off to serve on international committees. The cost bore little relation to the return. In contrast, [even] the network of bilateral relations has been weakened, although the instructions to the national delegations in the EU, NATO, UNO etc. come directly from the respective capitals.²⁴⁷

Although NATO's member states at the 1991 Rome summit propagated a 'framework of interlocking institutions', today neither a system based on the division of labor nor a indivisible network are present. It took until 1992, when the Petersberg Declaration gave the basic outline for the development of a common European defense identity through cooperation in the security field and through strengthening the European pillar of NATO. In the declaration „Western European Union members pledged their support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts [by forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)] in cooperation with the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and with the United Nations Security Council“.²⁴⁸ The decision to set up the WEU Planning Cell and to establish a 'Forum of Consultation' as a first step towards a possible enlargement of the WEU supported the goal to conduct a more military capable role than in the past and to become a major player in the realm of security and defense in Europe. The Kirchberg Declaration offered the opportunity for members of the Consultation Forum to become 'Associated Partners', a further step to bind East European countries while preserving the privileged status of 'Members' and 'Associated Members' (Iceland, Norway, Turkey). This development was, in general, estimated as a positive one, interestingly resembling the vision of a European security articulated by

²⁴⁶ Participation of these states in NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative will not solve this problem.

²⁴⁷ G. Diehl, Safeguarding German Interests, in: German Comments, No. 36, Oct 1994, p. 11.

²⁴⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 199.

George Kennan in 1948.²⁴⁹ While the European Council already in 1991 in Maastricht had defined the Western European Union as the defense component of the European Union and, thus, given the objectives of building up the organization and strengthening its operational role, NATO gave full support to the development at its summit in January 1994. Since then, it sees the WEU as the defense component of the EU and the European security and defense identity as a strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance. In addition, NATO endorsed the concept of 'Combined Joint Task Forces' (CJTF) as a means of facilitating contingency operations. „This concept is to be implemented in a manner that provides 'separable but not separate' military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU, in situations affecting European security in which NATO itself is not involved“.²⁵⁰ However, although this concept has been agreed upon at NATO's June 1996 meeting, the practical modalities remain to be determined. It points to a greater amount of still uncleared questions: Will the WEU merge with the EU in the future? How will Western European links with NATO²⁵¹ be affected by this eventual merge? Should the task sharing between NATO and EU/WEU then be in a way that NATO guarantees 'collective defense' while EU/WEU conducts all other operations, so far as it is capable to do? And generally, will the transatlantic relationship evolve, to forge

²⁴⁹ Kennan had the idea of a three-tier security system. At its core would be the five nations of the 1948 Brussels treaty plus the US, Canada, Norway and Denmark. He envisioned a second ring of 'associated members', comprised of certain governments (e.g. Portugal, Sweden) which would be accorded security guarantees in exchange for basing privileges. A third 'affiliate' category would be established for various nations and territories which the Western governments considered to be of special strategic importance.

For further details see: D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 38.

²⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, p. 201-202.

²⁵¹ According to Article IV of the Brussels Treaty that established the WEU, as amended in 1954, the signatories and 'any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation' with NATO. ... When the political union of the Twelve is at this faltering initial stage, is it advisable to reduce the Community's autonomy in relationship to NATO and to involve Washington in the very process of elaborating the political union?

see: D.S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Jul/Aug 1991, p. 338.

a new, stronger, and wider transatlantic bargain²⁵² and will this eventually lead to a completely new security and defense structure for Europe?

These questions have to be answered in the near future. It is quite clear that this cannot be done 'between breakfast and lunch'. However not every answer is probably possible because there are some fixed key points which are to be taken into consideration: „A European defense identity cannot be built unless NATO in effect withdraws from some of its responsibilities, because NATO has been such a completely dominant framework that it discourages the emergence of a real military defense role for the WEU or EC political union in Europe; it would be politically absurd to build a West European defense entity that has no autonomous military role in Europe“.²⁵³ In the January 1994 NATO summit's decisions it is clearly expressed that NATO „stands ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy“.²⁵⁴ However, the WEU is in no position either politically or militarily to rival NATO as an organization capable of power projection, of major peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations or of waging war. Thus in the foreseeable future, the WEU will concentrate on its support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts, as laid down in the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration.

The discussion about how to develop future European defense structures depends on the reason for it. One can distinguish between three different grounds: the first one is the 'evolutionary approach' which stresses the parallel development of NATO, EU, and WEU in a coordinated process, fulfilling the main task to avoid zones of different security in Europe and with the aim of having a 'congruence of membership' in all organizations in the long run. The second approach stresses the historical chance which has evolved through the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This gives the possibility of

²⁵² see: S.S. Balanzino, *Adapting the Alliance: Restructuring NATO after the Cold War*, in: *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 17, Spring 1995, p. 34-35.

²⁵³ D.S. Yost, *France and West European Defense Identity*, p. 335.

²⁵⁴ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Jan 10-11 1994, Chapter 6.

transferring stability and democracy to East Europe, which should be flanked by defense-oriented actions, so that these states could become members of the Western 'zone of stability'. The third approach is based on a threat assessment which sees Russia as a still aggressive, or at least uncalculatable state, so that Western security has to be based on 'collective defense' organizations with security guarantees. Although the first approach tends to stress the development of a European security system, the second one concentrates on 'collective security' systems, and the third one seems to point out the overwhelming importance of NATO, it is not possible to combine each of these approaches with an established organization. Recent developments and political course settings in the near future, especially in 1996, make forecasts difficult. However, 'as a model' one can define 'probability zones' of possible organizations' responsibilities which are defined by 'forms of engagement' and 'participating states'. In general, contributions, whatever they look like, should be complementary and mutually supportive to the settlements of problems, and ways and means should be sought for reducing unnecessary duplications to a minimum.²⁵⁵

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Judgments about NATO's development and importance are very different. On the one hand, it is seen as being in bad shape, „unable to resolve its identity crisis, brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union“,²⁵⁶ on the other hand, as indispensable to the security of Europe and as the only functioning defense organization. The purpose of NATO is mostly seen in having two possible functions: The first is its classic role: to defend its members against military threats, from wherever they arise. The other function is „to guarantee the security of its internal as well as external frontiers, assuring the peaceful conduct of its own members“,²⁵⁷ which became especially important because of new

²⁵⁵ For more detailed criteria see: European Union, The Council, Mutually Reinforcing Institutions, Note from the Secretariat, Political Committee, Brussels, Apr 12 1994.

²⁵⁶ see: E. Mortimer, In search of an Enemy, in: Financial Times, Dec 7 1994.

²⁵⁷ W. Pfaff, The new Job for NATO should be Security Eastward, in: International Herald Tribune, Dec 8 1994.

instabilities born of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism. NATO's involvement in former Yugoslavia made clear that an additional peacekeeping function under United Nations command, with a dual-key mechanism, cannot exclusively define its future. „If NATO cooperates with the UN [or the OSCE], it must simply be given a task that its members accept and then it must have a free hand militarily to fulfill that task“.²⁵⁸

NATO's character can be derived from its origin. The signature of the Washington Treaty in April 1949 was a reaction to the declared ideological aims of the Soviet Communist Party. The democratic states of the post-World War Two world saw that their national sovereignty and independence faced a threat from outside aggression and internal subversion. The development of undemocratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe and a series of dramatic political events, e.g. the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, forced them to develop a common defense system and to strengthen ties between them in a manner that would enable them to resist ideological, political, and military threats.

[The Parties to this Treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.²⁵⁹

NATO thus was founded on the basis of collective defense, risk- and responsibility sharing and, last but not least, on a mutual agreement on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The equality of security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances contributed to an overall stability within Europe. Furthermore a transatlantic link was built. The United States and Canada committed themselves to be part of the European security and common value system. Of vital issue was the United States' nuclear umbrella which participated in a credible deterrence against a conventional overwhelming enemy from the East. After the Cold War

²⁵⁸ F. Kempe, A reeling NATO gambles its Future, in: The Wall Street Journal, Nov 30 1994.

²⁵⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 04/04/1949, Preamble, in: NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 231.

NATO had to be adapted to the changed threat, environment and upcoming wishes of the Central and Eastern European states to participate in Western security. Thus, NATO cannot restrict itself to the task of collective defense. The most important challenge is the multitude of crises and conflict potentials. Therefore the force structures are being adapted to the new requirements, multinational reaction forces are formed and a NATO Long Term Study is initiated with the aim to adapt military structures to the new advanced task spectrum. Also political measures were taken to meet the new environment. The November 1991 Rome summit developed a new strategic concept which stresses the elements of dialogue, cooperation, collective defense and crisis management. The military dimension of the alliance remains thereby an essential factor. It continues to reflect a number of fundamental principles:

- The alliance is purely defensive in purpose
- Security is indivisible. An attack on one partner is an attack upon all.
- NATO's security policy is based on collective defense.
- The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe will be required for the foreseeable future.

The January 1994 Brussels summit was the 'reform summit' which achieved decisions about new initiatives of NATO: 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP), which invited the reform states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and other CSCE states to participate in a program for political and military cooperation, 'Combined Joint Task Force' (CJTF), with the aim of adapting NATO's structures and procedures for a more flexible and efficient conduct of new tasks and the possibility of strengthening WEU's operational freedom of action by providing elements from NATO's integrated command structure, and, last not least, 'Non-Proliferation', being an approach to develop an overall strategy to meet the threat of increasing sale of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. In May

1995, the alliance offered Russia a 'strategic partnership', which guarantees Russia to play, due to its size and importance, an adequate role in European security.

Taking into consideration the development of a beginning cooperative security network and the general preparedness to take over 'out of area' tasks, the Atlantic alliance had been capable to adapt to new challenges and political constellations, so that officials already ²⁶⁰speak of a 'new NATO'. NATO's adaptability is caused by daily politico-military cooperation, reliable partnership, material and procedural standardization, well-adjusted consultation mechanisms, and its integrated military structure. Thus, France, having taken first steps towards a deeper integration into NATO in December 1995, will further this development. However, future tasks will be more challenging than the successful 'being present' of the past. NATO has to act now. This takes as a prerequisite the agreement of member nations to participate in actions, although normally they loath to be dragged into conflicts not their own. „And peripheral arenas, where interests by definition are not alike, are tailor-made for the entrapment syndrome, which is as corrosive of coalitions as is the fear of abandonment“.²⁶¹ Thus, the danger of increased nationalized arguments is very acute. The continuing community of basic political values is not in question; but this does not immediately generate an obvious community for specific tasks, a shared practical agenda. In attempts to avoid tensions, „an articulate minority argued for a closely-defined role ... an article-5-only view“.²⁶² However, most member states regarded this as much too narrow a concept. They decided to create a new force structure within the integrated military structure which aims at establishing Rapid Reaction, Main Defense, and Augmentation Forces without giving strategic priority to any. But „in fact nations are concentrating on Reaction Forces in view of drastically decreasing funds and a sometimes freefall reduction of military forces“.²⁶³ Nevertheless, this was a reaction to

²⁶⁰ see: General Joulwan, NATO heute und morgen, in: Europäische Sicherheit, 8/1995, cited in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 9, Sep 1995, p. 36-38.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶² Director Ditchley Foundation, The Future of the North Atlantic Alliance, Ditchley Conference Nov 18-20 1994, Note by the Director, p. 1.

shifting probabilities: Crisis management with non-article 5 missions will be the most likely future scenarios. It is, however, necessary that NATO's coherence is still guaranteed, so that the Atlantic alliance will be further the central element of the European security architecture, the heart of the transatlantic relationship and the permanent bond between North America and Europe. This is especially essential if the organization enlarges. The 'widening' process can only be done safely when it is clearly defined and supported by the surrounding member states. It is not the colorful wrapping of NATO that attracts new partners but the core ideals, mutual solidarity, and the security partnership that no other organization has yet established. The alliance has taken on the task of stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe with the Partnership for Peace initiative. A balanced approach of integration and cooperation is operationalized to accomplish this task. This new kind of partnership is the logical continuation of the concept of partnership, dialogue and cooperation with non-NATO states which was defined and endorsed at the 1991 Rome summit and subsequently led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Internationality is one of the vital foundations of the alliance, with no privileges, only equal rights, irrespectively of the political weight of the members. It is this fact that entitles NATO to feel confident and legitimized in devoting itself to new partners and new tasks, and in projecting security to the East. In fact, another dominant view in Europe is that the European Union, not NATO, is the right instrument for the promotion of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁶⁴ In fact there is an element of institutional rivalry in this, increased by the fact that security can no longer be defined unidirectionally (i.e. militarily), but has other implications (e.g. economical). Thus, it would be unrealistic if a collective defense organization should organize Europe's future security alone. The 'concert of organizations' has to fulfill this task, mutually reinforcing each other.²⁶⁵ However, only

²⁶³ D. Genschel, *Transatlantic Relations and International Security, The Evolution of Civilian and Military Structures*, UNIDIR conference, Caen, Sep 22-23 1994, Second Session, p. 2.

²⁶⁴ see: M. Jakobson, *Collective Security in Europe today*, in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1995, p. 65.

²⁶⁵ see: European Union, *The Council, Mutually Reinforcing Institutions*, Note from the Secretariat, Political Committee, Brussels, Apr 12 1994, p. 1.

NATO can build the military backbone of a security system in Europe. It is seen as an 'anchor of stability'. Any measures that leads to a bifurcation of NATO into one organization for collective defense and another for peacekeeping would considerably weaken it in the exercise of both functions. Due to the changed security landscape and public opinion, there is not a single ally today who can afford to support an alliance which is oriented completely on defense against a major aggression what is now most unlikely. But on the other hand, if the allies are no longer prepared for and capable of collective defense, then the most important foundation of the alliance is gone. The main task of NATO as a defense alliance is and must continue to be to protect NATO territory and the political freedom of its member states.

2. European Union / Western European Union

The European Union takes responsibilities for the complete field of politics, also for security and defense. The 1991 'Treaty on European Union' formulates in its articles J.4(1) and J.4(2):

„The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense“.

„The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements“.

The implementation through the WEU is underlined by its member state declaration that the role of the WEU is, in the long run, to be strengthened, with the goal of a coordinated common defense policy between NATO and European Union. The WEU is seen, at the same time, as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance and as the defense component of the European Union,²⁶⁶ as an organization which strengthens NATO's

²⁶⁶ see: Erklärung zur Westeuropäischen Union, Feb 1992, in: Bulletin, No. 16, Feb 12 1992, p. 182.

cohesion and, at the same time, articulates European Union's politico-military goals. This means that a European common defense policy, as part of a common foreign and security policy, defines as its core part mutual assistance and protection. Security and freedom, beyond the European territory, is included by pointing to the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter.²⁶⁷ However, it is clear, that the main emphasis is laid on the security of EU member states. Despite Art V of the Brussels Treaty, which defines mutual help in case of a military attack, collective defense shall be, by far, guaranteed through NATO which is seen, in a substantial part, as a European pact. A 'congruence of membership' between NATO, EU, and WEU is, to some degree, necessary to avoid irritations and 'backdoor commitments'. A growing gap in European membership of NATO and EU/WEU would have a corrosive effect on the effectiveness of all the institutions concerned because it would send inconsistent signals to neighbor states like Russia. Such a 'disconnected' arrangement is not 'resilient' in a crisis, when common understandings and an effective development of policies is essential; it works only in a benign environment. Furthermore, by „devaluing the notion of mutually reinforcing institutions, it would couch NATO's enlargement in far more antagonistic terms than would a broader process of comprehensive political, economic and military integration“.²⁶⁸ It is necessary that, due to a EU/WEU-NATO membership linkage, a situation is avoided in which the EU/WEU would take on de facto security commitments towards Central and Eastern European states, while relegating the United States to 'counterbalance' this through a close bilateral partnership with Russia. „Such a division of labor is likely to overtax both European capabilities to defend Russia's neighbors and US capabilities of engaging Russia alone“.²⁶⁹ A congruence of membership, however, does not necessarily imply a rigid synchronization. There are good reasons why, for example, a NATO member like Turkey is not actually a member of the European

²⁶⁷ see: Treaty on European Union, 1991, Article J.1(2).

²⁶⁸ M. Rühle, N. Williams, NATO Enlargement and the European Union, in: *The World Today*, May 1995, p. 85.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Union. It does not fulfill democratic, economic or juristical standards on which the organization is based. The Western European Union's Associated Partnership and Associated Membership, the recently concluded Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, as well as NATO's Partnership for Peace program are ways of cooperation which can lead to a membership of an important country after some time, while avoiding instability of the organizations due to newly introduced problems. This is no 'fatal compromise' which endangers European integration,²⁷⁰ but a possibility of political stabilization of a country, and eventually a region, before the 'carrot' of a membership is reached.

Principles of NATO and WEU co-operation should be complementarity, compatibility, and transparency.²⁷¹ Moreover, the Petersberg agreement defines tasks like humanitarian help, peacekeeping missions, crisis management, and peace enforcement, to be conducted by 'forces answerable to WEU', without the transatlantic partners, if necessary. Parallel command and control structures, as well as force structures with NATO are, however, not planned. During its January 1994 and June 1996 summits, NATO agreed to endorse the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept with which NATO's integrated assets and capabilities can be made available for EU/WEU operations. This enables the WEU to conduct its own missions, as the defense arm of NATO or as the European Union's defense component. The CJTF concept underlines that Euro-Atlantic consultations and pragmatic strategies are necessary to realize complementary, compatible and transparent cooperation. It avoids duplications and parallel structures by using a flexible, multinational, mobile and economical approach for using scarce resources. It seems to be the only way in which NATO's capabilities, standardizations, and procedures can be used effectively also within WEU.²⁷² The CJTF concept is the key to the

²⁷⁰ This argument is used by W. Münster in his article: Die EU wagt einen fatalen Kompromiß - Mit ihrem Zugeständnis an Athen setzen die Außenminister die Integration aufs Spiel, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Feb 8 1995.

²⁷¹ see: J. Cutiliero, SecGen WEU, WEU's operational development and its relationship to NATO, in: NATO Review, Sep 95, p. 8-11.

²⁷² see: V. Rühle, WEU-Aspekte zur Anpassung von Allianz-Strukturen, Speech during May 1994 WEU Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg.

development of a European strategic ability to act militarily and, at the same time, the initialization of NATO's force structure adaptation. It should be one of the means that prepares, guides and controls operations for preserving peace, including the possibility that the Western European Union might use part of NATO's integrated military structure. Thus, the WEU has to find a way between the necessity to build up a certain autonomy for European military operations and the avoidance of a costly development of duplicated structures. A fusion of NATO's and WEU's organizational elements would, however, not fulfill this task because it would endanger the European operational autonomy, which was the aim of the Petersberg and Kirchberg agreements. Beyond facilitating the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations, the CJTF concept furthermore had the goal of permitting non-NATO partners to join NATO countries in operations, exercises and training as envisioned in the Partnership for Peace, and of giving NATO's force and command structure sufficient flexibility to respond to Alliance security requirements and new missions beyond article 5 contingencies, including requests from the UN or the OSCE to provide military intervention capabilities.²⁷³ This spectrum of goals made operationalization in detail difficult. France, for example, initially tried to implement the CJTF concept with the premise to make the WEU as autonomous as possible while, at the same time, insisting in a separate political and military structure for non-article 5 operations inside NATO. This would mean, that CJTF headquarters could no longer be applicable for collective defense. NATO's military structure would be used, but had no influence on the conduct of missions, and the transfer of assets and capabilities to the WEU were nearly automatic. This, of course, raised discussions, disagreements and unresolved problems among NATO and WEU member states that have not been resolved today, despite NATO's June 1996 summit's agreements.

NATO and nearly all Europeans neither need nor want two military organizations dealing with collective defense and out-of-area operations. Basic requirements for an ingenious adaptation of structures and procedures are to save the integrated command structure, to use it for collective defense and all other operations as far as possible, to use

²⁷³ see: S.R. Sloan, Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO, in: CRS Report for Congress, Mar 17 1994, p. 2-3.

the experience and skill of the Military Committee and its subordinated headquarters and to avoid ad-hoc structures. CJTF on the other hand makes it possible that every nation can visibly participate, for example in peacekeeping missions, if the nation agrees to the basic considerations above. This, especially, strengthens the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance and makes the Europeans capable of conducting crisis management on their own by using NATO's 'separable but not separate' assets. However, an autonomous European defense, existing side by side with the collective defense of NATO, would jeopardize the transatlantic relationship.

„The CJTF approach will not work without continued U.S. leadership and force contributions“.²⁷⁴ A European mission request which NATO turned down because of American objections would undermine the very coupling presupposed by 'separability', and, possibly undermine the Alliance's very survival.²⁷⁵ Because in the near future, the EU/WEU has to stem the decline in defense spending of recent years and reorient and equip at least some of their forces to be able to contribute to the varied coalition-style task force missions envisioned in a 'European security and defense identity' (which, as a prerequisite, has political consensus, financial expenditures, and a certain amount of standardization and interoperability, until today not yet agreed), it will be necessary to preserve America's contribution, militarily, politically, and ideologically.

If French policy reverted to more nationalistic ways or the United States qualified its support for the European Security and Defense Identity, progress in establishing CJTF capabilities would be seriously hampered. ... [Then however] NATO will appear increasingly irrelevant to security requirements, at least as seen from the United States. In such circumstances, the U.S. commitment to participate in European defense arrangements would continue to weaken.²⁷⁶

Although dealing with the European Union and the Western European Union, NATO's contributions to enable the former organizations to act, is difficult to discuss.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷⁵ see: E. Foster, NATO's Military in the Age of Crisis Management, Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1995, p. 47.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 5-6.

France, having made steps towards a more active participation in NATO in December 1995, finally seems to recognize this. For a long time it had argued that the WEU's variable geometry (i.e. engaging on different levels with different states, without a superimposed NATO structure) is its most important strength. The WEU should create its own permanent structures, favor co-operation before integration, and its development should be of prime importance.²⁷⁷ The political leadership in France since 1966 tried to create an autonomous European defense, with U.S. troops as only a supportive element. French leaders who envisioned the dissolution of NATO with the WEU taking its place, neglected cooperative European security arrangements, for example with NATO, EU/WEU, and OSCE, and conducted, more or less, a nationalistic security policy.²⁷⁸ Initiatives like the European Corps with France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain as participating nations, the European Maritime Force (EURMARFOR) and the Operational Rapid Euroforce (EUROFOR) between France, Spain and Italy underlined this. France tried to build up structures as a 'fait accompli', only hesitatingly accepting, for example, that the Eurocorps not only is an element in the process of the construction of a European Union common defense (fulfilling Petersberg tasks) but also is a contribution to strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. As a NATO component, the Eurocorps takes part in the common defense of the allies and in crisis management on the basis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).²⁷⁹

The November 1994 Franco-British summit was a further turning point. Born of their intimate military co-operation in Bosnia, the two countries announced the creation of a Franco-British European Air Group, to help run joint peacekeeping and humanitarian operations within and outside the NATO area. While the British stress that the Air Group would in no way weaken Britain's commitment to NATO, „the French think that the

²⁷⁷ see: J.-M. Guéhenno, Frankreich und die WEU, in: NATO Brief, Okt 1994, p. 12.

²⁷⁸ This argument is supported by an analysis of F. Valentin's article: Die Sicherheit Europas, Die NATO und die USA, in: Defense National, Jul 1994. (translated by German MOD, Bonn).

²⁷⁹ see: Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Resolution during its 7th meeting in La Rochelle, May 22 1992.

group, the first permanent joint military set-up between the two countries, indicates a genuine British acceptance of the need for a separate European defense identity".²⁸⁰ Having military cooperation 'on land' with the Eurocorps, 'at sea' with the EUROMARFOR, and 'in the air' with the Air Group, France has created bilateral and multilateral military co-operation outside established organizations, although always with additional links to them. This was only a logical step, if one wants a strong Europe through which one can continue to influence world affairs, preferably on one's own terms and, on the other hand, one tries to avoid the constraints that will inevitably entail, 'pooling' of sovereignty included, particularly in a Union with many more members. Whether the new French president Jacques Chirac can or will consolidate a new course is to be seen. It will be essential for the European Union's and the Western European Union's future politico-military abilities and for NATO's cohesiveness to guarantee France's active and constructive participation, to consolidate a new Franco-American partnership without reservations, and to overcome case-by-case participation, nationalistic unilateral policies, and mere governmental co-operation in politics, economy, and society.

3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

In the WEU's May 1995 Lisbon Declaration the role of the OSCE as a comprehensive security structure based on shared values is underlined.

Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the place of the OSCE in the European security architecture and noted in particular its potential as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as in promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights.²⁸¹

Unlike NATO, the WEU, and the EU, the CSCE-OSCE has always been a 'whole-European' institution. Although the 1975 Helsinki agreement puts the obligation on all member states to follow and implement ten basic principles (for example, territory

²⁸⁰ The Economist, France's wandering Eye, Nov 26 1994, p. 56.

²⁸¹ Western European Union, Lisbon Declaration, May 15 1995, No. 40, in: WEU Press and Information Service, p. 8.

integrity, peaceful conflict solution, and non-aggression), the OSCE was not able to build a solid foundation for a European security architecture because its treaties and agreements are political declarations of intention, which do not fall under international law. Making the CSCE²⁸² a regional agreement under chapter eight of the UN charter in the July 1992 Helsinki summit, did not alter this situation. Politically, however, the importance of the OSCE had increased. The November 1992 Charter of Paris and its additional political Common Declaration of Twenty-Two States was a first step towards a process of developing a new, intensified quality of co-operation with timely fixed governmental meetings, an OSCE secretariat and a war-prevention center. Recently, an 'Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights', a Forum for Security Cooperation and other mechanisms for specific problems like consultation and co-operation or peaceful settlement of disputes, has been established. Furthermore, for peacekeeping missions, the OSCE can use resources of NATO, EU, WEU, and also CIS. The question, however, of whether all these new elements make OSCE more capable must be regarded skeptically. There is no doubt that its strengths are to observe and pick out the central theme of problems, to settle conflicts peacefully by preventive diplomacy, and to protect human or minority rights. But whenever action has to be taken, conflicts are to be settled militarily, peacekeeping measures have to be conducted and 'means' have to be used, OSCE lacks financial, personnel, and military resources, as well as political agreements on established legal platforms.²⁸³

This can be explained by basic disagreements, especially between Russia and the West over how a new security system in Europe is to be developed. While the Western World stresses the need for Collective Defense (like NATO), Russia emphasizes Systems

²⁸² In December 1994, the Budapest summit changed the name of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), pointing out the ongoing development towards an increasing OSCE role in the European security landscape, no longer being only a 'conference', but having established permanent structures, among these: Meeting of the Heads of States every two years, OSCE Secretary of State Council yearly, Commission of High Civil Servants, Permanent Committee of Ambassadors, General Secretary, High Commissioner for National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Forum for Security Cooperation.

²⁸³ see: D. Lutz, Die Konkurrenz der Sicherheitsarchitekturen, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, Jan 30 1995.

of Collective Security (like OSCE), where member states have the 'obligation' to settle conflicts peacefully and are mutual guarantors of their partner's security.²⁸⁴ It is especially Russia's membership itself and thus its ability to play an active part in Europe's security landscape, including an OSCE partnership with the United States, probably the avoidance of NATO's expansion to the East and its subordination under a OSCE system,²⁸⁵ that makes such a model so attractive for Russia. In contrast with a positive scenario of a capable and empowered OSCE, Russia poses the negative alternative of a European division between a relatively stable north-western part, eventually enlarged by EU-associated partners and a highly instable south-east arc of crises, and a more or less cohesive CIS under Russian dominance.²⁸⁶ Thus, the Russian side has consistently promoted the idea of the central role of the OSCE in ensuring European security and stability.

The CSCE [today OSCE] is seen to be a prospective instrument to form relations between States and peoples on the basis of democratic values system. We move to the community of free democratic States. Though with delays and failures but we move. On this way the CSCE will have to meet, very likely, the major challenge of the modern times - to assist in establishing such patterns of political and social structure that could open up the creative potential of the people, give way to the drive for cooperation instead of leading mankind to a vicious circle of inability, poverty and selfishness.²⁸⁷

The significance and importance of the OSCE is neither suppressed nor neglected by the West. The organization is seen as one of the main players in overcoming the Cold

²⁸⁴ see: B. Chilko, Die russische Alternative zur Osterweiterung der NATO, speech at the Tagung des Brandenburgischen Bildungswerkes PRO EUROPA e.V., Erkner, Feb 1995, p. 19.

²⁸⁵ see: B. von Plate, Russland in einer Europäischen Sicherheitsordnung, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP, Apr 1995, p. 20. For further arguments, see also chapter VI (p. 22-24): OSZE versus NATO?.

²⁸⁶ see: H.-G. Ehrhart, Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt und die Folgen für die sicherheitspolitische Kooperation in Europa, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Feb 3 1995, p. 19.

²⁸⁷ Y. V. Ushakov, Perspectives for the CSCE: A View from Russia, Statement by the Chief of the Directorate for European Cooperation of Russia's Foreign Ministry, at the International Seminar „Institutionalization of the CSCE“, Budapest, Sep 2-3 1994, p. 11.

War, having had an important role in restoring the common system of values in Europe, in codifying common norms of political conduct, and in making fundamental principles of international law in Europe effective. In contrast to the above argument, for example, NATO views itself as an instrument of the United Nations Organization and the OSCE, on the basis of internationally passed resolutions, and is willing to conduct peace-keeping missions under their auspices, on a case-by-case basis. There is no doubt that the OSCE will play a decisive role in the future European security structure. However, it cannot be responsible for European defense, especially not as Europe's policeman. It must be clearly stressed that „the international organization of armed power ... can be done only by countries that know each other, trust each other, and have a clear idea of what they want to do“.²⁸⁸ This, however, is not the fact today. Putting all OSCE member states together creates an „amorphous body“²⁸⁹, that is probably capable of a consultative role, preventive diplomacy and ensuring member states observe basic principles, but not able to create stability through defense and military guarantees. The OSCE is not a security structure competing with NATO.²⁹⁰ Therefore, to realize the full potential of the Helsinki Charter, one should concentrate more on new challenges (such as economic and environmental issues), increase crisis prevention and crisis management capabilities with dedicated instruments, and make the OSCE the most important instrument for early warning and preventive diplomacy,²⁹¹ and maintain its function of one of the most important forums for multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements and their supervision. The CSCE

²⁸⁸ The Economist, The Dream of Europax, Apr 7 1990, p. 14.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ This fear is often expressed by those states who try to become NATO members. For details see: A.D. Rotfeld (SIPRI), The future of the CSCE: An emerging new Agenda, Budapest Seminar on The Institutionalization of the CSCE, Sep 2-3 1994, p. 9.

²⁹¹ see: R. Holbrooke, Europapolitik der US-Administration, in: Amerika Dienst, No. 25, Aug 16 1995, cited in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 9, Sep. 1995, p. 20. Future roles and functions of the OSCE are defined, from an American perspective, in: Strengthening the CSCE: A new Statement of Mission, Proposal by the U.S. Delegation at the Budapest CSCE Conference, Nov 22 1994, p. 1.

could also play a future role in conflicts which are lesser international disputes but rather have an internal, domestic character.

The expectations and hopes pinned on the international organizations concern primarily various forms of intervention in the matters which in the past were considered as those falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states (human rights, legislation, minorities, domestic conflicts, etc.) In this regard, the CSCE is, by definition, much more flexible than other security structures, since for more than 20 years it has dealt with problems that belong to the discretionary power of states.²⁹²

The fact that Russia has accepted OSCE monitors in its 'internal' conflict in Chechnya seems to underline that this 'internal' function is already, at least by definition and theoretically, accepted. The decisive strength of the OSCE lies in its long-term problem-solving approach, based on common values and consensus of the member states.²⁹³

Today the security landscape in Europe presents an inconsistent picture. Europe is undergoing a process of fundamental change, moving towards cooperation and integration. Processes of progressive integration, however, are opposed by centrifugal tendencies whose impact may cause the fragmentation of state entities in the east and south-east of the continent and problems and challenges, shown in the penultimate chapter. In this situation, it is necessary to stabilize European peace, democracy and welfare by pragmatic steps, without losing the positive development already achieved and, at the same time, without losing sight of the main goal: a European security and defense identity with close transatlantic links. Thus in the near future despite recent competitions of all for a 'place in the sun', all organizations, dealing with European security like NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, but also the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have to co-operate and to avoid new dividing lines. Otherwise, the 'chance of

²⁹² A.D. Rotfeld, The future of the CSCE: An emerging new Agenda, Budapest Seminar on The Institutionalization of the CSCE, Sep 2-3 1994, p. 12.

²⁹³ see: K. Achmann, KSZE - Ein Modell mit Zukunft, in: Briefdienst, Sicherung des Friedens, Bonn, Aug 1994, p. 14.

the century could be gambled away'.²⁹⁴ Developing an idea for the organization of European security in the very near future is affected by limitations; one can only give probable basic ideas. However, the following model outlines one such idea and shall be the basis for further discussions:

The European Union, as a decisive force in the process of Europe's unification and the central element of future European security structure, can slowly take over security responsibilities, not only in Europe but also on a global scale, in close partnership with the United States. The EU has to expand to offer former Warsaw Pact states a possibility to develop themselves into prosperous and strong partners. At the same time structural adjustments have to make the EU capable to deal with security and defense issues, especially during crises. If there is even a slight chance that European involvement in any crisis could at some stage lead to a situation that would require United States' support, the European Union would be well advised to consult the United States right from the beginning.²⁹⁵ Thus, a liaison office, an observer status, or some other form of participation should guarantee that the United States is not only informed about developments and decisions, but is also involved in political and/or military planning and preparation of the EU activities. As long as there is no perspective for a merging of EU and WEU, America's participation would be necessary and desirable in both organizations.

The WEU, for its part, could be given a threefold role:²⁹⁶ first, the role of politico-military adviser to the EU on defense matters, second, the role to introduce common positions during discussions with NATO, in line with WEU's vocation as the European pillar of the Alliance; and third, WEU could organize common military actions requested by the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and eventually also on its own initiative. The WEU should

²⁹⁴ see: D. Lutz, Die Konkurrenz der Sicherheitsarchitekturen, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, Jan 30 1995.

²⁹⁵ see: H. Mey, View from Germany, A European Security and Defense Identity - What role for the United States?, in: Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, Jul/Sep 1995, p. 316.

²⁹⁶ L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 78.

thereby not weaken the strong transatlantic ties, but rather reinforce them. Mutual transparency and complementarity are the key words.²⁹⁷

All new members of the EU are entitled to WEU membership.²⁹⁸ The WEU, however as shown above, cannot guarantee the security of its members on its own, and there is an inherent link between the Brussels and the Washington Treaty. Thus, NATO should have the priority in the sphere of collective defense, in which Americans and Europeans, on an increasingly balanced basis, would specify security guarantees in terms of what is required and who should benefit from them. NATO could also intervene for missions outside the territory of its member states, as long as there was American participation.²⁹⁹ In these cases non-NATO states could participate outside the integrated military structure but within a Combined Joint Task Force NATO-led operation. Due to its integrated military structure and its Partnership for Peace program NATO has a forum for the creation of compatibility, interoperability, and the habit of working together, among its members and with potential partners. To avoid duplication, this should be maintained.

The OSCE, additionally, should use its strengths, dealing with cooperative security by establishing „the closest cooperative ties with the UN and with European and Trans-Atlantic organizations while avoiding duplication of effort“.³⁰⁰ Despite the fact that the OSCE still has to cope with „the problems of potentially highly diverse national perceptions about sources and remedies of conflicts“,³⁰¹ and thus often is seen only as a „waiting hall for states going to join, on the longer term, existing European/Europe-

²⁹⁷ see: J. Schönbohm, Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the context of the developing future security structure in Europe, speech at: Trilateral Commission, Copenhagen, Apr 24 1995, p. 4.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁹⁹ L. Martin, J. Roper, Towards a common Defence Policy, The European Strategy Group and The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Mar 1995, p. 78.

³⁰⁰ U.S. Delegation at the CSCE Conference, Strengthening the CSCE: A new Statement of Mission, Budapest, Nov 22 1994, p. 1.

³⁰¹ see: H. Vetschera, Cooperative Security in the OSCE Framework - Confidence-Building Measures, Emergency Mechanisms and Conflict Prevention, p. 52.

related organizations“,³⁰² it is not without function. In the near future it should provide mechanisms „not so much of coercion ‘against’ another participating state but for cooperation ‘with’ another participating state in order to allow states to extricate themselves from situations which otherwise were likely to escalate into confrontation or even armed conflict“,³⁰³ in order to coordinate peacekeeping efforts, and, in general, to connect America, Russia, and other East European states to European security. In the case that Europe’s differentiation into a Western and a Eastern Group is not avoidable, with Russia eventually declaring the CIS a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the consequence of NATO’s expansion, it is necessary today to develop the basis for a future cooperative relation between both groups. The OSCE could take the lead in this ‘bridge function’, beyond bilateral arrangements, already in force.

The organizational framework for the near future could be as outlined above, with the long term goal of a European Union-Western European Union unity. As a long-term purpose future members of the EU should have a security status equal to that of the ‘old’ members, who are also members of NATO. Thus, the key word, as shown above is ‘final congruence of membership’. A prerequisite for the next steps is a compromise on how to conduct, command, and control Combined Joint Task Force missions. To avoid duplication, the development of a EU/WEU command and control capability, however, should not be taken into consideration. A real sharing of burdens and responsibilities between the EU and the United States is, so far, only possible, if a ‘modus vivendi’ could be found in which NATO’s and especially American assets and capabilities could be made capable for non-NATO operations. A new transatlantic economy and security community could be a basis for such agreements.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 53.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 55.

D. NEW SECURITY PARTNERS

Russia has good reason to support NATO's extending the zone of political stability into Central Europe. After all, twice in this century Russia, in the two world wars, has suffered greatly because of that region's instability.³⁰⁴

It is possible that especially this argument contributed to a change of the Clinton administration's initial 'Russia first' policy. After President Clinton's 1994 visit to Poland, America became the primary supporter of a NATO enlargement, taking over the British opinion, which is „in favor of a wider, rather than a deeper Europe“.³⁰⁵ United States' intentions are to achieve the initiative in the enlargement discussion, to maintain its weight and importance in the European security discussion, to avoid European solo efforts and, at the same time, to avoid an exclusion of Russia and Ukraine. The implementation of the Yugoslav-Dayton agreement through NATO has led France to rely more on traditional, established security organizations, taking into account that 'participation' gives it more influence than 'opposition'. In combination with economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe France overcame its fears of 'Atlanticism' and 'Germany, in case of enlargement being the new center of Europe',³⁰⁶ so that it is 'inevitably' promoting an enlargement of European security organizations.³⁰⁷ Additionally with Germany, after its unification being a promoter of 'deepening and widening', one should assume that there could be no doubt about the future track: an enlargement of the EU and the WEU, to strengthen the European security and defense identity and economic competition with the 'outer world', and an enlargement of NATO, to be addressed head-on as the main pillar of collective defense.

³⁰⁴ S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The Economist, Aug 10 1995, p. 27.

³⁰⁵ Z. Brzezinski, A Plan for Europe, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, p. 42.

³⁰⁶ see: K.-H. Kamp, Europas Erweiterung verschiebt das geographische Zentrum, in: Die Welt, Feb 20 1995.

³⁰⁷ see: K. Feldmeyer, Europa mit Rußland, Europa gegen Rußland - Eine Frage für alle und deshalb für keinen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Dec 7 1994.

However, despite the fact that Russia no longer sees Western security organizations³⁰⁸ as a direct threat, its former foreign minister Kosyrev stressed that they are still 'strange organizations', whose enlargement would mean a 'nightmare' to the establishment of a partnership between Russia and the West.³⁰⁹ Personnel changes in the Yeltsin administration point to the fact that Russia's foreign policy, in this realm, will become even more assertive and less geared toward the West. Therefore it is not easy to assess whether the short-term advantage of calming Russia by not offering membership to former Warsaw Pact states, would not be overwhelmed by long-term disadvantages of missing a chance to stabilize a region, in which Russia anyway would develop itself 'inevitably' towards becoming a Western nation. Or, in a negative scenario, Russia would anyway fail to become a democratic state, and that then an early enlargement would be even more necessary for the protection of its neighbors. „Yet, while an aggressive Russian revanchism cannot be ruled out, Eastern Europe's leaders concede that this extreme scenario is not their primary concern. ... More broadly, the East-Central European do not want to be left out in the cold“.³¹⁰ It is a climate of confidence which attracts them, despite many disappointments of the quality of Western support in the last years. And, most important, „East Central political elites have staked their legitimacy on their countries' gradual but steady adherence to the West, ... [having] essentially two institutional meanings: the EU and NATO“.³¹¹ Therefore stepping back from enlargement of these organizations would probably mean a political, psychological, economical, and ethical shock, which could lead to undesired developments.

Behind all these 'primary' reasons for including new partners in European security organizations, there are some 'secondary' ones. The 1996 Presidential elections in the

³⁰⁸ 'Security organizations' here are defined not only as Collective Defense and Collective Security organizations, but in a 'broader' sense. The EU, thus, due to its political and also military implications and its strong links to the WEU, beyond merely economic implications, is also taken as a 'security organization'.

³⁰⁹ see: J. Joffe, Kosyrew spricht von einem Alptraum, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Apr 26 1995.

³¹⁰ D.H. Allin, Can Containment work again?, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 54.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 62.

United States and Russia, the EU Intergovernmental Conference, ethnic lobbies, European fears about American isolationism, and, last but not least, a „sheer force of bureaucratic inertia and interest politics“³¹² will influence the political process and the enlargement issue. Thus, it is important that the discussion remains objective and unemotional. Many of these issues are already addressed in the treaties (e.g. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty) and many of the problems will be solved if only actual members can find a consensus. Instead of passive contemplation about the 'ifs' of an enlargement, active policies toward a stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe, especially of Russia, should begin today.

There are five different kinds of rationales and intentions of new partners toward Western security organizations: first, those who want to become a member immediately and have a 'good' prospect due to their internal democratic development, the settlement of disputes with neighbors, and their geographical position,³¹³ second, those who lay their main emphasis on economic cooperation and are militarily prepared for multilateral crisis management and peacekeeping measures, however which do not yet want to abandon their status as militarily independent states,³¹⁴ third, states which try to cooperate with Western security organizations but still need some time to overcome their former antagonist opinions or just want to see Western development before they make a decision,³¹⁵ fourth, countries which try to become members, but are not already prepared or, due to their geographical and historical situation, are not (yet?) able to become members,³¹⁶ and finally those who try to influence European security and build special links but are sure that they do not want to join NATO, the EU and/or the WEU, unless these organizations are changed completely.³¹⁷ While these rationales quite easily point out

³¹² A. Lieven, A new Iron Curtain, in: *The Atlantic Monthly*, Jan 1996, pp. 24-25.

³¹³ especially the Visegrad countries, eventually also Rumania.

³¹⁴ especially the former neutral states, eventually also Ukraine

³¹⁵ especially Bulgaria

³¹⁶ especially the Baltic states

³¹⁷ especially Russia, eventually also Belarus

the attitudes of single states towards Western European organizations, it is more difficult to assess the objectives of these organizations in the process of enlargement. While redefining their missions and 'deepening' their connections and cooperation, 'largening' is not always 'just a parallel process'. It has to be adapted to new structures, tasks and missions (or the reverse).

It may sound somewhat harsh, but I will admit my feeling that unless NATO finds soon the courage to clearly redefine its mission, and to expand in keeping with this new definition, it may within a few years become largely ineffectual.³¹⁸

The prospect of membership provides nations of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union with additional incentives „to strengthen their democratic and legal institutions, ensure civilian command of their armed forces, liberalize their economies, and respect human rights, including the rights of national minorities“.³¹⁹ The process of expansion, thus, shall help to promote regional stability and peace, even including nations which are not members. Beneath these political and military reforms, it aims at economic integration, so that no aspect of security is excluded. For Germany, it is furthermore crucial that it loses its frontier state status. This is not pushing a danger zone further to the East but a stabilizing of the whole region so that new front lines are not established while old ones are dissolved. All European security institutions therefore stress that their enlargement has to be accommodated by an increase in partnership and cooperation especially with non-member states. Nevertheless, although most politicians try to avoid mentioning this reality, it should be clear that Russia and some of its former Soviet Union allies are still on an unpredictable path. NATO's enlargement, but also the EU's and the WEU's, thus have a clear military aspect. Those who assume that the 'Russian bear will rise again', stress that „the time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower“.³²⁰ Others see an expansion of membership

³¹⁸ Vaclav Havel, cited in: C. Goldsmith, NATO needs a Raison d'Etre before Enlarging, Havel says, in: The Wassy Street Journal, Apr 28 1995.

³¹⁹ S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The New York Review, Aug 10 1995. p. 27.

as a possibility for retaliation. Any of the following should trigger NATO's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe: a clear violation of treaties or international borders, if Moscow withdraws from arms reduction talks, discontinues the denuclearization process or even absorbs Belarus and Ukraine.³²¹ In the same way the EU should enlarge as a preventive measure, if Moscow tries to re-establish a sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. However, it will be difficult to assess when exactly such attitudes and actions start and the triggering point for NATO's or the EU's enlargement has come. So far and because new partners would disagree with becoming part of this 'game', it cannot be a real rational or intention of European security institutions to use enlargement as a method for deterrence or even blackmailing. Another question is whether Russia should become member in NATO, the EU or the WEU. While as a long term goal for the East-West development can be envisaged, in which Russia is fully integrated politically and economically into European affairs, and thus as a worthwhile long-term objective is eligible for an EU membership,³²² there are doubts about a NATO and probably a WEU membership. Despite arguments, that a NATO membership of Russia would destroy the strategic balance in Europe and that two big and probably competing powers would destroy the character of the alliance, the United States are still insisting that there should be no exclusion. Washington has two reasons for this attitude: „some in the administration view Russian membership as a realistic way to enhance security. Others are reluctant to rule out Russian membership out of fear doing so would drive this already chaotic country into aggressive isolationism“.³²³ May it as it be, it is important to notice that 'the' Western rationale for enlargement is the spreading of peace, freedom and to extend the zone of prosperity. Furthermore it should be pointed out that a policy of taking Russia as a

³²⁰ W. Safire, The Bear will rise again, so build the Alliance now, in: International Herald Tribune, Dec 11 1994.

³²¹ see: M.E. Brown, The flawed Logic of NATO Expansion, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 45.

³²² D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, F.S. Larrabee, NATO Expansion: The next Steps, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 9.

³²³ The Wall Street Journal, Summit of Illusions, May 11 1995.

candidate implies a certain amount of negotiations, which not necessarily but eventually could lead to a bargaining between NATO and Russia over the price of enlargement 'in the near future', in which Russia will be 'surely' excluded. Therefore, it would be in general better to aim at a parallel process of enlarging the alliance and the EU, and at the same time establishing strategic partnerships with those states which are not available in the near future from the Western perspective.

As a final rationale for enlargement it is stressed that new members must not only be democratic, have market economies, and be committed to responsible security policies, but that they also should support the organizations' functioning, being not only 'consumers' but also 'contributors'. From this perspective, new members can and shall even strengthen the inner stability and further the 'deepening' process. From this perspective, an evolutionary way towards new members would be counterproductive. To extend the waiting time until a complete harmonization is established between new partners and enlarging organizations, would mean to miss the qualities, ideas, and contributions of these partners for the internal development. In the same way it would be counterproductive to establish 'partial memberships', 'memberships outside the integrated military structure', or other extraordinary forms of status aside from a 'full membership'. New members therefore should strengthen NATO's potential to fulfill its twofold function of 'military protection' and 'stability projection', without any limitations. For the EU it is equally necessary that Central and Eastern European economic systems be stabilized in a way that they, at least in the long run, will support the EU's cohesiveness, strength, political stability, and capability to cooperate in all matters of today's political landscape with other organizations and institutions. It is therefore necessary to find a common basis, on which policy may be founded and developed. The main rationale for an enlargement is therefore to combine internal cohesion with organizational widening.

In June 1993 the European Council announced that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which had signed 'Europe Agreements' with the Union would eventually be invited to become EU members. The 1994 Essen Council decided on a strategy aimed at preparing the eligible countries for accession to the EU.³²⁴ The possible membership is

for most of the eligible countries a major step toward access to the EU's expanding markets, which also enhances political stability.³²⁵ If political stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe and spreading the blessings of democracy and the market to the East is the objective of the West, so that the new democracies get a home and a community,³²⁶ then surely the EU is the right organization to join. Because the main disillusionment in post-Communist Europe stems from „the trauma of an uncertain economic transformation“,³²⁷ the form of Western integration that can best cope with this trauma is the opening of Western markets through new EU membership. However, the EU's demands for a membership are high, so that some of the new partners feel like being set into a 'waiting room'. This raises the danger that popular frustration about this can intensify regional instability by fanning the flames of particularism, nationalism or ethnic conflicts and, on the other hand, give the impression that a 'quick' NATO membership would better serve the integration into the West.³²⁸ Additionally, new partners sometimes see it as an unnecessary burden for membership that they must combine a certain amount of economic prosperity with the democratic development at home. However, the EU has to maintain a 'community of values'. Otherwise a dilemma would occur if, due to the applicant countries' failure to meet economic targets, the whole value of the EU and probably further Western European security organizations is no longer considered valid.³²⁹ Nevertheless, without a doubt, membership of the EU would give Central Europeans rapid

³²⁴ see: NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 194.

³²⁵ see: J. Simon, Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce', Visegrad Cohesion, and European Faultlines, in: European Security, Vol. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 491.

³²⁶ see: J. Joffe, Is there Life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall 1995, p. 24.

³²⁷ D.H. Allin, Can Containment work again?, in: Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 60.

³²⁸ Especially the proposal of the former French President Mitterand to „devise a holding structure, the 'Confédération' [which] intended to offer the CEE countries a temporary framework while negotiations took place on association with and then membership of the [European] Community“ contributed to such attitudes.

see: J. Howorth, Towards a European Foreign and Security Policy?, in: JES Hayward, Governing the New Europe, Oxford Polity Press, 1994, p. 10.

³²⁹ H. Magenheimer, Sicherheitspolitik und Machtgestaltung in Europa, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Feb 3 1995, p. 7.

access to one of the 'reliable' forms of security: higher living standards and a break with antiquated economic methods. This will stabilize those countries and spread stability to neighbors and other partners, if the EU is not only a 'feel good club' without prerequisites for the membership but maintains its challenging but also mutual benefiting character and its cohesiveness.

The question of how an EU enlargement will contribute to spreading a 'zone of stability' has to be answered by taking into account that the new membership of Finland has created an EU-Russian border of 1,300 kilometers. This might put security and defense questions into the center of EU's policy more than in the past. The Russian government welcomed Finland's entry into the EU; had it joined NATO, the Russian reaction would have been different. This is the reason why eventually the EU can develop a much closer relationship and economic ties with Moscow than NATO, despite the Partnership for Peace program and the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Whether a 'partial membership of the WEU', in which the „Article V security guarantee in the WEU Treaty of Brussels ... would be temporarily frozen“,³³⁰ would help Russia to accept the EU's overall security commitment to new Central and East European members, with the WEU as the EU's defense component, has to be figured out in the near future. In general, however, such a 'soft security' would probably undermine the WEU itself and new partners' participation in a common foreign and security policy. In general it should be clear that every step toward a greater diversity and towards greater constraints on the future decision-making process should be avoided, because enlargement would make the EU's work more difficult due to the increased number of participants.

NATO enjoys great prestige and influence in many Central and East European countries, especially in those which want to become members. They point out that NATO's advantage is „that it commits the United States and Canada to maintaining stability in Europe“.³³¹ At the same time it is the only organization that possesses the

³³⁰ J. Palmers, EU: Kohl wants East Europe in WEU, in: *The Guardian*, Oct 9 1995.

³³¹ J. Simon, Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce', Visegrad Cohesion, and European Faultlines, in: *European Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 491.

necessary military bases, communications, equipment, armed forces, command structures, and political coordination processes to accomplish this task. Thus, the possibility that new countries will join, must not be viewed on the basis of solely military considerations, but on the basis of common political, economic, and even cultural dimensions. The prospect of becoming eligible for membership will not only be an argument for domestic reform, bring together different parts of countries' political groups, and yield progress in resolving questions of ethnic multipolarity, but will also support the progress in resolving disputes with neighbors. Nevertheless, it is generally felt by new partners that achieving NATO membership is „an easier and speedier affair than membership in the ... European Union“.³³² From this perspective of new members, parallelism of enlargement between different European security organizations is often assessed negatively. As a result, NATO's Partnership for Peace program is seen by Central and Eastern European critics as an 'avoidance of an early NATO enlargement'. Examining the Final Communiqué of the December 1995 North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, one can easily see how small the actual steps towards enlargement have become.³³³ If the goal of NATO expansion is not to die completely, one should keep a certain amount of pace. At its January 1994 summit NATO decided to expand, a decision reaffirmed by President Clinton's Europe visit in the same year, „when he stated that the question was no longer whether NATO would expand but how and when“.³³⁴ While at the December 1994 North Atlantic Council meeting, Foreign Ministers stated that enlargement, when it comes, would be a part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe.³³⁵ In September 1995 a 'Study on NATO Enlargement' explained the 'why' of NATO's expansion. It is important to stress that with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty

³³² G. Wettig, Post-Soviet Central Europe in International Security, in: *European Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 472.

³³³ If 1996 is a year of only 'individual dialogue', 'enhancement of the Partnership for Peace', and 'internal adaptation and other measures, necessary to ensure that enlargement preserves the effectiveness of the Alliance', it will surely be not an 'enlargement-promoting' year. see: North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Dec 5 1995, p. 5.

³³⁴ R. Holbrooke, America, a European Power, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, p. 61.

³³⁵ see: NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 24.

an official and legal mechanism to enlarge the organization already exists.³³⁶ To set the hurdle higher than this would mean potential new members are being treated worse than in previous cases.³³⁷ On the other hand, the Partnership for Peace agreement was 'offered' and 'signed' because its fulfillment was seen as a good preparation and, albeit not officially, a prerequisite for NATO membership. From this perspective, NATO is actively supporting its enlargement by presenting a „vehicle to draw the Central and Eastern European states into a closer relationship with NATO“.³³⁸ Although in some cases, Partnership for Peace and bilateral contacts have encouraged competition rather than cooperation among new partners,³³⁹ it is clear that countries are quite intensively preparing themselves for membership and that this is 'sponsored' by at least some NATO members. All in all, one can say that NATO should only be enlarged if its internal stability, cohesion, and its military effectiveness are guaranteed, if not increased by the addition of new partners. If this can be guaranteed and the Article 10 criteria are fulfilled there should be no hesitation to answer, not only 'why' and 'how', but also the questions 'who' and 'when'.

NATO's enlargement has implications on stationing of troops and headquarters, the defense planning process, investments in infrastructure and military (including nuclear) doctrine. Although under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty NATO members are only 'obligated to employ such means as they deem necessary', and thus there is after all „nothing in the NATO treaty prohibiting a refusal to act“,³⁴⁰ most members and even most aspirants see this as an obligation to act, in case a NATO country is attacked, which

³³⁶ „The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty“.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, Apr 4 1949, in: NATO Handbook, 1995, p. 233.

³³⁷ see: V. Rühle, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, speech at: Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, Bonn, May 11 1995, p. 9, (translated by the author).

³³⁸ S.N. Drew, Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition: The Evolution of NATO from Berlin to Bosnia, National War College, 1995, p. 33.

³³⁹ see: Ibid., p. 35.

³⁴⁰ K.-H. Kamp, The Folly of rapid NATO Expansion, in: Foreign Policy, Spring 1995, p. 124.

makes NATO membership unique and attractive. Therefore it is necessary to be able to answer questions like: 'How can we credibly defend a bigger territory with probably decreased forces?' This not only implies financial sacrifices from everybody, probably nullifying the often-cited 'peace-dividend', but also the political preparedness for the members to underline the idea of 'all for one, and one for all'. Therefore, it is a step in the wrong direction, to muse whether one country would really want to go to war for another,³⁴¹ or, like Germany during the Gulf War, to hesitate sending troops for the defense of Turkey from a potential Iraqi attack. In every state one must realize that the costs of a NATO expansion are 'certainly impressive', because, despite all theories and wishful thinking, „NATO will be [probably] taking in security consumers rather than producers“.³⁴² Furthermore, NATO should be cautious that its enlargement does not make its structure and functioning so complicated that the synergistic effect of an increased membership is destroyed by a complex net of self-hindering 'knots and holes'. The nuclear powers, and most importantly the United States, have to make clear whether they are further prepared to 'risk their capital to save, for example, Warsaw or Prague'. A dilemma follows such an assertion: „If the answer is yes, the [U.S.] Senate is unlikely to ratify enlargement. If the answer is no, the credibility of America's security guarantees to its existing allies in Western Europe would have been wiped away at a stroke“.³⁴³ Thus, it is not enough that NATO's enlargement study points out that „NATO's current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance“.³⁴⁴

The main question is: 'how?'. It depends on the choice of future defense concepts about what the roles and missions, responsibilities, and functions of the military services in the different countries are. Especially the question of 'forward presence' of troops on

³⁴¹ ...as did, for example, the Czech ambassador at a meeting in Washington, thinking about Turkey, see: J. Joffe, *Is there Life after Victory?*, in: *The National Interest*, Fall 1995, p. 23.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ I. Davidson, *NATO looks East*, in: *Financial Times*, Apr 12 1995.

³⁴⁴ *Study on NATO Enlargement*, Sep 1995, p. 20.

foreign soil is part of this discussion. While it is sometimes pointed out that Alliance forces should not be deployed on new members' territory and this „qualified NATO membership would extend defensive guarantees without exacerbating Russian security concerns“,³⁴⁵ NATO's enlargement study clearly shows the importance „that other Allies' forces can be deployed, when and if appropriate, on the territory of new members“. ³⁴⁶ As these examinations show, this is a necessity if the dangerous elements of an uncertain political or defense credibility or an unfair burden sharing are to be avoided.³⁴⁷ Beside practical aspects about financing, adaptation of armed forces, military infrastructure, common training and exercises, language requirements, and the revision of national doctrines, tactics, force structures and compositions, it is essential that the 'costs' of clear political decisions about defense concepts are paid, albeit by all. Only this can guarantee a high probability for a mutual security increase in the future.

It is essential that NATO's enlargement lies in the American interest, if it enlargement is not to be without value. For the United States each new NATO member constitutes for the United States „the most solemn of all commitments: a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation“. ³⁴⁸ From this perspective it is clear that the United States Congress plays an important role in the enlargement debate, having to ratify the agreement with a two-thirds majority. This implies two relevant factors for new candidates: it will be impossible, first, to increase the number of new members over a certain limit, and second, to choose new partners which do not fulfill certain prerequisites.³⁴⁹ Different oppositions must be overcome: neo-isolationists which are against spreading America's security guarantees over an incalculable and restless Central and Eastern Europe, those who are not willing to newly engage in Europe after the Cold

³⁴⁵ H. Kissinger, cited in: M.E. Brown, The flawed Logic of NATO Expansion, in: *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 43.

³⁴⁶ Study on NATO Enlargement, Sep 1995, p. 16.

³⁴⁷ see overview over alternative defense concepts for the alliance in: R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, F.S. Larrabee, NATO Expansion, the next Steps, in: *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 16.

³⁴⁸ R. Holbrooke, America, a European Power, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Mar/Apr 1995, p. 63.

³⁴⁹ The U.S. Congress will, for example, surely not (yet?) agree to choose Bulgaria as a candidate.

War has been won, Senators who propose a 'Russia-first' policy and would not accept negative consequences for this approach, and finally those who point out that NATO enlargement will cost a lot of money which could be used for internal American affairs.

Beside these discussions it is not easy to figure out what in the future will make NATO especially attractive for the United States. There are those who express that „an evolution of NATO's role to encompass crisis management and conflict prevention beyond the traditional geographical limits should considerably increase NATO's value to the United States and make the latter more willing to assume further obligations“.³⁵⁰ From this perspective, the future United States role in Europe depends heavily on NATO expansion, because the task of 'stabilizing the East' gives NATO a future task and prevents it from the „risk of becoming irrelevant. ... [Otherwise it would have] no future in American politics“.³⁵¹ The polls, however, suggest that there is more support for defending Western Europe than there is for giving NATO new responsibilities.³⁵² Because the Alliance is not only dominated by the United States, but also depends on U.S. resources, it will be impossible to extend NATO's area of responsibility and its span of tasks if such an opinion gains the majority. Enlargement of European security organizations therefore makes it necessary that the transatlantic link is more than only a NATO Article 5 guarantee, the security partnership should have political, economic, and other strategic facets as well. Although political stabilization of Eastern Europe is often seen as a task for the EU,³⁵³ and thus not so much as an American responsibility, it would be a chance for the United States to cooperate in this task through a future active membership in an enlarged and deepened NATO with new tasks. It should be seen as such a 'chance' because only if America overcomes its recent isolationist and unilateralist

³⁵⁰ K.-H. Kamp, The Folly of rapid NATO Expansion, in: *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1995, p. 127.

³⁵¹ R.D. Asmus, Washington is right to prepare Expansion of NATO, in: *International Herald Tribune*, Dec 30 1994.

³⁵² The public's commitment toward NATO remains largely unchanged, with 56% in favor of keeping it the same, 5% in favor of increasing it, and a quarter favoring a decrease. See: J.E. Rielly, The Public Mood at Mid-Decade, in: *Foreign Policy*, No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 89.

³⁵³ see: I. Davidson, NATO looks East, in: *Financial Times*, Apr 12 1995.

tendencies it will be able to gain access to new markets in Central and Eastern Europe, maintain good relations with its trading partners, gain influence on the EU's and the WEU's developments, and (with some probability) not be 'called another time to re-establish security, peace, and order in Europe'. It is therefore the wrong approach to sacrifice a possible NATO enlargement, for example, on the altar of good United States-Russian relations, only to prevent a wrecking of future cooperation in the Far East, at a time when China's future is looking so uncertain. China would anyway „join Russia in enlisting world support against American export of democracy as 'destabilizing'" ³⁵⁴ It is therefore more important to concentrate on destroying Russia's fears and complaints, pointing out that NATO's enlargement is not directed against anyone but „a consolidation of the post-1989 status quo: ... free, sovereign countries exercising their free, sovereign choice to associate with us [NATO]" ³⁵⁵

Europe's security organizations' enlargement will be on the back burner for the very next future; a decision will be delayed until after the 1996 Russian and United States Presidential elections and, eventually, until after the Intergovernmental Conference of the EU. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that freezing the organizations in their old configuration would be a major setback for the American idea of spreading democracy, free markets, and the rule of the law.

By contrast, enlarging NATO in a way that encourages European integration and enhances European stability - the policy the [Clinton] administration is [hopefully] determined to pursue - will benefit all the peoples of the continent, and the larger transatlantic community as well. ³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ W. Safire, Russian and China to remarry, in: Monterey Herald, Jan 18 1996, p. 7A.

³⁵⁵ P.W. Rodman, Yalta in the Balkans, in: National Review, Dec 25 1995, p. 23.

³⁵⁶ S. Talbott, Why NATO should grow, in: The New York Review, Jul 13 1995, p. 30.

E. TRANSATLANTIC DEPENDENCIES

Chapter V has shown that in many cases the transatlantic link plays a major role. Thus, it is necessary to explain 'why' this link between Europe and America has to be maintained and further developed from the European perspective. The very basic reason can be taken from the origin of Western Europe's integration after the Second World War. Its normative references: 'democracy', 'free markets', and 'opposition to aggressive forms of nationalism' were transatlantic rather than European. „This helps to explain why it was so easy for Washington to accept the European integration“,³⁵⁷ and why, besides other reasons, the development of a European security and defense identity was not only accepted, but also promoted by the Clinton administration. However, the end of the Cold War and with it the vanishing of a clear threat perception of many politicians have altered America's views towards their involvement and their responsibilities in Europe.

Two examples show how deep these 'transformations' have been (or still are) and how important it is to show that a transatlantic link is a real 'necessity' to counter these trends. First, it was a not only secretly cited idea that „a stronger Russia could be a useful counterbalance to the strength of ... [a unified] Germany“.³⁵⁸ From this perspective, irritations of Russia should be avoided, even at the cost of not enlarging NATO in the near future and of taking into consideration the still insecure and unpredictable Russian political, military and economic development. Provocatively one could say that the security of the NATO ally Germany, if not of all Europeans, was sacrificed on the altar of an 'en vogue Russia first' policy. Fortunately the Clinton administration changed its mind and, ultimately, regained interest in European security affairs. The new approach is that that the three historical challenges - America's role in Europe, the political development of Europe, and the future of Russia - should be combined within a strategy that links, instead

³⁵⁷ D.T. Stuart, Can Europe survive Maastricht?, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 4 1994, p. 17.

³⁵⁸ B.Beedham, Russia gains, Germany loses, America should stay, in: International Herald Tribune, Dec 15 1994.

of splits, America and Europe.³⁵⁹ Secondly, it is important to point out that this is no longer self-evident. The president of the RAND Corporation, Jim Thomson, for example, recently expressed his opinion that the United States today would no longer be willing to build a NATO, except for the reason to guarantee Europe's participation in the worldwide interests and obligations of America. Obviously for him, European security is no longer one of the most important strategic issues for the biggest NATO partner.³⁶⁰

To counter Thomson's opinions, any doubts about the necessity of efforts to underline the importance of strategic alliances in and/or with Europe, even after the Cold War is over and even in a situation of internal problems and challenges of nearly every state, should disappear. For Europe, only America's authority and participation can allow progress towards a resolution of questions about how to find a sensible future for NATO, how to bind Central and East European states in a new European security order, and how to help Russia on its way towards stability.³⁶¹ A worsening of European security would be dangerous for both sides of the Atlantic. This must be clear in future discussions between the American President and Congress on the role of the United States in Europe. Since the Yugoslav debacle, Western Europe has come to believe that there is no question that European security can only be ensured by a proven, reliable transatlantic partnership with the North American allies, United States and Canada. It should be pointed out that NATO, the organization which the mostly binds America to Europe, does not constitute a 'bloc' with an antagonistic strategy, but is a political organization of nations sharing common basic values, an instrument for cooperative crisis management to serve peace, and a military alliance for collective defense against any possible potential threat. The United States is also committed to these objectives, as demonstrated by continued willingness to station a significant amount of troops in Europe. This commitment allows Europe to participate in the stabilization of the East, and not be forced to 'exclusively'

³⁵⁹ see: W. Stützle, Zum Schutz der Partner würde Amerika keine NATO gründen, in: Der Tagesspiegel, Jan 25 1995.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ see: R.D. Blackwill, Warum Europa und Amerika zusammenstehen müssen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine, Feb 20 1995.

concentrate politically, militarily, and financially on its own defense. A 'division of labor' would overtax European capabilities to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe and United States capabilities of engaging Russia alone.³⁶² The link between America and its European partners therefore shows that the 'transatlantic community' is clearly more than the sum of its parts. It is this special 'combination' of American and European security potential that attracts Central and East European states. Extending NATO rapidly, for example, without the United States' guarantees would lead to „commitments for Eastern Europe as empty as the hollow guarantees that France and Great Britain gave Poland on the eve of World War II“.³⁶³

Even in a situation in which relations between the Russian federation and the rest of Europe continue to improve, the case for maintaining a defensive alliance with significant United States forces in Europe does not diminish.³⁶⁴ Fire assurances normally are not terminated if the probability for fire decreases. Security must not be self-defeating! This argument is underlined by the fact that the gain of America's contribution in and for Europe was not only military security but also that, as the Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out already in 1967, „the presence of our forces in Europe under NATO ... contributed to the development of intra-European cooperation“.³⁶⁵ The United States thus helped to create a strong partner over the years. It is worthless to discuss whether this has been a 'European free ride'. Rather the question should be whether the pay-off of the American investment over the last decades should not be consumed, only because the maintenance costs of the transatlantic partnership seem to be too high. Decreased American interests in Europe would furthermore force traditional 'transatlantic-oriented' nations, like Great Britain, to make a choice between „an outpost of a fictitious Atlantic

³⁶² see: M. Rühle, N. Williams, NATO Enlargement and the European Union, in: *The World Today*, May 1995, p. 86.

³⁶³ K.-H. Kamp, The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion, in: *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1995, p. 129.

³⁶⁴ The opposite opinion is published by J. Roper, *Transatlantic Relations and International Security*, Conference organized by UNIDIR, Mémorial, un musée pour la paix, Caen, Sep 22-23 1994, p. 9.

³⁶⁵ Cited in: J. Joffe, Europe's American Pacifier, in: *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 81.

civilization and ... [its] destiny as a European nation“.³⁶⁶ Europe thus needs the United States to avoid being drawn into a real test, which might lead to a fundamental division instead of an enhanced community.

This real test would have to be faced especially if Europe's defense had to become autonomous even in the nuclear realm. Despite the fact that the 1994 French White Paper suggests that „with nuclear capabilities ... Europe's defense autonomy is possible“,³⁶⁷ it must be pointed out that „the old nuclear risk and burden-sharing arrangements ... represented, if only in institutional terms, a significant part of the Alliance's transatlantic glue“.³⁶⁸ The traditional rationales for the United States nuclear presence in Western Europe in the past have been „(i) promoting the political cohesion of the Alliance through arrangements for fairer nuclear risk- and responsibility sharing; (ii) providing more credible extended deterrence guarantees, on the assumption that US nuclear commitments would be less credible to adversaries and allies if they depended solely on forces at sea and in North America; and (iii) increasing the political influence of the non-nuclear European allies regarding US nuclear policy, given the judgment that their influence depends in part on accepting roles in nuclear delivery and support operations“.³⁶⁹ All this has not changed up to today; on the contrary: it is more true. Substrategic weapon systems therefore, even if reduced to a limited number of free-fall nuclear bombs, further establish the political and military coupling between conventional and strategic weapons, on the one hand, and between European and American allies, on the other. They spread the American nuclear umbrella over Europe and, at the same time, bind the United States conventionally to their partners. Fortunately the time is over, in which „some observers suspected that US nuclear weapons might be used to execute limited nuclear options against the Warsaw Pact, with

³⁶⁶ J. Gray, The great Atlantic Drift, in: The Guardian, Dec 12 1994.

³⁶⁷ cited in: D.S. Yost, Nuclear Debates in France, in: Survival, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 127.

³⁶⁸ N.K.J. Witney, British nuclear Policy after the Cold War, in: Survival, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 102.

³⁶⁹ D.S. Yost, Europe and Nuclear Deterrence, in: Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 98.

the possible result of a limited Soviet nuclear retaliation confined to Europe“,³⁷⁰ and thus, United States' nuclear weapons have probably de-coupled American and European security by making Germany the 'nuclear playground' for a superpower conflict. Because nuclear weapons are more than ever³⁷¹ political weapons, the discussion about a European nuclear identity is reduced to the question of whether an independent nuclear European potential can prevent war. If the answer is 'yes', it makes sense that Britain and France, the only European nuclear powers, put together their arsenals and develop a common, co-ordinated doctrine. If however the answer is 'no', and one can have massive doubts whether two 'mini-atomic powers' like France and Great Britain would be able to create at least a certain amount of 'credibility', there is no need for any European efforts, if the transatlantic link remains firm.

This is the background for questions like: 'what can France offer Germany, that Germany, due to the American deterrence, does not already have?'. The answer can be given just by the assessment that the little French nuclear umbrella only prevents from 'becoming wet' because the big American one is stretched over it.³⁷² This, however, does not mean that Europe's participation³⁷³ in nuclear deterrence is worthless for the common security. The contributions of many nations show that responsibilities and burdens are to be shared in a true partnership. Thus especially after the break-down of the Warsaw Pact, Europe should not create the impression that it is a 'civilian power' - „a tendency to finesse, defer or disregard uncomfortable issues of national and regional security“. ³⁷⁴ Only

³⁷⁰ K.-H. Kamp, Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, in: Security Dialogue, Vo. 26(3), 1995, p. 279.

³⁷¹ Nuclear weapons, by definition in the last decades, have always been 'political weapons'. Despite the new danger of nuclear proliferation and uncertainties about Russia's development, it is mostly agreed today that the probability of a 'use' of weapons of mass destructions has decreased. In so far the political role, relatively to the military role, has increased.

³⁷² see: J. Joffe, Atomschirm für Bonn? - „Wir würden lügen“, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Sep 9-10 1995.

³⁷³ Participation, in a wider sense, means not only 'possessing nuclear weapons', like France and Great Britain, but also in a way as Germany did it in the last decades. Therefore one can speak of a 'European nuclear participation', although there are only two 'hardware' nuclear powers.

signs that Europe is shouldering a major share of the burden of stabilizing its own security will increase Congressional support for an ongoing United States engagement in European security affairs. Therefore, it is no longer possible for the community of Western European nations to simply accept American leadership; it has to „develop the mechanisms and the concepts to take a strategic lead“,³⁷⁵ in order to retain a right to have a say in decisive security matters of the future. The ball is now in the European court. Europe needs America, but it has to show that it is not a donation that is needed, but rather, in addition to Europe's own contribution, the maintenance of the transatlantic partnership, as a further investment in the common future. It is worth to point out a second time, that it is the combination of American and European military and political 'forces' that provides an irreplaceable stabilizing function, radiating to all-Europe and beyond. It is unimaginable that an 'equal' partnership can be established in the next future, because Europe and its defense and security organizations are 'deepening' and 'widening', and this needs a great amount of time and coordination. However, if the Europeans demonstrate willingness and substantial achievements, the Americans, who are realists, will stick to their commitment: "The United States is a European power. ... We are here and will stay here, whichever President or party is in power, because it is in our interests".³⁷⁶

³⁷⁴ D.T. Stuart, Can Europe Survive Maastricht?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Feb 4 1994, p. 8. (See also Chapter 5.2.).

³⁷⁵ L. Freedman, Even hobbled, NATO is still key organization, in: The Stars and Stripes, Dec 9 1994.

³⁷⁶ Statement of the American Representative at the Colloquium „A Europe of Security and Defence“, Centre d'Étude et de Prospective Stratégique, in cooperation with the Brussels Centre d'Études des Relations Internationales, Sep 1995, cited in: R. Bussière, A Europe of Security and Defence, in: NATO Review, Sep 1995, p. 33.

VI. AMERICA NEEDS EUROPE

Why does a country like the United States of America, in these days the only superpower in the world, 'need' a number of countries which try to become a unit under the synonym 'Europe', which however are obviously far from a 'United States of Europe' and thus far from being an 'equal' partner? The United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO gives an answer:

The United States has vital interests in a Europe that is democratic, undivided, stable and prosperous, open to trade and investment opportunities, and supportive of political, economic, and military cooperation with the United States in Europe and other important parts of the world. Transatlantic cooperation is the key not only to advancing our mutual interests in Europe, but also to solving global problems.³⁷⁷

If one looks to this passage, one can find out that the reasons are multidimensional and cannot always be understood 'at first sight'. However, it is important to point out that there are 'vital' interests in Europe. The definition of the United States National Security Strategy states that the 'vital interests' are „of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity ... [and the United States] will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including - when necessary - the unilateral and decisive use of military power“.³⁷⁸ Europe's great importance for the United States is based on four important pillars. First, is the necessity for partners in general. Being the biggest power in the world does not automatically mean that America can rely on its self. International commitments, responsibilities, multilateral interconnections and dependencies build up the network in which every state and nation lives in today. Economically, for example, Europe is of great importance to America. Numbers speak for themselves: direct investments between the two continents exceed five-hundred billion dollars. These

³⁷⁷ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Jun 1995, p. 3.

³⁷⁸ The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 12.

investments are composed of American exports to Europe and on activities of the four-thousand European companies in the United States which provide more than twelve million jobs.³⁷⁹ The transatlantic economy shows how important both world regions are to each other and the well-being of the whole world. No 'partner' could stand solely on his own. „What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it“.³⁸⁰ The second pillar is 'historical experience'. America's participation in two World Wars is reason enough to be careful and make sure that Europe is democratic, undivided and stable. The recurrence of ancient fault lines - reminiscent of European politics before 1914 - with a return to traditional nation-state diplomacy, tempered by bilateral or trilateral co-operation of the most pragmatic kind, would set America on the alert. Despite the further development of the European Union and the deepening of NATO, dangers in this direction are real.

No western country wants to be the first to forfeit the opportunities - political and commercial - which relations with Russia still promise in the medium term. This has been evident in recent days as each country formulates its own mild rebukes to Moscow in a spirit of jostling competitiveness as opposed to collective indignation.³⁸¹

If the United States disengages from Western Europe, there could be a wholesale renationalization of defense policies, with each ally going its own way, causing international institutions and organizations to collapse. Thus, a positive United States' attitude towards the United Nations, for example, is very essential. Whether the stakes are „nothing less than avoiding World War III“,³⁸² is doubtful. Furthermore, it does not 'hit

³⁷⁹ see: V. R  he, Europa und Amerika - eine Partnerschaft im alten und neuen Geist, Speech at the Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, May 11 1995, p. 15-16.

³⁸⁰ H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 19. This is especially the reason why the United States of America cannot be called an 'empire'. Kissinger explains (see p. 21): „Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to *be* the system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy“. The logical result should be a policy beyond 'isolationism' or 'unilateralism'. Interestingly, as the next chapter will show, this is not the case.

³⁸¹ B. Clarke, Each State for itself, in: Financial Times, Jan 6 1995.

³⁸² E. Sciolino, Soldiering on, without an Enemy, in: The New York Times, Oct 29 1995.

the target' if one speaks of America as being Europe's 'lion-tamer'. But, on the other hand, the United States needs Europe as a 'partner', not as someone indifferent. This can be seen in relation to the third pillar of Europe's importance to the United States. Actually four dangers are seen for America: (i) nuclear dangers, (ii) regional, ethnical and religious conflicts, (iii) dangers from a failure of the democratic reforms in the former Soviet Union with a rise of a (new) dictatorship, and (iv) an economical stagnation in the United States.³⁸³ All of these dangers are not solvable unilaterally, especially the first three, which have a military impact.

... when asked on NBC's 'Meet the Press' last week, „What's so sacred about NATO?“ Mr. Perry found himself in the peculiar situation of using the arguments of war - the cold war, to be exact... „There are still 20,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union,“ Mr. Perry said. „And the political and the economic recovery going on in those countries is extremely fragile. Extremely fragile. So we have a very strong interest in the security and stability of Europe.“³⁸⁴

Europe, and within it especially the former USSR, is of vital importance to the United States, because without a secure development towards democracy and economic well-being in this area great dangers for the United States might arise. This pillar between America and Europe, however, has an additional important aspect. While on the one hand, the United States perceives a special responsibility to maintain certain global ideals such as human rights and the rule of the law, on the other hand it is not able and willing to intervene in all areas and cases when these ideals are disregarded. Furthermore, the missionary approach has its limits, politically by concentration on internal problems, economically by financial restraints, and militarily by a tendency towards a 'no-dead war'.³⁸⁵ It is however not always possible to act decisively in today's crises if the own

³⁸³ Les Aspin in a hearing of the U.S. Senat's Armed Forces Committee, Jan 7 1993, cited in: Institut für Strategische Analysen e.V., Die USA und Deutschland, Study for the German MOD, Bonn, Feb 1993.

³⁸⁴ E. Sciolino, Soldiering on, without an Enemy, in: The New York Times, Oct 29 1995.

³⁸⁵ see: T. Friedman, U.S. Belief in the 'No-Dead War', in: Monterey County Herald, Aug 25 1995.

people are not put at risk and if the 'Vietmalia syndrome'³⁸⁶ gets the upper hand. It is not enough to have the means of a world power, but it is necessary to 'conduct' leadership, with instincts and instruments of a great nation. Participation of European partners, mutual aid and co-ordination, on the other hand, facilitate United States' leadership and produce consensus externally, in the international community of states, and internally, among the American population. Finally, the forth important pillar, why America needs Europe, deals with the common origin and belief system of the Western World, already mentioned in chapter 3. Although the number is declining, it is not negligible that about fifty-seven percent of all Americans have European roots.³⁸⁷ There are „a myriad of deep historical and political-philosophical ties between the United States and Europe“,³⁸⁸ which are the basis for shared common attitudes, for example on human rights and other basic values. History shows what happened to Germany when it left the community of Western peoples in this century. Although history does not repeat itself, and is thus not predictable, one can say with some probability that the United States would have equally major troubles if it would isolate itself from its original mother continent. Asia, for example, surely cannot be a substitute. It has neither a common history or an actual common belief system with the United States, nor does it try to hide its differences. When Kishore Mahbubani, the top civil servant at the Singaporean foreign ministry, declared that „the American society is breaking down and falling apart“,³⁸⁹ he wanted to publicly point out the differences and, at the same time, to delimit his country and continent from America. „As for Western Europe“, he goes on, „its socioeconomic policies are fundamentally untenable and its foreign policy is blind to the 'ring of fire' surrounding the continent. ... East Asia, meanwhile, is having an explosion of confidence based on the realization that Asians can

³⁸⁶ This expression was used by R. Holbrooke, meaning: the placing of constraints on policies by the memories of the worst cases rather than the successes. See: E. Sciolino, *Soldiering on, without an Enemy*, in: *The New York Times*, Oct 29 1995.

³⁸⁷ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO*, p. 4.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁸⁹ Cited in: *The Economist*, *Asian Values - the Scourge of the West*, Apr 22 1995, p. 34.

do anything as well as, if not better than, other cultures or societies".³⁹⁰ Many Asians see an 'excess of democracy' and an 'overdose of freedom' as the West's greatest problems... Deeper can the differences not be! America should think twice about changing its partner, although economic advantages may probably seem to give a good pay off. Europe, on the other hand, has the same sense of history. Christianity and Enlightenment have produced a mix of culture and civilization, from which the models of Western society are derived. The identification with the Occident stabilizes the Western civilization.³⁹¹ Though these are mostly mental elements and probably less seen in the United States, one should stress that this is the basis on which all other co-operation grows, be it culture, economy, or military.

... without its Atlantic ties, America would find itself in a world of nations with which - except in the Western Hemisphere - it has few moral bounds or common traditions. In these circumstances, America would be obliged to conduct a pure Realpolitik, which is essentially incompatible with the American tradition.³⁹²

In responding to new problems under new circumstances, all national governments will almost certainly have to create far more effective and more consequential patterns of collaboration. This is even more true as internal problems of states today cannot be solved without an exchange of experiences and an international burden of responsibility sharing. Internal problems like reform of health care and education, minority rights, family planning, and the prevention of environmental pollution are examples that point to the need for multilateral approaches. External challenges are equally important. However, to find a partner or to be a partner is not enough. Common learning and problem solving makes it necessary that both parts have the same fundamental belief system, equal political and moral concepts, and, if possible, the same historical roots. Only such societies can be a true reference to each other. America does not need to search for such a partner since it is already on hand.³⁹³ Europe is and will remain the natural partner and ally for America.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ see: G. Diehl, Die Deutschen Interessen, in: Politische Meinung, Sep 1994, p.4.

³⁹² H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 819.

Europe and America should have the goal to become equal partners. This means, on the one hand, that Europe will in the future no longer be only the protected ally, but that the link between the two continents will be defined by a 'Partnership of Equals'. However, symmetry and equality are neither 'necessary' nor 'sufficient' conditions for stability and effectiveness. They might, in a negative way, promote transatlantic competitorship and a battle for influence.³⁹⁴ This must be avoided by a communal outlook, compatible style and behavior, and complementary function.³⁹⁵ If this can be fulfilled, probably a paradigmatic shift may happen, a shift towards a strengthening of the national security of the United States of America and, eventually, of the United States of Europe.

A. AMERICAN SECURITY ISSUES AND TRENDS

After 1990 America's identification a.) as the adversary of the Communist threat, b.) as the major guarantor of peace, freedom and stability of the Western world, and c.) the 'owner' of the mission of democracy and free markets, was no longer self-explanatory. The United States slid into an identity crisis. Economical frustrations and political doubts about the framework of policy contributed to an overall assessment that America's troubles were overwhelming and had to be solved soon. Since the West was no longer mobilized on the front lines of a grand ideological crusade, it seems to be only logical that the nations turn inward to solve domestic problems. The twofold danger is clear: A paradigm shift from being the Western leading power, or more, 'the' world power, towards an isolationism and a concentration on domestic politics will challenge not only

³⁹³ see: K. Kinkel, German-American Friendship - The Transatlantic Agenda 2000, Speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Apr 19 1995, in: German Information Center, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, p. 2.

³⁹⁴ A good example for such a competitorship can be seen in the 'battle for influence' of the Western powers in Central and Eastern Europe. See: M.M. Nelson, U.S. and Germany battle for Influence over Eastern Europe, in: The Wall Street Journal, Apr 5 1995.

³⁹⁵ see: M. Brenner, W.F. Schlör, P. Williams, German and American Foreign and Security Policies: Strategic Convergence or Divergence?, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studien, Nr. 98/1994, Dec 1994, p. 9.

the outside world, American allies, Western ideology, and economic identity, but also the United States' national security itself. The raised question is not only about the appropriate balance between domestic and foreign policies, the obligation of the United States' government to its own citizens and to the maintenance of global order, but also about how the link between American politics and American people stabilizes or destabilizes recent developments. Never before has the distance between 'citizens' and 'state' been greater in America.³⁹⁶ Although most Americans agree that a shared history and a shared understanding of that history are vital to their identity as a nation, most of them do not care about politics, do not take part in elections, and do not follow the advertisement contaminated news.³⁹⁷ The state, in classical literature seen as the powerful and terrifying 'leviathan', has degenerated in these days to a milk cow or a massive Gulliver, who got tangled up in the net of his overall responsibilities.³⁹⁸ On the other hand, a second paradigmatic shift derives from a dissolving society. 'Every man for himself' is a recipe for chaos, that is well known. But 'every man for his group' is seen as an adequate solution of decreased state reliance and leadership, internationally and to its own internal society. The melting pot 'America' does not melt any longer.

A cult of ethnicity has arisen both among non-Anglo whites and among non-white minorities to denounce the idea of a melting pot, to challenge the concept of 'one people', and to protect, promote, and perpetuate separate ethnic and racial communities.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁶ The latest report of the United States Department of Education shows that only forty-seven percent of all American students can identify the principle goals of the United States Foreign Policy between 1945 and 1990, not to speak from the one of 1990 until today. See: The Sunday Monterey Herald, Americans can't agree on history, Nov 5 1995, p. 14A.

³⁹⁷ Official questions about the voting behaviour in a Naval Postgraduate School class (National Security Affairs Curriculum) in January 1996 showed interestingly that, with two exceptions, every foreign but 'no' American officer had participated in the last elections (plural!).

³⁹⁸ see: W. Schäuble, *Und der Zukunft zugewandt*, Siedler Verlag, 1994, p. 98.

³⁹⁹ A.M. Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America - Reflections on a multicultural Society*, Norton & Company, 1993, p. 15.

The underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups. Ethnicity seems to be the defining experience for most Americans. No longer the language, laws, institutions, political ideas, literature, customs, precepts, and prayers, which were primarily derived from white Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition, count.⁴⁰⁰ If this trend gets the upper hand the American state will become isolated from inside and out. The splits inside the American society are not only racial or ethnical. Religion, ideology, social status, regional origin and education play additional roles. Among these lines, groups of interest, of common values and ideas are developing, showing to the 'outside' common strength. These lines are giving the 'inside' a feeling of invulnerability, protection, and untouchability from others, even from the state. Since neither the state nor the family are any longer primary places of identification and a functional social environment, the 'group' becomes the 'one and only' place to identify with. It is more likely that groups cooperate when having common ideas and ideologies to fight for, than groups being contact points for the government or the state, which become isolated from below. The 'fin-de-siècle-mood' of the United States' society, thus, is handed over to the state, with an implied obligation to change life, to give perspective, to show leadership and greatness, however, not to count on its members while fulfilling this duty. It is not astonishing, under this consideration, that political rights, more and more, come to be seen as 'group benefits' rather than as universal rights,⁴⁰¹ and that the actual agenda of politics is determined by America's inner disposition and problems.

Groups are, however, sometimes necessary to spread humanity, to make life joyful, and to underline the moral connection between human beings. In some occasions they are also directing to the state itself. In 1963, for example, Martin Luther King Jr. led a march on Washington with three specific goals: the opening of public accommodations to all, the passage of a voting rights act and equal employment opportunity. Although his movement was very powerful and the state, thus, had a strong 'discussion' partner, Martin Luther King Jr. had a unique message for 'all' American people, leading to a general increase of

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁰¹ B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: *Commentary*, Nov. 1993, p. 38.

democracy in the United States, unlike Louis Farrakhan's march in October 1995.⁴⁰² It was not an ethnic march on Washington. Its ultimate purpose exceeded individual and group interests. The differences can be seen quite clearly: Movements and groups today are searching for their own identities while no longer identifying with the United States. The search for an identification implies the search for a substitute of the state. The vigorous assertion of subnational loyalties above a common, unifying bond, is a centrifugal force leading to a crisis of the United States' identity, a crisis that may lead to state isolationism. The task for the American state is to conduct an active policy of promoting elites regardless of their origin and skin and to integrate people by motivation and support to take over a certain amount of responsibility.⁴⁰³ Work for society must pay off! 'Help for self-help' is a concept of non-governmental organizations, dealing with problems in underdeveloped countries. One should not be shy to take it as an idea for the interior of the American society also.

Never before has everybody been so dependent upon one another, individually and internationally. Thus, mutual help and responsibility sharing is a necessity in modern society, as Martin Buber, a German philosopher of Jewish faith once said: „Love your neighbor, for he is as you“.⁴⁰⁴ Loving one's neighbor, however, has the prerequisite to love oneself. How to make this possible and how to avoid a further paradigmatic shift in America's society, should be the answer to this basic question. The moral argument is that accepting weaknesses, unequalness and injustice of the society, imperfectionism of the state, and even of the international community can be more easily done, with the obligation to improve the situation. Therefore, the lack of Christian values, moral relativism and an isolation from any religious or moral judgment of one's personal life is a

⁴⁰² see: C. Thomas, Why the Leadership of a March matters, in: The Monterey Herald, Oct 9 1995, p. 10A.

⁴⁰³ see: W. Weidenfeld, Schreiben wir eine deutsch-amerikanische Erfolgsstory, in: D. Weirich, Auftrag Deutschland, Mainz-München, 1993, p. 88.

⁴⁰⁴ R. v. Weizsäcker, Speech of the German Bundespräsident at Georgetown University, Washington, May 23 1993, in: W. Weidenfeld, Vor neuen Herausforderungen, Tätigkeitsbericht des Koordinators für die deutsch-amerikanische zwischengesellschaftliche, kultur- und informationspolitische Zusammenarbeit, Auswärtiges Amt, 1992/93, p. 106.

danger which is able to spread from the internal American society to the outside. On the other hand it is interesting, that it was not the discovery of some mystical set of new principles, but its „faithful adherence to the old verities: hard work, enterprise, family, thrift, responsibility“,⁴⁰⁵ that brought Asia its newfound wealth. Today these values may be called 'Asian', but they are essential Protestant work ethics that helped to build the West. Thus, state isolationism 'from below' can only be stopped if people's probable behavior at the polls does not always determine politics (this is a task for politicians) and if people find themselves more and more on safe moral grounds (and this is foremost a task for those who educate and teach).⁴⁰⁶

Bill Clinton won his Presidency by announcing an 'America First' Policy. Because without conducting a strong foreign policy no country can be successful when dealing with domestic problems, a complete isolationism of the United States will neither happen nor be taken into consideration. However, the framework of American policy has changed. As the President envisaged it, „the U.S. role should be to tip the balance, ... not to bear every burden“.⁴⁰⁷ Erosions are not visible even though official declarations and speeches confirm a strong partnership and alliance with America's friends. „The isolationist impulse has risen from the grave, and it has taken the new form of unilateralism“.⁴⁰⁸ It is very clear that only punctual attention to foreign policy with catchword phrases are not enough to overcome a „compassion fatigue“.⁴⁰⁹ Lack of interest, dissolution of personal networks, change of generations, focus on domestic politics, inconcrete definitions of positions, and surprising jumps from one foreign policy

⁴⁰⁵ Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia's Welfare - Learning from the West's forgotten values, Jun 23 1994, p. 5.

⁴⁰⁶ A tall order, indeed.

⁴⁰⁷ Bill Clinton's Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, Apr 1 1992, in: M. Brenner, W.F. Schlör, P. Williams, German and American Foreign and Security Policies: Strategic Convergence or Divergence?, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studien, Nr. 98/1994, Dec 1994, p. 27.

⁴⁰⁸ A. Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, p. 5.

⁴⁰⁹ T. Sommer, Die Supermacht zieht den Kopf ein, in: Die Zeit, Nov 25 1994.

position to another gives the United States a 'vanishing image' for their partners.⁴¹⁰ Considering absolute numbers, and mentioning America's participation in former Yugoslavia, this perception seems not completely correct. Relatively to America's former strong position and picture, it is however obvious. The United States 'seems' at least to isolate itself. This attitude becomes especially dangerous if it refuses to do what is necessary to lead, but proves unwilling to support a neo-internationalism, i.e. a foreign policy that seeks to build institutions that are capable of coping with the wide range of global problems. The result would be a drift⁴¹¹. The fact that the United States is still a global power, requires that it behaves as such, despite the fact that it was „never very comfortable with the power it accumulated“.⁴¹²

Yet for most of their history, Americans had taken peace for granted; defining peace as the absence of war was both too passive and too uninspiring to serve as a permanent theme of American policy.⁴¹³

American foreign policy has to define, more than ever, what are 'vital interests' of the nation and how this affects allies, friends and other countries. Especially the former hope that this new definition will not lead to a general isolationism or minimalism, which today is often seen in the American refusal to embrace any set of foreign policy goals, despite an annually published 'National Security Strategy'. More and more it is seen that, „the nation wants to retreat from some forms of involvement, but, when it does become involved, wants to fulfill its tasks quickly in order to be able to turn away from them again, ... [which gives] American policy its frustratingly unpredictable character“.⁴¹⁴ The reasons for it are threefold: First, the 'bipartisanship' agreement of all American parties about

⁴¹⁰ see: W. Weidenfeld, Erosionen sind nicht mehr zu übersehen, in: FOCUS, 39/1995, p. 156.

⁴¹¹ see: R.N. Haass, Paradigm lost, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Jan/Feb 1995, p. 58.

⁴¹² J.L. Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 5.

⁴¹³ H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 761.

⁴¹⁴ W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 22.

foreign policy, initiated after the Second World War by Senator Vandenberg, is gone.⁴¹⁵ The Republican National Security Restoration Act, intending to „cut U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations and restrict the President from placing U.S. troops under foreign command“,⁴¹⁶ as well as the Peace Powers Act, modifying the 1973 War Powers Act by putting more restraints on the President's ability to deploy United States' troops, underline that parts of the Congress have a deep mistrust of international security organizations and even of their own government. This makes it difficult to create „a 'grand design' for imposing own ideology or way of life upon the international system“. ⁴¹⁷ On the other hand, a cold-blooded Realpolitik will not have the support of the American people. A value-based approach is still the only way of conducting policy. Second, the United States is going through a loss of sight process. Because it cannot 'handle' all upcoming worldwide challenges, its ability to distinguish between 'necessity' and 'non-necessity', between problems that can be solved and those which must be endured, is decreasing. The long hesitation to take action in the former Yugoslavia shows that it has unfortunately already made much progress in that direction.

Richer inhabitants of the poorest countries learn from youngest childhood how to politely step over the quadruple-amputee beggar in their path without looking at him, as they enter a restaurant or a bank. Blindness, too, can be learned, and we have to learn how to passively ignore avoidable tragedies and horrific atrocities.⁴¹⁸

A further aspect of this is the stressing of 'global' interests, instead of regional commitments. It is clearly seen that the division of the world into spheres of influence will

⁴¹⁵ It died in 1968 or so.
see: T. Sommer, Die Supermacht zieht ihren Kopf ein, in: Die Zeit, Nov 25 1994.

⁴¹⁶ G. Graham, Contract with America is on target at halfway mark, in: Financial Times, Feb 20 1995.

⁴¹⁷ C. v. Crabb, Jr., Postwar American Diplomacy Doctrines and National Security Policy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 35.

⁴¹⁸ E.N. Luttwak, Now that great Powers are gone, in: International Herald Tribune, Nov 23 1994.

give others the possibility to act 'in their sphere' without regard to international norms⁴¹⁹ and in non-acceptable ways, which thus might be „the formula for disaster“.⁴²⁰ On the other hand, however, under the present financial, economical and political constraints, an American lock, stock and barrel 'global' commitment means 'no' commitment.

Third and finally, vast differences between the American public opinion and leadership exist. The future of United States foreign policy is especially strongly discussed. While the 'public opinion' overwhelmingly favors a strong transatlantic link, economic leaders see the Asian region equally important and politicians „clearly prefer Asia“⁴²¹ these days. It is therefore necessary, that an intellectual structure, a domestic and international discussion, and a broad interaction between all interest groups is conducted on which foreign policy can be based on. Unwillingness to speak out regularly to American people about such issues is surely the wrong policy for a president. Moreover, case-by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply inadequate. The choice is however, which of the 'ends' (Wilsonianism, Economism, Realism, Humanitarianism, or Minimalism) should be chosen and which of the 'means' (Unilateralism, Neo-Internationalism, or United States' Leadership) is most practicable.⁴²² The paradigmatic shift towards state isolationism seems

⁴¹⁹ see: A. Lake, American Power and American Diplomacy, in: U.S. Policy and Texts, Oct 26 1994, p. 13.

⁴²⁰ A.M. Haig, Jr., U.S. Commitments and Capabilities: In the Service of a Balanced Foreign Policy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 9.

⁴²¹ Frankfurter Allgemeine, Das Virus des Neoisolationismus hat Amerika nicht erfaßt, Mar 16 1995. Americans make some more unexpected distinctions, beside others: a strong support for the United Nations, a willingness to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea, support for an independent Palestinian state, belief that Japan should have a place on the U.N. Security Council, and prefer „that the United States play an 'active' role in world affairs“. Thus, arguments are mostly based on the view of politicians and other leaders which, of course, will determine the politics of the future. See: J.E. Rielly, The Public Mood at Mid-Decade, in: Foreign Policy, No. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 76-77.

⁴²² R.N. Haass article: Paradigm lost, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Jan/Feb 1995, gives advantages and disadvantages to all these proposals. They shortly are defined by:

Wilsonianism:	desire to see other countries adopt a form of democratic governance and civil society
Economism:	a sense that traditional interests have receded and that economic concerns need to be paramount
Realism:	focus on order among rather than within states, mostly emphasized by a balance-of-power

inherently to predict a future unilateral economism for the United States. There are some indications even though this clearly cannot be purely fulfilled. This trend alarms all those who see that this probably will threaten America's national security. The world longs for America's leadership despite intellectual and political differences. How to handle international crises and how to structure international alliances or security systems, might be seen from different perspectives. However, it is equally true, that the goal is the same for all: the increase of international security. Small nations have to contribute to this goal because they also get their piece of the security cake. The American piece, however, will probably be the biggest and the most important. It is thus unthinkable, that the United States try to conduct a minimalist or an only economist approach. Because America is economically not able to prefer exclusive humanitarianism and politically not willing to accept a pure Wilsonianism, probably foreign policy will be determined in the future by a realism which inherently has some humanitarian, Wilsonian, economic impacts. It is impossible for the United States to act alone and isolated due to the size of the problems to be solved and the intensity of international interconnections. In doing so they would risk fulfilling the task only marginally. Since the nation state will further be the major player on the international field, nobody wants to give others a de facto veto over its proposed foreign policy. A neo-internationalism will make only little steps forward. Thus, United States' leadership will be the only solution in the near future. Because this is so obvious for most of the states, the danger of America's 'isolation from outside' is much bigger if it does not fit into this matrix. A zigzag foreign policy over the full range of 'ends' and 'means', often described as 'Genscherism', will confuse and minimize the followers who are needed for a leading country. The United States should avoid isolationism. Essential to be able to build a necessary consensus around its policy preferences is to have allies and friends willing to act, and to make its mark on

Humanitarianism:	the world is seen less in terms of nation states per se than as peoples, focus on the alleviation of poverty, disease, hunger, overcrowding, environmental degradation etc.
Minimalism:	refusal to embrace a set of foreign policy goals, sees only modest U.S. interests in the world

international organizations. This should be the foremost task for American foreign policy in the near future.

Along with the implications on social and cultural aspects, values and foreign policy, finally economic aspects have to be mentioned. These days, Europeans fear that the United States will turn their back on the 'old' continent Europe and open new markets in Asia to stabilize its economy. It is not a surprise that America is paying particular attention to the changing international and economical power and is even subordinating its diplomacy under this goal.⁴²³

In the 1950s and 1960s the American public was concerned with 'bomber gaps' and 'missile gaps' with the Soviet Union. It is now, with much greater justification, concerned with economic performance gaps with Japan.⁴²⁴

The real implications of the problem are politico-economical. The deficit affects all facets of American government, curtailing the policy options available to national leaders. Looking from the outside it is more than strange, for example, that political clashes on further budgets cause a governmental shutdown over weeks and months. It is clear to everybody that these political clashes effectively cost more money than prolonging the old budget's spending, while considering future political and financial directions. „America will politically withdraw from the world as much for want of money as for want of will“.⁴²⁵ From a national economy view this means that profit making, decreasing the international budget deficit, getting access to new markets, creating jobs, and competition with 'friends and foes', regardless what will be the political effect, will determine America's economic politics in the future. Despite the effect that international turmoil and problems always force the United States to spend money helping, for example, Russia and Ukraine to dismantle their atomic weapons or North Korea to build light water reactors in exchange

⁴²³ see: A. Lake, American Power and American Diplomacy, in: U.S. Policy and Texts, Oct 26 1994, p. 12.

⁴²⁴ S.P. Huntington, America's changing strategic interests, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Jan/Feb 1991, p. 9.

⁴²⁵ B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 39.

of a risky nuclear program, the general trend towards a more 'robust', ruthless, and mercantilist economic politics can be clearly seen. Underlying the American tectonic shift are irritations about German and Japanese economic strength and feelings of competition rather than partnership. Why has the European Union reduced or abandoned trade-barriers with more than a few states, but not with the United States of America? Why does the United States promote a free trade zone with countries of Latin America and the Pacific region while acting 'indifferent to the idea of a Trans Atlantic Free Trade Area'⁴²⁶, thus neglecting the zone in which the common ideas of free trade and market economy had their origins?⁴²⁷ The realization that the purpose of foreign policy must be by far to serve domestic economic considerations leads very quickly to isolationism. This is dangerous in three ways: First, a foreign policy based on economics can all too easily be overwhelmed. Instability can interrupt the emergence of markets and a great deal more. Similarly, the desire to sell for economic reasons can conflict with the need to sanction or isolate a country for political or strategic purposes. Second, economism can easily come to resemble neo-merkantilism. A foreign policy based on export promotion runs the risk of degenerating into a search for specified, quantifiable results that will only increase the role of domestic political, often protectionist, forces in economic relationships.⁴²⁸ Failure to meet short-term goals tends to lead to retaliation and protectionism. This can harm the overall bilateral relationships. Third, „unless the globalizing economy can extend its reach to people in the lower economic strata, where population is growing most rapidly, the coherence of many if not all political systems is likely to come into question“.⁴²⁹ This might put in danger the national security of the United States more than actual military threats. In the long run, it makes the access to resources much more difficult and furthers

⁴²⁶ see: C. Parkes, US cool on Kinkel's Atlantic trade plan, in: Financial Times, Apr 20 1995.

⁴²⁷ see: W. Weidenfeld, Wir brauchen die Transatlantische Gemeinschaft - Plädoyer für eine neue Grundlage der europäisch-amerikanischen Zusammenarbeit, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 9 1995, p. 11.

⁴²⁸ see: R.N. Haass, Paradigm lost, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, Jan/Feb 1995, p. 47.

⁴²⁹ J.D. Steinbrunner, Reluctant strategic Realignment - The Need for a View of National Security, in: Brookings Review, Vol. 13, Winter 1995, p. 6.

political turmoil worldwide. Furthermore, open markets should be supported on purely humanitarian grounds. Specifically, the post-World War II German history shows that open markets and free trade are the best bases for economic increase and employment.⁴³⁰ As President Clinton announced, when declaring his economic program, America should no longer ask: 'does it have a pay off for *me*?' but 'does it have a pay off for *us*?'. Otherwise will the 'mixed signals' coming from the United States help those in Europe, Asia and worldwide who say: 'we have to define our own interests' and that means 'a bloc' or, even worse it leads to the fact that „Europeans may, however slowly and painfully, resign themselves to the inevitability of war ... if economic recession deepens to the point of threatening the stability of democratic regimes“.⁴³¹ The threat is that the United States economic nationalism will give rise to similar policies in other industrial or industrializing democracies (e.g. Russia). As President Clinton cites the German Defense Minister Ruehe, „if our new friends are not able to export their goods, they may instead export instability“.⁴³² In general, there is no need for an American political isolationism caused by a vision of 'necessary economic security'. The fundamental difference between power and prosperity is that power mostly is a zero-sum game and can only be gained at the expense of others. Prosperity can be shared by will. A system in which companies are competing on their quality and reputation, not on the subsidized financing they get, prevents the United States from being isolated due to a virulent nationalism.

The United States is going through a tectonic shift, internally and as a state itself. It is entering a season of sharpening internal strains, during which it may be as badly divided along partisan, class, gender, and ideological lines as it was along sectional lines in the 1850s. If the above trends continue, they will probably lead to the destabilization of the political system and its replacement either by an anarchy of groups or a more

⁴³⁰ see: H. Kohl, *Deutsch-Amerikanische Partnerschaft für Frieden, Freiheit und Wohlstand*, Speech in Berlin, Sep 9 1994, in: *Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, Nr. 84, p. 782.

⁴³¹ D. Moisi, Deputy Director of the French Institute of International Relations, cited in: S. Kober, *The Fallacy of Economic Security - The Clinton Administration's Attempt to use political and economic Muscle to create an International Playing Field tilted toward the U.S. is extremely risky*, in: *USA Today*, Vol. 123, May 1995, p. 21.

⁴³² see: *Ibid.*, p. 22.

authoritarian form of rule. The biggest mistake would be resignation. Politicians should show courage and solidarity, domestically and internationally, especially when „miracles of leadership as great as any we [America] had witnessed in the past to keep the miracle of this venerable democracy alive“⁴³³ are needed. A turbulent political storm lies ahead.

B. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities.⁴³⁴

This is one of the key messages from the 1995 United States National Security Strategy. It expresses, on the one hand, a tendency against isolationism and against fears that America will disengage from the world, as it is feared even by those who for a long time have tried to avoid United States domination.⁴³⁵ The message that America is neither 'too good for the world', nor 'not good enough'⁴³⁶ but 'unique', underlines that it will be able to act decisively when the decision to act has been taken. On the other hand, however, the diversity of assets points out that it is not always the military which could do the best to reach national goals, obviously not internally, but also not internationally. Although President Clinton „is determined to maintain our [United States'] military as the best trained, the best equipped and the best prepared fighting force in the world“,⁴³⁷ and

⁴³³ see: B.D. Portner, Can American Democracy survive?, in: Commentary, Nov. 1993, p. 40.

⁴³⁴ The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Feb 1995, p. i.

⁴³⁵ „The issue today, as France has increasingly come to realize, is not whether the United States will dominate Europe, as it once feared, but whether the United States will stay in Europe and make a positive contribution to the resolution of Europe's new security problems“. see: F.S. Larrabee, Implications for transatlantic Relations, in: M. Jopp, The Implications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe's foreign Relations, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers, No. 17, Oct 1994, p. 32.

⁴³⁶ see: A. Lake, The Need for Engagement, Speech at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Nov 30 1994, p. 8.

members of the American Congress want „to maintain the largest, most powerful military force on the earth“,⁴³⁸ it is not envisaged to employ these forces in every case. American national strategy proposes, in the opposite, to substitute over the long run the marketplace for the battlefield as the dominant area in which nations interact, and in which international conflicts work themselves out. In the short run, however, the problem remains of how this transition can be advanced, and of what part military force can play in the process.⁴³⁹ Additionally, it has to be answered which effect the 'Primacy of Economics' will have on the cooperation of states and militaries.

In general, the development of the modern world shows clearly that only few aims can be reached by one state or group alone. The United States of America, thus, is more than ever dependent on cooperative management of world-politics. Allies, friends, neutral states and adversaries play an important role. This tendency, on the one hand, can be judged positively because interdependencies on a cooperative basis lead to more stability in world politics. On the other hand, United States leadership cannot any longer be seen in the light of a relation between a 'world power' against all other powers. The United States of America needs 'Partners in Leadership' if it wants to implement its mission to spread democracy all over the world, to secure the economic world-market and to sustain its security. The National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement is a first try to combine these tasks. The special relationship to this global responsibility is derived mainly from the United States great power status, the „common underlying faith that the United States possesses the world's best system of government, that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by ... adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy“,⁴⁴⁰ as well as from its global interests. Therefore it is not astonishing that the main chapter of the National Security Strategy, dealing with economy, has the headline

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴³⁸ A. Lewis, More than Bosnia is at stake, in: Monterey Herald, Dec 3 1995, p. 15A.

⁴³⁹ Question was especially discussed in the course: Joint and Maritime Strategy, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Prof. Moran, Jul-Dec 1995.

⁴⁴⁰ H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 18.

„Promoting Prosperity at Home“. The different topics on which the strategy puts emphasis on are bilateral and multilateral economic treaties or partnership in economic coordination. Thus, it was quite natural that at the December 1995 United States - European Union summit in Madrid the 'New Transatlantic Marketplace' became the „key component of [all] efforts ... to build a strong transatlantic community among democratic market economies“. ⁴⁴¹ The National Security Strategy stresses four key-elements: broad-based economic growth, the environment, population and health, and democracy. ⁴⁴² These elements give the tendency of the United States government of 'engaging abroad' as their economic mission. It is furthermore clearly seen that the range of environmental risks jeopardizes international stability. In short, it can be discovered that a clear division between security, economy and the spread of democracy cannot be made, despite the clear division of the topics into chapters. This leads to the (right) assumption that military means are quite obvious part of an economic mission. However, first the strategy considers several critical questions before a military commitment should be done which emphasize the use of non-military means, a clear definement of a mission, a risk and cost assessment as well as a reasonable assurance of support from the American people. ⁴⁴³ This is the result of what today often is called the 'Vietnam-Syndrom'.

To some former doves, the fundamental lesson was never to get involved in a land war in Asia; to others, it was to avoid intervention in international trouble spots unless the nation's vital interests were clearly at stake. Some commentators warned that policy makers must be wary of the sort of simplistic reasoning that produced the domino theory and the Munich analogy. Others pointed to the weakness of South Vietnam and admonished that even a superpower could not save allies who were unable or unwilling to save themselves. For still others, the key lessons were that American power had distinct limits and that to be effective, American foreign policy had to be true to the nation's historic ideals. ⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴¹ NTA Fact Sheet, White House release, U.S.-EU Economic Relationship; the NTA Marketplace, in: U.S. Information & Texts, Dec 7 1995, p. 9.

⁴⁴² The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Feb 1995, p. 22.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 13.

There are three categories of National Interests defined: Only when vital national interests are at stake, it is sure that military power is involved, if necessary. For the second and third category, important and humanitarian interests, United States military forces should only be used if they advance interests and if they are the best tool to address certain problems.⁴⁴⁵ Thus it is quite unsure that military means will be involved in economic questions, even if they are of worldwide interest. Secondly, one has to see whether military means are capable to support economic goals, if they are adequate to the operationalization of the strategic goals and if they fit into an approach toward a greater emphasis on coalitions between the leader United States and probable followers.⁴⁴⁶

It is self-explanatory that foreign investment is discouraged by anarchical, unstable, and fundamentalistic religious, ethnic or nationalistic situations. In the contrary, 'zones of peace, wealth and democracy' can extend themselves, if they are free of political pressures. They can become an attraction point. Though these zones cannot prevent the „zones of turmoil and development from having coups and revolutions, civil and international wars, and internal massacres and bloody repressions“,⁴⁴⁷ there are reasonable arguments that nothing can threaten the zones of peace because they are economically and military powerful. They will not go to war with each other because it would bring no gain to them, while the destruction of a war causes such damage at home and abroad that even a great victory could not balance the costs. On the other hand, military means are still needed, because national security problems will continue, especially for conflicts with states from outside the zone of peace.⁴⁴⁸ For the actual international situation this means

⁴⁴⁴ G.C. Herring, *America's longest War*, Mc Graw-Hill, Inc., University of Kentucky, 1996, p. 310.

⁴⁴⁵ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Feb 1995, p. 12.

⁴⁴⁶ „...willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community“. In: The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Feb 1995, p. 7.

⁴⁴⁷ M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, *The Real World Order*, Chatham House Publishers Inc., Chatham, New Jersey, 1993, p. 7.

that a 'zone of peace' is established by North America and Western Europe, actually enlarging to the East, a region which is not already immune to setbacks. Thus, at first sight one has to point out, that military capabilities have a wide range of tasks in the future, which will link allies together. However, there are important differences on what should be their quantities and qualities and for which missions they should be capable. While NATO, for example, sees principles of peacekeeping missions which „guarantee firm and durable settlements to crises, ... directed at supporting peace efforts and at moderating conflicts, as the situation requires“,⁴⁴⁹ others think that „U.S. armed forces are being turned away from their historic role and toward a new, thankless and open-ended task of administering global social welfare“,⁴⁵⁰ and that these missions 'beyond collective defense' will undermine public support, American credibility abroad and the readiness of the armed forces.

The military dimensions of 'Enlargement and Engagement' are combined with two questions: (i) What are the capabilities of the armed forces in relation to the spread of Western economy? and (ii) What are the scenarios and aims, armed forces should or could be involved in/for? An answer to the first question can be found in the United States Military Strategy. It points out that the achievement of the national military objectives is based on two pillars:

- Thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities.
- Promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁴⁴⁹ NATO Press Service, Follow-on to the 1993 Athens Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Dec 6 1995, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁰ M. House, The wrong Mission, in: Financial Times, Sep 9-10 1994.

These two pillars include a fight-and-win capability, deterrence and conflict prevention and a peacetime engagement.⁴⁵¹ While the first of these capabilities is mainly the backbone of the defense of the United States and its allies' homeland, it implies the capability of major warfighting abroad, like the Gulf War. Sticking to the first question, one can say that the capabilities to fight a major war is the prerequisite for the United States to act as a world power with its special mission of spreading democracy and free markets. Its membership in NATO underlines the ability and the will to fight against any aggressive adversary combined with the allies. Furthermore, a credible deterrence and conflict prevention capability, reaching from nuclear deterrence over confidence building measures to peace enforcement, is necessary to counter any upcoming state and peer competitor. These necessities are based on the assumption that „in international politics, the appetite often comes with eating: and there really may be no way to check an aspiring rival except by the mobilization of stronger military power“.⁴⁵² The national objectives only can be achieved if it is possible to hold back all kind of aggressors which can threaten the United States and its allies by more than a certain degree. This global approach gives, in general, the possibility to act regional and abroad, i.e. away from the homeland or that of the allies. If one assumes, that the National Security Strategy aims not only at stabilizing and broadening today's 'zone of peace', i.e. the zone of America with its allies and perhaps additionally its major trade partners, but also at creating 'new' zones of peace and free trade, which is presumably a key goal, one should generally demand a military capability to stabilize regions, support confidence building measures and peacekeeping capabilities with an overseas power projection possibility. Finally, military capabilities for humanitarian help, security assistance, as well as counterdrug and counterterrorism are needed to establish basic prerequisites for a region of peaceful trade.⁴⁵³ All these capabilities,

⁴⁵¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Feb 1995, p. 4.

⁴⁵² M. Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, p. 21.

⁴⁵³ This implies above all disaster relief missions and operations-other-than-war, such as restoring civil order. See: Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, May 24 1995, pp. 2-17.

whether they are achieved or planned, show that the military is in principle expected to be able to conduct a variety of missions which support a secure environment as a base for economic trade and as a promotion of those countries which want to be stabilized for a normal economic exchange among trade partners or which could become members of a secure economy zone. As seen in the close links between the EU, WEU, and NATO, a certain security, i.e. the absence of armed fighting and the guaranty to have the freedom of unspoiled trade, is the minimum basic prerequisite for every economical system. Therefore, the engagement, leading to an enlargement of a zone of peace, does have a significant military dimension. The role of armed forces, and in Western Europe especially also the role of United States armed forces, thus is not only helpful but indispensable. Furthermore, „only by leading abroad, by meeting the obligations of engagement and seizing its opportunities, can America stay prosperous and secure ‘at home’“.⁴⁵⁴ It is a totally different question whether the military ‘should’ be brought into action in a certain situation. A deployment of America’s forces is always a question of the operationalization of the National Security Strategy.

As shown above, a certain degree of security has to be guaranteed if one strives for economic increases. It is obvious that this is much easier in a settled ‘zone of peace’, as the European-American link of countries, than in certain other regions where free markets grow up. A country under siege of its neighbor’s troubles, terrorism or civil war is one, in which the norms of peaceful conflict resolution simply is not working well. Thus for example, Russia and Ukraine play such an important role for NATO, although none of these countries will become member in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the permeability of borders for refugees and migration is so critical that no country can choose isolation and at the same time be connected economically with prosperous but far away economic partner countries. „ ‘Zones of Peace’ thus means a contiguous territory within which the countries are necessarily concerned with each other, whether they like it or not“.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁴ A. Lake, The Need for Engagement, Speech at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Nov 30 1994, p. 3.

The military implications of this starting point are fundamental. If only a settled zone has to be secured as the basis for a very slow and secure expansion, the needed assets are limited, perhaps not by their quality but surely by their quantity. Economic, cultural or civil relations with upcoming countries outside the zone are ways to aid in the stabilization of certain countries, but military security is only possible if some states of the region achieve wealth and mutual relations. In short, low-level military peacetime engagement, mainly in the form of humanitarian actions, would be needed. The question is, whether the stabilization of a country can be reached without a certain military presence from outside. On the other hand, these nations, taking their first steps into a new and uncertain world, have to concentrate on stepping up their own military preparations rather than seeking new ways of economic development. Thus, it is doubtful that their progress towards peace, economic wealth and democracy will move quickly. This insecurity of further development surely can be seen as counterproductive to the United States National Security Strategy's expression of „Promoting sustainable Development Abroad“.⁴⁵⁶ American power surely is not able to secure the whole world, but it can be „the linchpin“⁴⁵⁷ that holds states in place, gives them time to develop and gain strength. American presence in regions abroad causes the development and deployment of adequate military forces. A 'mission' to strive for worldwide democracy, economic well-being, and the realization that Western culture and economy „belongs to the whole world ... [and] the present Westernization of the world is not an imposition but a unifying process“,⁴⁵⁸ therefore has its military dimension and price.

The main question of how a transition from 'battlefield to marketplace' can be advanced, is whether to support established regimes, even if they are not completely democratic, to underline security as a basis for further economic development through a

⁴⁵⁵ M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, *The Real World Order*, Chatham House Publishers, Inc., Chatham, New Jersey, 1993, p. 32.

⁴⁵⁶ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 1995, p. 21.

⁴⁵⁷ A.L. Friedberg, *Ripe for Rivalry*, in: *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 32.

⁴⁵⁸ M. Nicola, *Western Culture belongs to the World*, in: *Monterey Herald*, Jul 5 1995.

'bolstering approach' or further reforms mainly by intervention in the fields of democracy and social affairs as a 'reformist approach'. Promoting the latter, one could argue that the United States' ideals cannot prop up reactionary regimes by bolstering their economy. To „tie the developing nation to the capitalist 'metropolis' on the basis of military, economic and political relations of permanent dependency“⁴⁵⁹ only to settle overseas markets, cannot be a fundamental goal. The belief system of the 'reformist approach' is based on the assumption that a world of democratic nations would be much more just, peaceful and therefore able to enter a society of economic dependencies. However, it can be criticized by pointing out the success in reformist interventions in non-democratic states and, on the other hand, the limitations of the capacity to foster change and reforms in such countries without backing the governments. Modernizing or transitional societies are always relatively unstable. Whether more order through changes in a broadened area could be produced, can be doubted. 'Order over change' seems to be more successful than 'order through change'. Beside this, there are many examples in history which show that a combination of both is possible. 'Order and change' is an attainable compromise. Stability can be reached, as a prerequisite for economic development, 'among' states as well as 'within' states. However, sometimes, when dealing with the enforcement of a secure environment for economic growth and well-being, two steps on the ladder from 'democracy' over 'governmental stability' to 'regional security' must be taken at once.

A significant military dimension is needed for a basic stabilization of certain regions as a prerequisite for their economic participation in the world market, for the support and protection of developing states and, last but not least, for the creation and enlargement of regions of free economy and trade which promote stability, wealth and peace on their own. „In a political framework that aims at solving crises and conflicts by tackling their roots and causes, it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, confine or terminate violence or war“.⁴⁶⁰ For the near future the United States and its allies have to

⁴⁵⁹ D. Mc Donald, American Policy toward the Third World, in: America and the Third World, p. 22.

⁴⁶⁰ German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994, No. 256, p. 37.

deal with some key determinants of the future security environment. These are the prerequisite for the National Security Strategy proposal to substitute the 'marketplace' for the 'battlefield'. Some of these key determinants are:⁴⁶¹ the continued development of shared global values; the continued primacy of the state in the global system; the pace and extent of economic, political, and cultural integration among developed states and regions; and the continued relevance of military missions. These key determinants point to a continuously developing world. In spite of increasing problems there is a possibility to raise the comfort level of all people, to spread democracy and welfare and, at the same time, to secure the desired status. However there are several prerequisites, which point to a strong transatlantic link between America and Europe. On the one hand, timely and decisive actions by multilateral bodies are „utterly dependent upon the determined leadership of a great power that has the resolution and audacity to move out front, to pull the majority along rather than to wait for it, to carry the lion's share of the burden while tolerating free riders, and to live with the inevitable criticism. ... Multilateralism is not the antithesis of unilateralism. ... Multilateralism is unilateralism plus“.⁴⁶² On the other hand, it is clear that, beside the leading world power, there must be 'followers' and 'partners', to build a „coalition of the center“.⁴⁶³ The Europeans, especially the Western Europeans with their new Central and Eastern Partners, can be (or become) 'real' partners of the United States. As the U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement expresses it, „Our goal is an integrated, democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity“.⁴⁶⁴ Beside others, the prerequisites for this are:

⁴⁶¹ see: see: E.H. Tilford, Jr., World View: The 1995 Strategic Assessment, Strategic Studies Institut, U.S. Army War College, Feb 10 1995, p. 9.

⁴⁶² I.L. Claude, Jr., Collective Security after the Cold War, in: G.L. Guertner, Collective Security in Europe and Asia, Strategic Studies Institut, U.S. Army War College, Mar 2 1992, p. 21.

⁴⁶³ This allegorie is often used in United States' internal political discussions. (See: A. Lake, The Need for Engagement, Speech at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Nov 30 1994, p. 1.) However, it fits to the external, international situation as well.

⁴⁶⁴ The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 25.

- that America and Europe understand each other as 'one' zone of security and welfare, not divided but linked by the Atlantic ocean,
- that both understand that the exploration of new markets cannot be done competitively, but is only manageable in a multilateral and multidimensional approach,
- that both develop the same sense of responsibility for areas of common interest, like Russia, Asian countries and probably the Middle East and Northern Africa,
- that the transatlantic link maintains a strong military element,
- that military cohesiveness, adaptability, interoperability and compatibility are made strong enough that real task and responsibility sharing is possible,
- and most importantly, that 'Engagement and Enlargement' not only remains a general idealistic guide for the United States policy, but becomes a strategic concept which can be used when dealing with actual problems in world policy.

C. POWER PROJECTION AND FORWARD PRESENCE

Beside the fact that military power as an important part of the transatlantic relation, plays a further role in United States Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 'how' this could and should be operationalized must be examined. Will the Americans prefer to station troops in Europe, not at least to maintain and support regional alliances (in this case NATO), even if it is very costly, or will they keep flexible, mobile and easily transportable assets in their homeland? The discussions about 'Forward Presence' or 'Power Projection' have been around since the end of the First World War. Despite the fact that the overall force levels overseas remained remarkably consistent

through the 1980s, since the end of the Cold War discussions about these levels have begun anew.⁴⁶⁵ How far opinions differ can be seen from two statements:

Partnership with and presence in Europe, also from the United States strategic viewpoint, is indispensable.⁴⁶⁶

The American government thinks not so much in terms of territorial defense as in terms of power projection, and it has equipped its forces for that purpose.⁴⁶⁷

There are those who see United States presence in Europe, not only as the backbone of the defense, but also as supporting neighbor countries in their efforts towards stability and democracy. Others ask whether America is getting a fair return on its defense investment abroad. In general, it is not affordable nor desirable for the United States to station military forces all over the world. Lack of money and imperial implications of a 'Pax Americana' are two reasons for this. Global interests as well as responsibilities of the United States can therefore only, in case of necessary military interventions, be preserved by the additional ability of 'Power Projection'. The National Military Strategy underlines, as its central strategic elements, 'Forward Presence' and 'Power Projection'. But both elements are only taken into consideration when the United States interests and values are sufficiently at stake.⁴⁶⁸ Thus, it has to be explained 'why' these two elements should be preserved side by side, and what effects this will have for both partners of the transatlantic community, America and Europe. During the Cold War the main focus of almost all Western strategies lay on containment and deterrence. In a world of 'turmoil and insecurity' these elements are even more important.

⁴⁶⁵ see: D.S. Yost, The Future of U.S. overseas Presence, in: JFQ, Summer 1995, pp. 72, 74. „Especially the debate in the House of Representatives in 1994 on the Frank Amendment was noteworthy. It called for reducing authorized end strength for NATO Europe unless host nations paid 75 percent of nonpersonnel costs (on the model of the agreement with Tokyo)“.

⁴⁶⁶ V. Rühle, Europa und Amerika - eine neue Partnerschaft für die Zukunft, Speech at the Sicherheitskonferenz, München, Feb 4 1995, p. 3. (translated by the author).

⁴⁶⁷ W.R. Smyser, The Europe of Berlin, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 1995, p. 18.

⁴⁶⁸ See: The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. iii.

In the new environment, a continuing U.S. „Forward Presence“, albeit at a lower level, provides reassurance in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Central America that regional stability remains important to the United States. A U.S. presence also deters regional powers from jockeying for positions of dominance.⁴⁶⁹

However, today's military strategies, and especially the United States National Military Strategy, also emphasize the promotion of stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction.⁴⁷⁰ This leads to military engagement in peacetime, with elements like: Military-to-Military Contacts, Nation and Security Assistance, Humanitarian Operations, Counterdrug Operations, Counterterrorism Operations, and Peacekeeping Missions. Most of these tasks require stationing of troops over more than a short period of time. Thus, achieving the 'National Military Objectives' means thus having an 'Overseas Presence'.

Stability is the prerequisite for United States' central strategic goals of spreading democracy and enlarging the community of free market states. Worldwide stability is furthermore dependent on deterrence and conflict prevention, which can be conducted only limited from American soil. Consequently, forces of sufficient size and capabilities have to be present at the right time and the right place. This is only possible if there are places of forward deployment. „Power projection is not possible without bases, and particularly, without bases on the opposite shores of the world's oceans“,⁴⁷¹ because 'time' is an essential factor and only quick reactions often can be decisive.⁴⁷² Because of its geographical position, its maneuvering grounds, airports, harbors, depots, and well prepared support installations especially Europe and Germany are such an important basis for United States Power Projection to regions 'out of area'.⁴⁷³ America's overseas

⁴⁶⁹ H. Binnendijk, P. Clawson, *New Strategic Priorities*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995, Washington, p. 17.

⁴⁷⁰ see: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Feb 1995, p. 4.

⁴⁷¹ W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 18.

⁴⁷² For further details about this aspect see: G. Bernhard, *Die Zeit ist immer zu kurz - Anmerkungen zur Krisenreaktion*, in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, 1/95, pp. 21-26.

presence thus has not only a deterrence function against direct threats and a commitment to the inner balance of the states (and probably continents), but it can also be seen as a clear signal for the United States will to be a leading nation. This political signal cannot be given by increasing mobility, deception, stealth, and electronic warfare; means which are inherently combined with an increased capability of power projection.⁴⁷⁴ However, a credible power projection complements the overseas presence „in acting as a deterrent to potential adversaries“.⁴⁷⁵ Enhanced mobility and flexibility make it possible to react quickly if military means are necessary. 'Power Projection' is an element for deterrence, conflict prevention and warfighting. When a crisis turns to a conflict, these forces will assist allies and friends who do not have the advantage of forward deployed American forces or cannot restore a peaceful situation on their own. Thus, 'Power Projection' underlines the decisiveness of America's armed forces.

The deployment of United States armed forces has different reasons in every region. In Europe especially the leadership in NATO, which has been and will be the bedrock of European security in the near future, is the reason for retaining circa 100,000 troops. The main purpose is to have a capability for multinational training and crisis response in the framework of collective defense. On the other hand, Europe is 'the' American base for missions involving rapid deployment to conflicts outside Central Europe and peace-enforcement operations.⁴⁷⁶ It is however important that in the long run America's „Forward Presence“ in Europe defends 'common' American and European interests. Otherwise, the European function as an 'American logistical turntable' would be only barely accepted by the European population which is not willing to serve exclusively American interests.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷³ As a matter of fact, it takes only 60 percent of the efforts to transport capacities to Western Europe than, for example, to Saudi-Arabia. See: S.E. Dean, *Sichere Kantonisten?*, in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, 12/94, p. 627.

⁴⁷⁴ see: D.S. Yost, *The Future of U.S. overseas Presence*, in: *JFQ*, Summer 1995, p. 78.

⁴⁷⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Feb 1995, p. 7.

⁴⁷⁶ see: Secretary of Defense, *The Bottom-up Review*, Sep 1993, p. 14.

In Northeast Asia regional threats require the stationing of an amount of troops as large as in Europe. Prepositioning of material furthermore increases the crisis-response capability in this region. In Southwest Asia local sensitivities to a large-scale Western military presence on land necessitate heavier reliance on periodic deployment of forces on ships. In Africa only a very small contingent of troops is deployed to provide logistical support for American forces transiting the African continent. In Latin America United States forces help to promote and expand recent trends toward democracy and to combat drug traffickers. A special American presence remains in Panama to defend the canal during the transition to full Panamanian control in 1999.⁴⁷⁸

As a result it can be pointed out that 'Forward Presence' is especially worthwhile if a clear threat assessment leads to the assumption that allies, friends or partners will otherwise suffer from an aggression. On the other hand, as in Europe, a regional overseas presence can be used as a base for further deployments of forces to other regions. Europe, from this perspective, can be seen as the biggest aircraft carrier worldwide. But stationing an amount of 100,000 troops in a region like Europe and Northeast Asia is also a political sign of reliability, partnership, real cooperation, and has a lot of psychological effects. For example, thirteen million Americans served in Germany during the last fifty years, so that contacts and emotional links from country to country have been developed. Overseas presence is thus an essential mechanism to support mutual friendship and an advertisement for the values of the Western democratic hemisphere. For Japan, the situation is more complicated. American power is „the linchpin that holds Japan in place. By doing so, it delays the full transition to an independent Asian sub-system and allows time for forces that can mitigate the effects of multipolarity to gain in strength.⁴⁷⁹ Beside these general stabilizing factors there are three more benefits of „Forward Presence“.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁷ see: see: H. Mey, Die USA und Deutschland, Studie des Institut für Strategische Analysen, Feb 1993, pp. 31 and 57.

⁴⁷⁸ see: Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-up Review, Sep 1993, p. 15.

⁴⁷⁹ A.L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry, in: International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 32.

⁴⁸⁰ The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995, p. 10.

- an enhancement of the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operation, by improving the ability to operate with other nations,
- the possibility to use the United States position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security, and
- a facilitation of regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in absence of strong armed forces may be willing to coalesce around the United States in a crisis.

As shown above, there are a lot of advantages for being forward deployed and having troops overseas, ready to fight or engage in 'operations other than war'. When those forces are deployed in areas of crises which could become conflicts, the force size might not be sufficient for response actions or for fighting a regional war at the side of an ally. Thus, the United States must anticipate the need for force-augmentations. This power projection will assist the regional allies „in creating a viable defense to halt the invasion rapidly and will form the basis for the subsequent buildup of combat power needed to defeat the aggressor decisively“.⁴⁸¹ The difference between “Forward Presence“ and 'power projection' therefore is that „Forward Presence“ prevents regional conflicts from occurring while power projection is necessary especially if deterrence fails.⁴⁸²

The National Security Strategy stresses as one of its primary objectives the enhancement of American security by having a military capability to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, in concert with regional allies. Four phases of this two-wars scenario are generally planned: halt the aggression, augment the forces, counter the offensive, and, after the defeat of the enemy, provide for post-war stability.⁴⁸³ In the

⁴⁸¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Feb 1995, p. 13.

⁴⁸² Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-up Review, Sep 1993, p. 7.

fourth phase, in case of a second conflict, the major parts of the armed forces involved in such a scenario would 'swing' into the second theater of war. This swing-strategy has consequences for strategic mobility, preparedness and technological superiority. In short, the ability to project power is necessary. In contrast to a stationary forward deployment, a power projection force must have the flexibility to perform in different critical parameters, including different threat, terrain and warning time. Instead of focusing military attention on containment and deterrence of one preeminent adversary, America thus „must prepare for a world dominated by regional threats, uncertainty and change, and new mission priorities“.⁴⁸⁴ Having the ability to project power in a world of decreasing military capabilities, increases the necessity for skill and readiness.

Finally, because we are a military that has to be ready at a moment's notice to project our forces overseas, we have to not only retain our ability to be ready at all times to deploy. We have to do better than we were able to do before, because when you had a force that was as large as our force was yesterday, you had the luxury where not everyone had to be able to hit on all twelve cylinders simultaneously.⁴⁸⁵

In general it can be pointed out that 'Power Projection' is a required element if local sensitivities to an American military presence make an overseas deployment politically impossible. For example in Africa, military infrastructure is only poorly developed yet global responsibilities may lead to the necessity to 'cover' this region and possible conflicts in those regions where United States forces are deployed will make a military augmentation a necessity. Therefore, despite the fact that there is a strong tendency to see them as alternatives, 'Overseas Presence' and 'Power Projection' are 'both' necessary strategic elements.

⁴⁸³ see: K.-D. Schwarz, Amerikanische Weltmacht im Wandel, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Feb 1995, p. 118.

⁴⁸⁴ Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense, May 24 1995, p. 1-2.

⁴⁸⁵ General Shalikashvili, Speech at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Nov 9 1994, p. 7.

There are differences, however, about the definition of those two elements and over which military service is inherently in which 'business'. Before looking to their abilities and claims for the future, it should be generally remarked that their demands are naturally also linked to other priorities than waging war with the best suitable force combination in a „unified vision for joint operations“.⁴⁸⁶ Getting involved means being important, which of course has an impact on the next budget. Thus, it is not astonishing that all American services try to acquire capabilities for all purposes. The key-word of 'Four Air Forces' shows this approach quite clearly. On the other hand, it is only the Marine Corps with its task to 'prepare' a theater of war for the other forces, that has really a reason for sea, land, and air capabilities.

The Army stresses, as its special characteristics, readiness, deployability, versatility, and sufficiency.⁴⁸⁷ The combination of these characteristics gives the Army the ability to establish itself on the soil of another land, hold it for as long as necessary, and control its population and resources. The unique Army contribution is thus the ability to dominate the land, to occupy territory. It derives its duty to be a 'Power Projection Army' from the nation's strategic purposes and the strategic environment.

Today the Army serves a nation that is engaged around the world - a troubled and uncertain world.⁴⁸⁸

By having a mechanized armor brigade afloat, by stressing preparedness and flexibility of force packages and its deployability, the Army underlines its power projection capability. On the other hand, it sees a clear necessity for going 'joint' if power projection is necessary. Very much stronger is the Army's claim to be the „central element of America's Overseas Presence“.⁴⁸⁹ With the objectives of 'Overseas Presence' which are

⁴⁸⁶ Department of Defense, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense, May 24 1995, p. 2-2.

⁴⁸⁷ see: Department of the Army, Decisive Victory, A White Paper, Oct 1994, pp. 12-17.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁸⁹ Department of the Army, The Army - The Central Element of America's Overseas Presence, Jan 9 1995, p. 1.

influence, assurance, deterrence, and posturing for crisis response, the Army provides itself with a wide range of possible overseas tasks from 'military-to-military contacts' over 'combating drug-trafficking and terrorism' to 'humanitarian assistance'.⁴⁹⁰ Thus, the Army can be seen as the 'cornerstone' for overseas presence. Through its obvious presence it delivers a „strong message to friends and foes“. ⁴⁹¹ After the Cold War is over, the Army no longer has to concentrate on the European battlefield. Therefore, the terminology has switched from 'Forward Defense' during the Cold War, to 'Forward Presence' in the immediate period following the fall of the Soviet Union, to 'Overseas Presence' today.

The basic documents of the Air Force are 'Global Reach - Global Power' (1992) and 'Global Presence' (1995). The first document stresses the basic characteristics of Air Forces to provide sustained, precise firepower, reconnaissance and surveillance, critical refueling, and global lift to rapidly deploy and sustain joint forces in theaters. The 'Control of the High Ground' with Space and C3I Systems⁴⁹² marks the technological advance which the Air Force includes in its principles. Furthermore, the Air Force stresses that it can build United States influence by strengthening security partners and relationships. However, this does not mean that the Air Force must maintain an actual presence in foreign countries. Just the other way around, the Air Force tries to replace the preoccupation with presence with a 'regional focus', stressing at the same time that „distance does not mean disinterest“. ⁴⁹³ Though a long-term presence in Europe and Asia with reduced force structure and overseas bases is guaranteed, the emphasis is put on technological, „extensive programs with partners like Great Britain and Japan [to] provide a conduit for Air Force professionals to share expertise“. ⁴⁹⁴ Beside this techno-political element, the future 'military' purpose is the ability to employ and use space forces. The

⁴⁹⁰ see: Ibid., pp. 7-11.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁹² C3I: Command, Control, Communication, Information.

⁴⁹³ Department of the Air Force, Global Reach, Global Power, Dec 1992, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

expression: „America is an aerospace nation“⁴⁹⁵ can be seen as the basic principle to make an exchange between ‘necessary occupation of a territory’ and ‘being present without presence’. The United States Air Force can no longer afford to physically deploy forces in every region of concern. Thus, advances in technology, most notably information technology, open the fourth dimension of a ‘virtual’ battlespace.⁴⁹⁶ In short, technical advances which lead to the improvement of situational awareness, strategic agility, and lethality „enhance the role of all military forces in exerting presence“.⁴⁹⁷ As a conclusion it can be pointed out that the Air Force stresses its capabilities for a worldwide and effective power projection while being omnipresent due to its (future) technological advancement in space and information means. It can be seen quite clearly that not only the emphasis but also the meaning of the word ‘Presence’ differs between the services: from ‘Showing the Flag’ (Army) to ‘Big Brother is watching You’ (Air Force).

While it seems the Army and Air Force concentrate on one of the strategic elements, the Navy and the Marine Corps take ‘both’ of them as their crucial capabilities. Thus it is not astonishing that the fundamental roles of naval forces are seen as: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence.⁴⁹⁸ With its expeditionary forces the Navy and (especially) the Marine Corps can respond quickly to crises in distant lands and are able to sustain support because of their self-sufficiency. The Navy tries thereby to build ‘power from the sea’, which means both: maritime firepower by operating independently, as well as support for the other services when fighting a possible air-land battle.⁴⁹⁹ Because of its forward deployment, its high readiness and its independence of foreign bases, the Navy and the Marine Corps are very capable in the area of crises management and response. They can arrive, and ‘show the flag and determination’ of the United States, but are also

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁹⁶ Department of the Air Force, *Global Presence*, 1995, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁹⁸ Department of the Navy, *Forward from the Sea*, 1995, p. 10.

⁴⁹⁹ Department of the Navy and Marine Corps, *From the Sea*, 1994, p. 9.

easy to withdraw back beyond the horizon. Despite the massive firepower of an aircraft carrier which can be projected on land, its presence, for example, often is seen more as a signal than as a threat, but the mere presence is enough to deter a would-be aggressor from initiating trouble.⁵⁰⁰ On the other hand, a friendly maritime force near the home-coast can also stabilize national developments in foreign relations as well as in domestic politics. Third World governments in particular are often reluctant to grant permanent basing rights to the United States forces because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling regime. However, in case they do not have a fundamental anti-Western approach, a general prospect for support 'from the sea' is welcomed. For the Navy and the Marine Corps 'Power Projection' and 'Overseas Presence' are strongly linked together. To be a 'Soldier of the Sea'⁵⁰¹ thus means not having a sustained inland-role or an exclusive role on the 'blue waters' securing the sea-lines of communication. The Navy and the Marine Corps tend to embrace both: 'Power Projection' and 'Overseas Presence'; but they are linked to their medium 'water'. Thus, one can see them as traditional warfighting services. For 'operations other than war', for example, the Army is more capable, and since people live on land, it is quite clear that also many other implications of an 'Overseas Presence' are linked to a real presence on land. Naval forces will never be able to march over the Champs-Élysée, White Hall, or Unter den Linden.

Most of the Americans agree with the idea of active United States engagement in world politics, but they also have the opinion that fair burdensharing among allies and friends has to be established. America's interests are no longer only determined by foreign threats but also by internal economic and social problems. What can be expected in relation to power projection and „Forward Presence“? Without an American „Forward Presence“ neither credible alliances can be preserved nor nation-building, peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to restore or establish democracy is possible. 'Influence' and 'Presence' are linked together whereby 'Presence' means more than a countries' coverage

⁵⁰⁰ P. Kelley, H. O'Donnell, Jr., *The Amphibious Warfare Strategy*, in: J.A. Barber, Jr., *The Maritime Strategy*, 1986, p. 25.

⁵⁰¹ see: *Ibid.*, p. 29.

by satellites or a carrier battle group fifty miles in front of the coastline. Whether it is necessary to reach a certain number of troops and whether these troops must necessarily have only one purpose (e.g. the protection of Europe) and cannot be seen as a possible basis for other tasks (e.g. the basis for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa, former Yugoslavia, or the Middle East) is doubtful. As a minimum, a 'credible' presence is required. Credibility is not only a question of quantity and quality. It is also linked psychologically to contacts between people. Thus, as shown above, troop contingents of Land and Air Forces are indispensable if allies' interests are really also vital American interests. 'Power Projection' capabilities supplement the stationing of troops. The United States Armed Forces are improving their abilities to project power throughout the world. All services, without exception, try to increase their performance for this special task. They do it not least because they know that the United States will get involved in world's crises, as the only world power today. Thus, it can be doubted whether American Armed Forces can limit their deployment to cases where crises are containable, manageable, cheap and close-ended. Of course, America is not the world's policeman, but it cannot stand a „self-containment“⁵⁰² without risking a dangerous isolation. The duty of a world power, as Hedley Bull describes it, includes that interests and views of other states are understandingly considered when the own policy is formulated.⁵⁰³

The United States should be resolute in upholding its commitments to key security partners. Backed by overseas presence and other capabilities, these commitments contribute to a structure of stability and order (albeit imperfect). This structure will be necessary, for the foreseeable future, to promote vitality in the world economy, sustain democratic reform, organize collective action against aggression and other threats ... and ensure America's own security and prosperity.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰² K.-D. Schwarz, *Amerikanische Weltmacht im Wandel*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Feb 1995, p. 107.

⁵⁰³ see: H. Bull, *Von der Verantwortung der Weltmächte*, in: *Europa Archiv*, 1980, p. 547.

⁵⁰⁴ D.S. Yost, *The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence*, in: *JFQ*, Summer 1995, pp. 81-82.

D. PARTNERSHIP IN LEADERSHIP

The times of a mere national foreign policy is over. No country, even not the United States, can manage the new global challenges alone. The international reaction in general is a „Recovery of Internationalism“,⁵⁰⁵ stressing that scarcely any item of international politics, (for example, preventing aggression, stopping nuclear proliferation, promoting human rights and democracy, and redressing human disasters that normally attend civil wars) can have unidimensional or unilateral solutions. Partnership among nations of common interests, ideas and, importantly, of common ideals is, thus, not only necessary but crucial for the future. „Partnership means: common action and common responsibility sharing. Responsibility sharing means conducting mutual political influence - regional and worldwide“. ⁵⁰⁶ Thus, on the one hand, Europe needs a strong America, as a strong ally of the developing 'old' continent. An economically and politically strengthened and combined European Union, for example, also in the future will consider the military, economic, intellectual, and cultural partner 'United States' and its participation on the European continent important and desirable, if it is possible in the future to establish a 'partnership among equals' or, as the German Bundespräsident has expressed it, 'relational societies'. On the other hand, it was the United States which had figured out that the role of European partners was essential for Europe's own future world-power status. Despite the fact that Germany, due to its size and power, is not able to be an 'equal' partner, in May 1989 the American President Bush announced a 'Partnership in Leadership'. Even today, the precise meaning of this term is unclear, particularly in the effect the 'Partnership in Leadership' would have on future transatlantic relations from the United States-German bilateral standpoint. Four explanations are obvious: first, 'Partnership in Leadership' builds the contrary pole to the former American policy of containment of Germany. 'To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down' had long been functions of

⁵⁰⁵ see: D.C. Hendrickson, The Recovery of Internationalism, in: Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 1994.

⁵⁰⁶ V. Rühle, Europa und Amerika - eine neue Partnerschaft für die Zukunft, Speech at the Sicherheitskonferenz, München, Feb 4 1995, p. 4. (translated by the author)

NATO.⁵⁰⁷ Despite the fact that the last function has evolved into 'keeping the Germans integrated',⁵⁰⁸ even today this rationale is no longer adequate, because Germany after its unification has shown that it is not only integrated in NATO, the European Union, the Western European Union, and generally as a member of the Western societies, but that it is also 'the' promoter of a Western integration and a strong transatlantic link, based on common values and beliefs. That Germany is an equal partner of the 'society of Western nations', should be a 'truism' for everybody today. The United States have acknowledged this, by being the only Second World War country which really, without reservations, supported the German unification. 'Partnership in Leadership' therefore can be seen as an evidence of trust. Second, the United States need a balanced American-European partnership. This means on the one hand, that it is especially Germany which can play the middle, compromising, balancing, and nevertheless forward-looking role between other European countries which have been traditionally Atlantic-centered or Europe-centered in their outlook. America, since the Clinton administration took office, is interested in close and intensive links to its mother continent, and at the same time, in strong capabilities and self-reliance of Europe itself, to establish a 'real' partnership among equals. On the other hand, Germany is seen as a partner of a 'strategic alliance' to contain the southern arc of crises of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as to integrate Central and Eastern European states into the Western community. It is necessary to concentrate its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to reach these goals. Germany, due to its geographical situation, its traditional good relations to most of the parties in the Middle East and Northern Africa, without any colonial obligations and debts, due to its own transition experiences of its eastern part, and due its economic skills is a capable and central anchor place and contact point for these efforts. Furthermore, America since the end of the Second World War has relied, as shown in the previous chapter, on the 'logistical turntable Germany'. Thus, 'Partnership in Leadership' takes into consideration that former practical cooperation will also be essential in the future, but with the fully

⁵⁰⁷ This was expressed by NATO's first Secretary General: Lord Ismay.

⁵⁰⁸ see: J. Joffe, Is there Life after Victory?, in: The National Interest, Fall 1995, p. 25.

acknowledged sovereignty of the re-unified German state. Third, the partnership between the two countries is based on economic reasons. Increasing interdependencies and differences with the trade partner Japan on the one hand, and on the other the (until today) very non-homogeneous European Union, were the reasons the United States began to search for an economic crystallization point in Europe. In economic problematic situations it makes more sense to strengthen alliances and partnerships, to establish problem solving communities and to combine, than to rely on protectionism and subsidized industries. Trade wars and even a policy of being 'tough on trade'⁵⁰⁹ are counterproductive. Therefore Germany, due to its hard currency, its advanced industry, technology, and sheer economic growth was the natural partner for the United States.

It is the economical leadership in the European Union that, from the American view, predestines Germany for being a partner in a leadership role.⁵¹⁰

Fourth and finally, it is the calculation that a stronger Russia would not be a useful counterbalance to the strength of the newly unified Germany, but that in fact Germany can help to stabilize a Russian economy and state, which was a basic reason for a strong strategic partnership between the United States and Germany.⁵¹¹ Russia is still in a transitional process without a clear outcome and sometimes even without a clear goal, towards which this development shall happen. Harsh Russian statements against NATO enlargement, fears of a new Russo-Chinese entente which would „foreshadow a turn away from democracy in today's single-superpower world“,⁵¹² the installation of the new Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, who is expected to support Islamic fundamentalism and Iraq's resurrection while trying to create alliances against America's

⁵⁰⁹ see: H. Mey, Die USA und Deutschland, Studie des Institut für Strategische Analysen, Feb 1993, p. 53.

⁵¹⁰ H. Brill, Ein zaudernder Partner in der Führung, in: Die Welt, Dec 27 1994. (translated by the author)

⁵¹¹ The Clinton administration has changed its mind in this question, from a 'Russia first' policy towards a 'NATO Enlargement' policy. See: B. Beedham, Russia gains, Germany loses, America should stay, in: International Herald Tribune, Dec 15 1994.

⁵¹² W. Safire, Russia and China to remarry, in: Monterey Herald, Jan 18 1996, p. 7A.

'destabilizing support of democracy',⁵¹³ make it more necessary than ever to keep an eye on Russian developments, to keep Russia on track towards democracy, free markets and stability, but also to find a common policy towards Russia among Western nations.

In the new, unpredictable multipolar world, and given the potential danger from China over the next few years, Western policy towards Russia should in my view be devoted to keeping options open, and keeping an eye on the West's possible future need of Russia as an ally.⁵¹⁴

By stressing a greater European responsibility for its own defense, while being anchored in NATO, it can be demonstrated to Russia, that it does not face a United States-led anti-Russian coalition, but „an instrument for managing crises in which the Europeans are undertaking their full share of the political and military burden“.⁵¹⁵ Until today, Russia has only mildly criticized the WEU's associate partnership strategy and EU's actual and future-planned enlargement. Thus, it is pretty clear that America's partnership with Europe is necessary, beside other elements, to have a foot in the door of the European Union's and the Western European Union's defense and security policies towards Russia (which probably can develop more smoothly, more steadily and more undisturbed than NATO's).

Having European partners, America could speak through them or, at least, could have a European advocate in topics of vital interests. Germany, as a 'Partner in Leadership', can fulfill this role. It has historical and geopolitical interests in a good relationship with Russia, as well as those on a personal level.⁵¹⁶ It has heavily supported the renewal of the Russian economy by spending a lot of money, is the only Western European nation with 'personal' experiences with Russian troops on its soil, and is strongly enough engaged in NATO that a close German-Russian relationship could

⁵¹³ see: Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ A. Lieven, A new Iron Curtain, in: The Atlantic Monthly, Jan 1996, p. 25.

⁵¹⁵ M. Rühle, N. Williams, NATO enlargement and the European Union, in: The World Today, May 1995, p. 87.

⁵¹⁶ There is a close personal relationship between the German Chancellor Kohl and Russia's President Yeltsin.

supplement a United States-Russian relationship. Such a relationship could occur without the fear of an developing new power center or of a tendency towards a European unilateral policy towards Russia without transatlantic cooperation and with the eventual aim of isolating America. Russia surely is not 'irrelevant', as Zbigniew Brzezinski has called it.⁵¹⁷ Its nuclear potential and sheer magnitude, its dangerous potential for environmental pollution, for being a proliferator of nuclear, biological or chemical material, arms, knowledge and delivery systems, its huge population, its resources, and its actual transition from a Communist world power to a, (hopefully) democratic and western value-oriented state, makes Russia to a country which should be taken into consideration when formulating international and foreign policy. However, it is dangerous for the United States only to concentrate on Russia, while leaving its European allies on the side-lines. If Western policies towards Russia are only be conducted through a bilateral American-Russian dialogue, it will be far harder to offer meaningful support for Ukraine, to turn off Moscow's (nuclear?) deliveries to Iran, to contain Russia's orientation towards China, and to avoid military, economic, and political crises with Russia, if Russian-American relations deteriorate. A multipolar relationship, with more than only two participants, can produce flexibility and avoid stalemates in the East-West dialogue, despite the fact that coordination processes among the Western partner's policies towards Russia will take time, effort, and necessitate political compromises in some cases.

If the United States more willingly accepts that leadership has to be shared and that, when dealing with other states, it has more and more to be a 'receiving' country as well, as opposed to being the 'giving and dominating' state only, it will have the chance to take part in an „aggregate West European productivity, aggregate West European population resources, and aggregate West European defense potential“.⁵¹⁸ However, it has to abandon a policy which Charles Evans Hughes in 1924 formulated as follows:

⁵¹⁷ see: S. Sestanovich, The Risks of letting Russia disengage, in: The New York Times, Oct 25 1995, p. A15.

⁵¹⁸ P. Seabury, American National Interests and American Alliances, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 85.

... while Washington favors certain forms of international collaboration, it will not tolerate the submission of crucial questions related to America's diplomatic and security interests to the determination of any group of outside countries.⁵¹⁹

It becomes clear that there are other countries which might have found better solutions to some problems. Social and educational policies, health care, and industrial policies may be examples of internal affairs, relations to the United Nations, an example of external affairs. Thus, when President Bush offered Germany a 'Partnership in Leadership', this probably meant more than a coordinated foreign and security policy. Furthermore, by mobilizing the support of other nations and leveraging its resources through alliances and institutions, America can achieve important objectives without bearing all the risks or paying all the bills. As President Clinton expresses it:

When America's partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt it undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to work with us. If we do maintain our partnerships and our leadership, we need not act alone.⁵²⁰

If these words really mean political partnership with others, probably under the leadership of America, there is no future reason for irritation about who initiated a political solution, who became involved in a right or wrong moment, and about anybody looking at an affair from a great distance for a long period, as happened in the Western world in relation to the war in former Yugoslavia.⁵²¹ It is however the general and understandable desire that the United States no longer take the main part of the global responsibilities. There is no longer the will, political and financial capability to „defend any area ... without regard for the victim's merit or its contribution to the common defense“,⁵²² as it was the

⁵¹⁹ Quoted in: C. v. Crabb, Jr., *Postwar American Diplomatic Doctrines and National Security Policy*, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Security Commitments and Capabilities*, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 43.

⁵²⁰ Clinton's remarks on Bosnia, Nov 27 1995, in: *The New York Times*, Clinton's Words on Mission to Bosnia: 'The Right Thing to Do', Nov 28 1995.

⁵²¹ see: C.R. Whitney, *Success has many Fathers among Allies*, in: *The New York Times*, Nov 23 1995, p. A9.

⁵²² H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 709.

case when America's [missionary] national interest was the principle guide only. 'Partnership in Leadership' requires an adequate reaction and contribution, even taking special situations into consideration, in case of Germany for example its internal transitional difficulties after the unification. 'Contribution' means, among mere financial and material expenditures, an active policy, bringing in ideas and solution proposals, taking risks by eventually being politically outvoted and taking part in multilateral actions, whether they are political, military or other actions. Second and not lesser important, it is necessary to avoid a „widespread indifference or ignorance concerning affairs in the backyard“⁵²³ of the partner(s). The central strategic issue in the years ahead relates to the development of a policy framework within which the more regional-oriented European concerns can be brought into coherence with the global interests of the United States. European allies must be made to realize that fundamentally they would be among the first to suffer if America at some future date faced a really major strategic threat at its southern border, and the United States should understand that a challenge like the Yugoslav crisis or the dangers from Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Africa dangers not only their interests but also their own national security. Hesitating by working together when such crises occur, should be avoided under all circumstances. „Only a shared perception of threats to common interests and a mutual conception of how best to preserve such interests“⁵²⁴ can overcome divisive issues in alliance relations.

'Partnership in Leadership' is a fundamental future concept for the transatlantic relation. Germany is an adequate country for this partnership with the United States. It must be stressed, however, that these two 'partners in leadership' are not isolated from the outer world, especially not from other West European countries. The 'special relationship' between Great Britain and the United States, as well as the so called 'Quiet Alliance' between Germany and Great Britain and the politico-economical axis between France and Germany, promoting as the leading powers the 'European idea', are essential elements of

⁵²³ P. Seabury, *American National Interests and American Alliances*, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Security Commitments and Capabilities*, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 88.

⁵²⁴ J.K. Davis, *U.S. Global Strategy and Alliance Relationships*, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Security Commitments and Capabilities*, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 95.

the European and trans-Atlantic political landscape.⁵²⁵ 'Partnership in Leadership' between the United States and Germany thus is a supplementing partnership, not an exclusive one. There is no reason for a European competition between Germany, working hard to 'become' a real American partner, Great Britain, assuming that for long it 'is' the real American partner, and France, stressing that America 'should be' its partner, but will it never really be due to fundamental political differences. The only important thing is that Western policy efforts support themselves, so that it can influence the world in a positive and effective manner on its way towards the third millennium.

⁵²⁵ A very expressive and explanatory graphic of the relationships between the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in the mid-1990s is shown in: H. Brill, Geopolitische und geostrategische Leitlinien deutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, Verteidigungsanalysen, Vol. 6, Jul 1994, p. 8.

VII. THE ASIAN OPTION

Already after the Second World War, Admiral Douglas MacArthur announced that in the next thousand years the world's history would be written in the Pacific. Furthermore, he had prognosticated a great American prestige in the Far East, especially due to the intense and decisive involvement in Asia with the effect of the re-establishment of the liberty and freedom of many Asian countries during the 1940s.⁵²⁶ However, at the present when in the 1980s masses of Filipinos demonstrated with slogans like 'Yankee go home!' it became clear that after the Second World War every country had its own understanding of America's contribution and function in the Asian-Pacific region. Each bilateral and multilateral relation was seen from different perspectives, even among partners, as for example Japan and the United States. For Japan, the bilateral alliance offered the possibility to regain strength, to concentrate on its post-World War II economic recovery and also to live in a diplomatically protected world, far away from the necessity to define its own foreign policy goals dealing with neighbors and, especially after the war, its potential enemies. The United States, on the other hand, saw the primary necessity to bolster political, friendly states against the rising threat of international communism. Japan, with its sea-connection to Russia, was for this approach, not only any country among others, but had a strategic importance. Thus, the American tendency towards being a major player in the Asian-Pacific region is only understandable when taking into account this military dimension, and especially the United States - Japan and the United States - Korean security relationship, which has been „reaffirmed by every incumbent President since Eisenhower“.⁵²⁷ Furthermore, the normalization of Sino-American relations derived in some degree from the hope and expectation that China

⁵²⁶ see: J. Ortmann, Amerikas Position im Pazifik, in: Europäische Wehrkunde, 5/88, May 1988, p. 266.

⁵²⁷ C. v. Crabb, Jr., Postwar American Diplomacy Doctrines and National Security Policy, in: U. Ra'anani, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, p. 33.

would play an active and influential role in containing both North Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism. On the other hand, it was America's aim to create an economic sphere of influence and a new market for goods, in a sense that security cooperation and economical development belong together as the prerequisites for an enduring stability.⁵²⁸ Domestically only an engagement in this region would be agreeable within a combination of both.

The end of the Cold War changed this basis towards the latter element, especially for the United States. A new definition which takes into account the changed distribution of political and military power became necessary. The new world order allowed all participant states to concentrate more and more on economic matters and problems than being fastened to the former military stalemate. For the first time in this century the Asian-Pacific region is on a track towards „welfare without warfare“.⁵²⁹ The United States with its financial problems shifted from its overwhelming security role to a policy of 'jobs first' and 'fair trade'. This created conflicts with Cold War friends, such as Japan that has previously benefited from 'free trade' policies. Asian companies could no longer rely on open United States markets to achieve economic stability and growth in exports. In some American circles even a 'Japan bashing' became 'en vogue', showing that changes had a greater dimension than assumed. On the one hand, it is clearly seen that Asia produces a quarter of the world's gross national product, that it creates enormous markets for consumed goods and high-value foods and conducts big infrastructure programs, in which America's participation would create jobs at home and decrease the foreign trade deficit. On the other hand, Asian companies penetrate more and more the American market, so that domestic companies become new competitors and are more and more 'under the weather'. Furthermore, especially Japan and increasingly Korea are accused of being 'free riders' in the security realm. United States' troop deployments to these regions, it is argued, do not develop the necessity for an adequate financial and military contribution to their own security. Increasing pressure and partially overstretched demands towards

⁵²⁸ see: V. Rühle, Die pazifische und atlantische Dimension gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Speech at Stanford University, Feb 27 1995, p. 2.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

America's responsibilities put the superpower's capabilities and motivations on the brink.⁵³⁰ Therefore it becomes clear, that „what will be especially distinctive about any new world order (and Pacific order) is the linkage between security and economic concerns“.⁵³¹ Asian countries' economic power can and must be translated into political considerations and perhaps political and military responsibilities. Additionally, not only the security environment of Asia but also the whole world is getting closer as interrelationships become greater importance. „A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence“.⁵³² Furthermore, in the emerging unipolar world-system regional cooperative security arrangements have become important.

There are special dependencies in the East Asian region which make predictions and a clear assessment of threats and power difficult. If, for example, the United States should move away from its forward deployment policy and withdraw most of its forces from the region, Japan's role, for example, might increase significantly. This, on the other hand, would create destabilizing rivalries between Japan and China, which could affect again the United States - Chinese relationship. Taiwan and South Korea, also emerging as new powers in East Asia, add a „new level of complexity to the already complicated power relations“.⁵³³ Thus, it is only possible to describe very generally and monodimensionally the power constellations and their effect on America's contribution and attraction in/to Asia, especially the East Asian-Pacific region.

The enormous rise of Asian economies and the sheer volume of Asia-Pacific commerce attracts not only the strategic thinking in economics but also in politico-military affairs. President Clinton's emphasis on a concept of an American-led Pacific community

⁵³⁰ see: N.D. Kristof, U.S. military Role in Asia debated, in: Monterey Herald, Dec 3 1995, p. 2A.

⁵³¹ D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 99.

⁵³² H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone Book, 1994, p. 24.

⁵³³ D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 85.

based on free trade and political cooperation, articulated at the 1993 Tokyo G7 summit, thus showed not only the opportunity to revitalize the American economy, but articulated a view of the region as key to a foreign policy centered on geoeconomics.⁵³⁴ This gives rise to the idea of a 'Pacific Community', of a continent based on common values, goals, interests, and mutual respect. However, this seems only to be the case, if one looks from a certain distance. Local security dynamics and economical, as well as political competition set the region more 'on the fence' than ever before. The two regional giants, Japan and China, have not worked out their relationship's problems, there are shifts and changes since the break-down of the Soviet Union and all the major actors are devoting more of their national resources to the military. With a degree of good-will one can find a sense of identity in the Confucian culture, a new informal, non-confrontational style, and a self-confidence of the newly industrializing economies. But this identity tends to be Asian, not Pacific.⁵³⁵ Thus, the more symbolic than practical declaration of ten nations of Southeast Asia being a 'nuclear weapon-free zone' in 1995 is seen from an American perspective more as a possible interference with the movements of ships and submarines in the region, than as an example of increased peace and stability.⁵³⁶ Moreover, when dealing with other states, most Asians are likely to act opportunistically rather than based on common grounds, so that a real partnership cannot be developed due to differences in basic understandings of the behavior of nations. Nevertheless, there is no possibility for an international policy without or against Asia, despite all fears of a loss of preeminence. Calls for more restrictive policies towards technology transfer will not produce long-term solutions. One has to accept and adapt to a situation in which the relative shift of economic power to the Pacific has strengthened the image of Asian countries, especially in comparison to the United States. Additionally, one has to take into consideration that.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁴ see: R. Manning, P. Stern, The Myth of the Pacific Community, in: Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1994, p. 79.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., p. 81.

⁵³⁶ see: D. Thurber, Asian Nations declare Nuclear-free Zone, in: Monterey Herald, Dec 3 1995.

⁵³⁷ see: D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, pp. 78-79.

- Japan-Russian relations remain chilled due to continuing unresolved bilateral issues,
- the increasing primacy of domestic policies can be taken as a trend towards nationalism, which might be counterproductive against the rise of interdependent and internationalized major industries,
- drastic cuts in military spending in the United States call into question the credibility of its continuing defense commitments and increase the pressure on states like Japan for expanded burden sharing, and that
- this, as an effect, draws Japan to its traditional position of 'doing the least required' militarily to maintain close relations while pleading special circumstances as reasons to avoid larger responsibilities.

These considerations come together with challenges to the East Asian security. They arise from the standoff on the Korean Peninsula, which could initiate regional nuclear proliferation, China's refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, particularly if it declares independence, and the continued disputes about territorial questions (e.g. Russia-Japan: Kurile Islands, Japan-South Korea: Use of waters around northern territories, China-Taiwan: Senkaku Islands, China-Others: Spratly Islands, etc.). Furthermore, all the major Northeast Asian actors - Japan, China, and South Korea - are acquiring regional force projection capabilities.⁵³⁸ Thus, the American allies, Tokyo and Seoul, have been particularly keen in the Post-Cold War environment to meet with their Northeast Asian neighbors: North Korea, China, and Russia, and the United States to discuss regional security problems related to arms buildups. These neighbors, however, have their special interests, problems and probably dangers:

⁵³⁸ see: S. Simon, East Asian Security, in: Asian Survey, Dec 94, p. 1055.

1. Russia

With its improved relations with China, the recognition of South Korea in 1990 and, despite the disputes over the islands of Hokkaido, cooperation with Japan, Russia has normalized its regional relations. Although Russia has not remarkably reduced its military capabilities, it tries to make a more ambiguous and friendly policy towards the attractive high-growth economic area. Difficult relations with its former allies North Korea and Vietnam, the conversion of military industry and internal problems, however, will hold Russia back for a while 'being a player on stage'.

2. China

China's growth-minded leadership is focusing on the creation of an undisturbed investment and trade-oriented neighborhood. It desires increased economic relations with the United States and Japan to counter the overwhelming dominance of both in this region. Although in 1993 it agreed to participate in regional security dialogues, such as the Asian Regional Forum,⁵³⁹ it is presently consolidating its political control over Hong Kong and attempting to counter Taiwan's independence. China faces internal problems with nationalist movements, inefficient state enterprises, and a growing income gap between rural, poverty-stricken, resource-depleted areas and booming coastal provinces.⁵⁴⁰ Despite the economic problems, it has increased its defense budget between twelve and eighty percent per annum. „The acquisition of new weapons could make it a formidable regional power, affecting the ... balance in the region“.⁵⁴¹ Because China is Russia's biggest customer of arms for cash and due to the newly elected Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, there are fears about a new Russo-Chinese remarriage, which „would foreshadow a turn away from democracy in today's single-superpower world“.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁹ see: Ibid., p. 1052.

⁵⁴⁰ see: Business Korea, Prof. Kennedy suggests East Asia Conference on Security, Feb 1994, p. 51.

⁵⁴¹ D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 88.

⁵⁴² W. Saffire, Russia and China to remarry, in: The Monterey Herald, Jan 18 1996, p. 7A.

Predicting such events however, is as difficult in the changing political landscape of Asia, as to deny them.

3. North Korea

After the United States-North Korea negotiations and the accord, signed in 1994, which calls for immediate suspension of the North's nuclear projects in exchange for provision of two light water nuclear reactors and steps toward diplomatic recognition, a major problem and touchy issue was set aside. Sanctions against North Korea, for example, being supported by Japan and South Korea but opposed by China, had otherwise led to new frictions. China has special interests in good relations to both parts of Korea because it sees itself as the new mediator after Russia terminated its economic support to North Korea, particularly due to ideological differences. Taking into consideration a United States partial withdrawal from the peninsula, it would be possible that China becomes the most influential power. This would be furthered by the fact that Seoul tries to conduct its own reunification policy, no longer strongly relying on United States advice, at the same time ensuring that Japanese payment of war reparations to Pyongyang would not jeopardize the process of unification. Japanese and United States influence thus may decrease over the peninsula.⁵⁴³ Because it remains a communist regime and due to its still strong military capabilities, within which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons cannot be explicitly excluded, North Korea will remain a key power for the Northeast Asian region.⁵⁴⁴ The explicit danger of nuclear proliferation will have the United States keep an eye on North Korea.

The different approaches, tendencies, perceptions and links show that the idea of a 'Pacific Century' is almost a cliché. In contrast to today's Europe-Atlantic region the Asia-Pacific region has a vast geographic expanse, as well as cultural, political, and

⁵⁴³ see: D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 94.

⁵⁴⁴ see: R. Fisher, J. Dori, U.S. and Asia, Statistical Handbook, 1995, pp. 52-53.

historical diversities. Because the United States is not willing or capable, as the only remaining world power, to guarantee freedom and peace for the region, despite its remaining, eventually decreased, presence, all regional powers have to find a way to a peaceful co-existence and eventually co-operation. Under certain circumstances this may lead to regional cooperative arrangements,⁵⁴⁵ as the most likely way to guarantee the mutual security of a whole region. It is clear, however, that stability in the Pacific cannot be 'created' by establishing an important all-overwhelming organization at a special time. Only a more overlapping, multitiered system can provide order and peace in the Asian-Pacific region. Bilateral, intra-Asian, transpacific, and global elements have to come together. That seems to be an unmanageable task. But, if members accept the territorial, political, and ideological status quo, no state seeks hegemony, and security is viewed not in absolute terms, then there is a good chance for regional cooperative arrangements.

An important question is, how the United States, especially in relation to the economy giant Japan, can and should possibly participate in such arrangements and in the region in general. As well as, what is its role and responsibility for the future. There is no doubt about the fact that the global tasks of creating peace and security, to promote human rights and the rule of the law, as well as to save the environment can only be fulfilled with a participation of Asian-Pacific governments and groups. Thus, it is essential that these states take full responsibilities and that they become 'partners for mutual benefits'.⁵⁴⁶ It should be moreover agreed that intensive cooperation in economical, technological, and cultural issues can bring partners closer together. This will make governments able to concentrate their efforts in a 'responsibility partnership', as the German Foreign Minister Kinkel had proposed during his visit to Japan in November 1995.⁵⁴⁷ Nevertheless, there are irritations and disputes about the 'how' this could be

⁵⁴⁵ Paul Kennedy has suggested to create an Asianized 'Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe' (OSCE) as a logical first step. see: Business Korea, Prof. Kennedy suggests East Asia Conference on Security, Feb 1994, p. 52.

⁵⁴⁶ see: Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, Asien-Konzept der Bundesregierung, Oct 12 1993, p. 3.

⁵⁴⁷ see: German Info Center New York, Kinkel: Japan und Deutschland wollen „Partnerschaft der Verantwortung“, in: Deutschland Nachrichten, Nov 3 1995.

established and under what circumstances. For example, although the 1992 Tokyo Declaration, signed by U.S. President Bush and Japan's Prime Minister Miyazawa, committed the two countries to „create an even closer partnership [based on the acceptance of their] special relationship [for building] a just, peaceful, and prosperous world“, ⁵⁴⁸ there are disharmonies about burden sharing and responsibility sharing aspects. President Clinton's policy toward Japan is concentrated on trade issues, with a „new determination to get hold of Japanese technology“. ⁵⁴⁹ Japan's firms, which own certain technology, see no reasons why they should share this technology with others. Such tensions lead the Japanese to seek other partners and to balance their traditional dependence on America for defense by more self-reliance. Calls for closing United States bases in Japan are becoming more and more intense. Yet, Japan knows, on the other hand, that „neither Europe nor self-reliance can replace America; and America knows it has to underpin security in East Asia. The worry is that small frictions [often] will frustrate the planning needed if the alliance is to pass the test of future crises“. ⁵⁵⁰ Officials in the United States point out, that a strong cooperation with Japan „lies at the heart of our [U.S.] efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom in the region“. ⁵⁵¹ By most nations, especially Japan, it is taken for granted that this implies a strong overseas presence and a further engagement. However, the end of the Cold War and the reduced military power of Russia (though it keeps a large amount of nuclear weapons) has given the opportunity and the incentive to reduce overseas deployed forces, to stress more than before, United States power projection capabilities and to put emphasis on economic problems. Thus today, the two traditional pillars of American predominance in Asia - economic strength from its markets and overall financial presence, and security strength from its bilateral alliances and military bases - are both diminishing assets. The latter because it is seen as no longer

⁵⁴⁸ D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 75.

⁵⁴⁹ The Economist, America, Japan, and the Unmentionable, Feb 25 1995, p. 33.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁵¹ S. Talbott, U.S.-Japanese Leadership in the new Pacific Community, in: U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Feb 13 1995, p. 90.

necessary, the former because, unfortunately, others have taken over the United States' position. Although the engagement in the Pacific Region is increasing in absolute terms, it is declining in relation to upcoming multifaceted powers.⁵⁵²

Seeing Japan's success in exploiting the open U.S. market while placing barriers on foreign investment at home, China is building up a huge bilateral trade surplus. ... With the illusion of being the 'last superpower' long shattered, Americans have to think about American interests in terms of ... other great powers.⁵⁵³

This attempts to answer the question: 'What do the Americans get in return for their ensuring of military security for states like Japan and Korea?'. The United States trade deficit with Japan is worse than official numbers lay out because Japanese subsidiaries in other Asian countries are exporting to the United States. On the other hand, the turnover of American subsidiaries in Europe is eleven times as great as in Japan, four times as much as in Asia entirely or Canada and Mexico combined. Europe and America, thus, should have many incentives to stay together⁵⁵⁴ in a transatlantic common market that practices a two-way trade. Therefore, there are proposals that the Clinton administration should „follow up its successful tough line in trade talks ... giving Japan a stark choice between opening its market to the estimated \$ 50 billion in American imports lost every year and setting up equally restrictive U.S. barriers“.⁵⁵⁵ However, America should not withdraw from the Asian continent, even if it could afford it. The United States remains a major and important power for the Pacific and Asian region. Washington's primary attraction for the Pacific Partners is increasingly found less in its military presence than through American investment to balance the Japanese, as well as continued access to

⁵⁵² see: R. Manning, P. Stern, The Myth of the Pacific Community, in: Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1994, p. 85.

⁵⁵³ M. Lind, A fresh Foreign Policy for New Times, with the Emphasis on Asia, in: International Herald Tribune, Apr 19 1995.

⁵⁵⁴ see: K. Kinkel, Foreign Policy in a New Era: Forging a Transatlantic Approach, Speech at the American Institute for Contemporary Studies, Washington, May 25 1995, in: German Information Center, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, p. 2.

⁵⁵⁵ M. Lind, A fresh Foreign Policy for New Times, with the Emphasis on Asia, in: International Herald Tribune, Apr 19 1995.

a United States market that absorbs twenty-five percent of Asian exports.⁵⁵⁶ Despite its big trade deficit, America is still the biggest power in the economic and military realm. Thus, balancing Japan has different aspects. Asian states need not fear a major Japanese naval or air buildup to protect Japan's maritime trade routes and access to Persian Gulf oil, so Korea and China will be less tempted to increasingly build up their own long-range force projection capabilities. This will be hopefully, reason enough for the United States to continue - albeit at reduced levels of military forces - its presence. Its traditional interests are equal to the actual ones.⁵⁵⁷

- to prevent domination of the Asia Pacific region by any hostile power or combination of powers,
- to assure United States access to and through the region,
- to foster the spread of market-oriented economies open to United States exports, and
- to further the growth of democratic values and institutions.

All in all one can say that America tries to keep (or build) regional stability with favorable terms for the United States economy. This is not only its right and obligation, but it would be irresponsible to its people not to do it. In the same way, German-Chinese relations have been developed, especially in 1995, with mutual visits between the Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the German Chancellor Kohl.

⁵⁵⁶ S. Simon, East Asian Security, in: Asian Survey, Dec 1994, p. 1049.

⁵⁵⁷ see: D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 81.

The German-Chinese alliance scarcely means that Bonn is about to bolt the Western alliance; it does mean that, in the aftermath of the cold war, Germany has the maneuvering room to search for new tactical alliances.⁵⁵⁸

However, what Germany and America should care about when dealing with Asian countries is, that they not only support the integration of countries like China into the world's economical web, which probably might be a prerequisite for stability in Asia,⁵⁵⁹ but that they also make sure that it furthers democracy, human rights, and freedom as pillars of their foreign policies. This might create frictions especially with those states which perceive American insistence on these values as interference in their internal affairs and an attempt to change the nature of their regimes, which is, in certain cases, quite true. Insofar as Washington uses access to United States markets as a „lever to change human rights policies by its trading partners, joint hopes of economic development are held hostage to the internal politics of these states.⁵⁶⁰ Nevertheless, it should not be the case that America abandons its principles in search of accommodation, China, on the other hand, answers accommodation with belligerence,⁵⁶¹ threatening Taiwan, pirating U.S. computer software, proliferating nuclear technology, supplying anti-American regimes, hammering dissidents, using forced abortion and starvation to control population, and slaving people as an intricately planned part of its economic program.⁵⁶² If close allies like Japan do not clearly take side against such facts, if they even mostly act „as an opportunistic intermediary rather than an ally“,⁵⁶³ it becomes difficult to decide who will be a greater challenge for the future. Furthermore, often Asian societies see problems from a completely different standpoint of basic understandings and value system. In the past

⁵⁵⁸ J. Heilbrunn, Springtime, in: *The New Republic*, Oct 16 1995, p. 24.

⁵⁵⁹ see: W. Fechner, Für vertiefte euro-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit, in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, 5/95, S. 30.

⁵⁶⁰ S. Simon, East Asian Security, in: *Asian Survey*, Dec 1994, p. 1049.

⁵⁶¹ see: *The Monterey Herald*, Timidity toward China doesn't work, Dec 19 1995, p. 8A.

⁵⁶² see: A.M. Rosenthal, Stop feeding at Chinese trough, in: *The Monterey Herald*, Jan 9 1996.

⁵⁶³ see: M. Lind, A fresh Foreign Policy for New Times, with the Emphasis on Asia, in: *International Herald Tribune*, Apr 19 1995.

thirty years, America has experienced a 560 % increase in violent crime, a 419 % increase in illegitimate births, a 400 % increase in divorce rates, a 300 % increase in children living in single-parent homes, and a drop of almost 80 points in Scholastic Aptitude Test scores. Asian societies, unlike Western ones, sometimes see this not so much as a result of a vanishing consensus inside the United States' society, but as an example of an 'excess of democracy' or an 'overdose of freedom, worshipped as religiously as Hindus worship their sacred cows'.⁵⁶⁴

Real partnership cannot be built on such crucial differences; with such governments only a 'missionary Realpolitik' is possible, taking into consideration that isolationism would be no solution because it does not change anything in the future. America and its Western partners have to promote their values through active policies. This can be done by being a partner in an alliance, member in multilateral relations, and especially in Asia as a member of rising mutual and regional cooperative arrangements. The proposal to bolster Russia so that it becomes a strong counterweight in Asia against China and Japan,⁵⁶⁵ therefore does not lie in the American national interest, for two reasons: first, America would become isolated, no longer being involved as a major 'player' in Asia. Russia, with its new upcoming consciousness, being again an important power, would not only bind the Asian countries, but would concentrate the Western European awareness upon itself. The transatlantic link would be no longer of importance. Second, the United States would have to pay a price for expecting Russia to cooperate in Asia. In these days, this price obviously would be the abandoning of NATO's expansion, or furthermore its replacement with a pan-European security organization that includes Russia. Whether this price would be acceptable is doubted heavily. Guidelines for strengthening a free trade in Asia should therefore at the same time solidify the United States position in the region.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁴ see: The Economist, The Scourge of the West, Apr 22 1995, p. 34.

⁵⁶⁵ This proposal was made in: M. Lind, A fresh Foreign Policy for New Times, with the Emphasis on Asia, in: International Herald Tribune, Apr 19 1995.

⁵⁶⁶ R.A. Manning and P. Stern had worked out such guidelines in their article: The Myth of the Pacific Community, in: Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1994, p. 93. These guidelines stress transforming

What does all this mean to the, until today, very important United States - Japan relationship? It will not be possible, in the long run, to conduct an American foreign policy which 'contains' Japan economically and militarily, as some of its neighbors hope it. Japanese power and influence will grow in the Pacific region and worldwide as that of its competitors. Mutual friendship, common shared values and burden sharing, as well as responsibility sharing, will make it easier for the United States to reach its missionary goals and will thus be of worth for all the region. This however, is only possible by close cooperation and political coordination. The Nye initiative, a proposed extensive planning process designed to align, as much as possible, the strategic thinking of the two countries and to clarify the roles that each would carry out in the event of a military crisis, seems to be a step forward in the right direction at the right time.⁵⁶⁷ Japan and the United States have no real alternative to keep their mutual friendship and alliance if they want to escape a situation similar to that of 1923, when the United Kingdom-Japan alliance was terminated and Japan tended to go too far, for fear of falling short. However, not all can be left as it is. Beside reducing asymmetries and sharing the costs and responsibilities, it is equally important to move the relationship beyond the Security Treaty and to develop a greater sense of common purpose and perspectives. Probably with this, Japan can become one of the first Asian states to participate in a strong transatlantic community. Although it will not be a member of a transatlantic military or economic treaty, it would be possible to integrate it, under certain circumstances and with the above prerequisites. Similarly, Russia could be integrated too. Nevertheless, Russia is too great militarily and geostrategically and Japan too great economically to be a 'member' in the already developing new European transatlantic security order.

APEC into a regional framework of enhancing trade, concentration on near-term results, forging a link between the North American Free Trade Agreement countries and Asia, advancing an 'open regionalism' by sharing information and designing dispute settlement mechanisms, and developing sources of domestic support to underpin United States engagement in Asia.

⁵⁶⁷ see: P. Ennis, *The Nye Initiative: Can it save the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance?*, in: Tokyo Business Today, June 1995, p. 38.

In case of Japan, the task will be to resist mercantilism and the insular 'if only' mentality (e.g. if Japan had only another constitution, then...).⁵⁶⁸ Finally, in case of the United States, the challenge will be to avoid a return to isolationism and narrow economic nationalism. Washington's approach to a Pacific security should place a greater emphasis on multilateral arrangements, mutuality, consensus, local contribution, and on a contribution to regional cooperative arrangements. This, however, is not only a 'plan for America',⁵⁶⁹ but also a plan for Japan and for all the states of that region, probably in connection with Europe and the whole world.

⁵⁶⁸ D. Unger, P. Blackburn, Japan's emerging global Role, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Georgetown University, Washington, 1993, p. 83.

⁵⁶⁹ see: Shintaro Ishihara, Wir sind die Weltmacht, Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch Gladbach, 1992, pp. 188ff.

VIII. MODERNIZED TRANSATLANTIC LINKS

We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm our conviction that the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century. For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace and prosperity for ourselves and for the world. ... We reaffirm the indivisibility of transatlantic security.⁵⁷⁰

This 'transatlantic' statement gives an answer to the question of whether transatlantic links are 'a continuing necessity' or 'just an option'. It draws a line from a common past to a common future, trying to preserve the 'epic achievements' into a world which has changed politically, militarily, economically, and even sociologically. To find a strategy in an uncertain scenario, a changing and unknown surrounding, and a domestic as well as international fragmenting and, at the same time, integrating world, it is always good to use fixed and well-known procedures, stabilized paths, and to conduct only those changes which are obviously necessary. From this perspective, it is not only enormous but also astonishing how great the changes in the political landscape over the last five years have been. Nevertheless, the initial transition phase after the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the East-West confrontation is over. There are more and more countries, politicians, groups, and individuals which today are disappointed about the actual decreased pace of change. 'The winds of change' are no longer hurricane-like, but seem to have become only breeze-like, with an additional uncertainty in their direction. The prospects which had been promised by the international community in the early 1990s are neither reached nor sometimes any longer aimed at. The reasons for this lie in the human capability of imagination which is often bigger than the mathematical and unemotional probability of future reality. Additionally, however, the tasks have increased exponentially. For example, with the tectonic shifts of the last years, building economic upon military strength, and vice versa, is no longer possible. While Paul Kennedy had argued that „the ability simultaneously to maintain economic vitality and military capability - the skill with

⁵⁷⁰ United States-European Union Madrid Summit, The New Transatlantic Agenda, Dec 3 1995, in: U.S. Information & Texts, Dec 7 1995, p. 19.

which statesmen balanced each against the other - has been the single most important determinant of influence in world politics“,⁵⁷¹ today this 'marriage' is divorced. Further fragmentations, due to race, religion, language, nationalism, protectionism, and a new drive for power, „gratify intangible desires“,⁵⁷² but make it by far more difficult to plan and to conduct a multidimensional policy with a strategic vision.

... but people have also been known to seek 'freedom' through nationalism, terrorism, racism, authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism. ... The search for freedom, then, tends toward fragmentation in the political realm, while the search for prosperity tends toward integration in the economic realm, and therein lies a historical pattern of considerable importance for the post-Cold War world.⁵⁷³

The more uncertain the way of politics becomes, the more necessary it is to look at the goals or, if there are no goals, to formulate them. Germany, after its unification, had gained this experience as well as the United States, France, Russia, Japan (and there are many more examples) still today. Finding 'common' goals with others, normally is an advantage, bringing up the possibility for mutual problem solving, creating synergetic effects, and giving the possibility for the societies of being a 'reference' to the other. Although called a 'Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan', the New Transatlantic Agenda, beside providing only vague proposals on how to reach them, mainly points out common goals under the headlines:

- Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development Around the World
- Responding to Global Challenges

⁵⁷¹ Paul Kennedy; *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York, Random House, 1987, p. XVI.

There are, however, some doubts whether Paul Kennedy is right with this argumentation.

⁵⁷² J.L. Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 200-201.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

- Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations
- Building Bridges Across the Atlantic

Despite the fact that it is a great achievement that the United States and the European Union are agreeing on their main international directions, every country and organization still has the choice of how these goals are obtained. It may be the same, parallel, or completely different ways which are taken into consideration. Mostly there are options between which sovereign states or international organizations can choose, sometimes, however, there are only necessities. The difference between 'option' and 'necessity' lies in the fact whether there are real alternatives or not. An 'option' always has alternatives, mostly being of nearly equal importance and value. On the other side is a 'necessity' an option which has only worse and more unimportant or lesser value alternatives. The transatlantic link, often cited in the plural as 'transatlantic links' to show its multiple dimensions, is 'one option' to reach the above goals. It has been established in the past mainly through NATO, and thus under defense and security aspects. NATO has been a concrete, organized security partnership, based on common values and beliefs, but also on a common threat assessment. Moreover, although not brought into an official multilateral form of agreement, the transatlantic community has always had positive economic consequences, so that the Euro-American region evolved as a 'zone of prosperity'. The old transatlantic 'bargain' was „protection in return for influence“.⁵⁷⁴ After the end of the Cold War, it is possible today for the United States to pull back on the American continent, renewing the Monroe Doctrine, or to move its interest center into the Asian-Pacific region. Furthermore, it would be an imaginable option to install a global balance of power system between the three dominant states United States, Russia, and China. For all these options, the United States would not necessarily need NATO or the transatlantic link. Nevertheless, to maintain its great power status it would need allies.

⁵⁷⁴ J. Schönbohm, Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the Context of the developing future Security Structure in Europe, speech at the Trilateral Commission, Copenhagen, Apr 24 1995, p. 10.

These allies, at least would guarantee America's influence in Europe. A consequence of all these options would be that something new has to be created. Concentrating on an existing organization like NATO would no longer be of important value. Beside possibly changing alliances, this would mean much effort, politically, financially, economically, and militarily.

European partners, on the other side, would have to face the consequences of balancing Russia on their continent alone. Due to the fact that the EU is far from able to do this, there would occur uncertainties in the security realm, political competitorship, and eventually economical weaknesses.⁵⁷⁵ Internal squabbles do not question the organization itself but only its internal shifting of weight, emphasis and importance. Especially for Germany, a scenario with one of the above mentioned options would be a great challenge and probably a step back on its ladder of development towards becoming a 'normal' European country. In these cases, Germany has to arrange its relations with Russia and its neighbors, as well as inside the EU and NATO, relying more on itself, especially in military matters. It is imaginable that the disadvantages could be minimized by a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. However, neither America nor Germany would be politically able to conduct such a policy without damaging their relations with other European partners. Furthermore, the dissolution or devaluation of European security organizations, like NATO, would leave behind a big 'pile of smashed crockery', an obstacle on the way towards any form of security in Europe. There is no doubt about the fact that there are good arguments why especially Germany should be a special partner of the United States.

Unlike the French, they feel embarrassed by any mention of ethnic glory. Unlike the British, they live in the present and have no occasion for nostalgia for World War II. ... Moreover, as the world's third largest economy, controlling, willy-nilly, the third of world production in the European economic area, Germany can afford to be generous politically. ... with nine neighbors and the longest borders in Europe, it also understands the need to jawbone compromises. ... Yet the striking

⁵⁷⁵ From this perspective it becomes clear that it is neither a fear of something new, nor mere inertia or political fashionable wording, if Europeans declare their belief in NATO.

aspect of Germany's stance is the regularity with which the popular consensus chooses enlightened, long-term self-interest over short-term gain.⁵⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship is and should be moreover important under the notion that it is implemented into the multidimensional and multi-state transatlantic relationship. As the United States Ambassador Kimmitt expressed it, the American-German link has European facets:

As goes Germany, so goes Europe. As goes Europe, so goes the Trans-Atlantic relationship so vital to American and European security.⁵⁷⁷

One could say that there are alternatives to the preservation of the transatlantic relationship. Those would be mainly conducted through NATO. Nevertheless, none of those mentioned above is obviously equally desirable. There are no 'real' alternative options, but 'contrasts' against which the continuing necessity of Europe's and America's 'old' security landscape become significantly apparent. The basic consideration that the transatlantic relationship is still essential to the partner's future security and prosperity did not vanish with the 'Berlin Wall'.

Nothing is, however, to be preserved in an eventual 'old-fashioned' Cold War format. „The Euro-Atlantic partnership must remain the foundation and nucleus. It must be given a 'fresh impetus' so that states on both sides of the Atlantic are not tempted to go their own ways. The common challenges make cooperation necessary, and the common basis of shared values and interests make cooperation possible“.⁵⁷⁸

Modernized transatlantic links differ in two ways from former ones: first, they inherently comprise not mainly the defense dimension but also a variety of other elements, especially and essentially economic considerations. A new transatlantic agenda, however, is even more than the sum of NATO and a Euro-American region of prosperity. 'Strategic

⁵⁷⁶ E. Pond, Germany finds its Niche as a Regional Power, in: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, Winter 1996, pp. 29-30.

⁵⁷⁷ R.F. Kimmitt, speech at the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Jun 8 1993.

⁵⁷⁸ J. Schönbohm, Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the Context of the developing future Security Structure in Europe, speech at the Trilateral Commission, Copenhagen, Apr 24 1995, p. 10.

stability' spreads from external, international affairs to internal problems. Second, over time European unification will produce a common identity. Although this still will take some time, in the future the United States will probably not have to cope any longer with a multiplicity of single and independent states but with 'one' partner, which is becoming, more and more, equal. A new transatlantic relationship, developed and established now, must be initially prepared for such a future 'bilateralism'.

The next chapter gives an outline of the dimensions of cooperation and how the transatlantic relation should or should not be established. Beside this, it is essential to notice that the maintained link between the two continents America and Europe, mainly characterized by the United States, NATO, the EU and today's European nation states, has an underlying vision of a common great future. This vision is not constructed by itself, it must be supported and promoted wherever and whenever it is possible. Only then, will there be „little to fear but much to gain“.⁵⁷⁹

A. DIMENSIONS OF COOPERATION

The question, therefore, is not primarily one of reshaping the trans-Atlantic partnership. The main objective is to find solutions to a range of problems that Europe and the United States can master only by working together.⁵⁸⁰

The transatlantic partnership has to be maintained, not just by going on in the day-to-day business but by modernizing and multiplying the links. During the last five decades the Cold War had limited the dimension of the 'bridge over the Atlantic' because the need for military security was an 'overwhelming' topic. There is no doubt that the relations which evolved from this military and security partnership are to be preserved also in the future. Nevertheless, having changed completely, the international landscape gives new

⁵⁷⁹ President Clinton, cited in: V. Rühle, Die pazifische und atlantische Dimension gemeinsamer Sicherheit, speech at Stanford University, Feb 27 1995, p. 5.

⁵⁸⁰ K. Kinkel, Germany sees an evolving Agenda for a still much needed Alliance, in: International Herald Tribune, Mar 30 1995.

possibilities to use other facets of the common European-American potential for mutual problem solving and for the creation of prosperity and welfare. Now it is necessary to create structures for political coordination, for the solution of urgent questions of the West's modern industrial societies, and for the transatlantic trade and economic relations. The coordinator for the German-American cooperation, Werner Weidenfeld, thus has proposed to build a „European-American Political Cooperation“,⁵⁸¹ with the task to define a common position to all questions and problems of mutual interest. Additionally, one has to mention that this exchange of ideas and cooperation in the future does not explain itself just with its existence. While during the Cold War the transatlantic security was a well known and mostly accepted reality, today it must be able to affect peoples' life and daily problems. This has two effects: first, the European and the American states of the transatlantic community must become a reference to each other. Learning from each other and using the experiences is thus the first necessity of future cooperation. The prerequisite for this is mutual openness, truthfulness, and the political courage to point out own failures in domestic and foreign policy. Second, the European-American relations can only grow from the sympathies of the citizens. The fundamental element therefore are contacts, exchange of views, and connections between the societies. In today's information-age this should not be too difficult. However, it is very seldom that somebody falls 'in love' by telephone-contacts alone ...

Internationally, it is often stressed that the United States will need to 'fulfill its leadership role' in the future. Especially in Europe, where the states „still quarrel too much among themselves to accept any single European political authority, [so that] leadership on tough issues still has to come from the outside power“.⁵⁸² Furthermore, America's leadership, being the only world power today, is a general necessity for the promotion of United States' interests and ideals, as President Clinton puts it:

⁵⁸¹ This European-American Cooperation should work like the European Political Cooperation. See: W. Weidenfeld, *Wir brauchen die Transatlantische Gemeinschaft*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 9 1995.

⁵⁸² E. Pond, *Germany finds its Niche as a Regional Power*, in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Winter 1996, p. 31.

Today, because of our dedication, America's ideals, liberty, democracy and peace, are more and more the aspirations of people everywhere in the world.⁵⁸³

Nevertheless, although America alone often 'makes the difference', it is not willing and able to be the world's policeman. 'Leadership' does not mean to be everywhere and always internationally involved. Today, leadership is more and more based on the contributions of others. According to the allies' perspective 'allegiance' has to be replaced by 'contribution'. The Latin origin of the word 'contribution' (com+tribuere) means to give its own share voluntary but with others for the common good.⁵⁸⁴ This has two consequences: one is that no longer all states should look to the United States to 'make the first step' and then to follow afterwards. It is often required that America takes the lead, but its allies should from the beginning on show their contribution and willingness to act. The second consequence is that the 'principle of contribution' should not be undermined by a differentiation about where it is 'really' necessary to act, where the risks are only minimal, where a 'good press' and publicity is guaranteed, or where the least price has to be paid. Despite national fears to be submerged in numerous different contributions, it is necessary in the future that one orients his contribution more at the necessities and no longer at the sufficiencies. The form of these contributions (e.g. being a logistical basis, sending troops, giving money) does not really matter if every state can credibly confirm that this is its best possible share and a burden which it can carry. 'Fair share' and 'free riding' have been questions in the realm of cooperation since European security institutions had been originally constructed. The United States had especially proclaimed that in quantifiable and unquantifiable ways its allies could do more.⁵⁸⁵

Due to the changed international security situation, it is understandable that defense spending is decreasing. Nevertheless, Western Europeans have to acknowledge

⁵⁸³ President Clinton's remarks on Bosnia, in: The New York Times, Clinton's Words on Mission to Bosnia: 'The Right Thing to Do', Nov 28 1995, p. A6.

⁵⁸⁴ see: A.K. Henrikson, Führung, Zusammenarbeit und das Beitragsprinzip, in: NATO Brief, Dec 94-Jan 95, p. 18.

⁵⁸⁵ For further details and arguments of both sides, see: W.R. van Cleave, The Military Sinews of a Global Strategy, in: U. Ra'anan, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Security Commitments and Capabilities, Archon Books, Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 169-172.

that they are still and will continue to be dependent on America's strategic nuclear forces, air transport capabilities, strategic reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities. The desire to develop a 'common foreign and security policy' on the basis of an 'European security and defense identity' it is thus necessary that the balance between American forces and capabilities in Europe and Western European efforts is still maintained on a secure level. Future cooperation should neither make United States contributions obsolete nor European efforts unnecessary and only 'nice to have'. This implies that there be a further stationing of American troops and assets on European soil. This stationing is not to be taken as a necessity but must be actively promoted, especially by those countries which are 'bearing the burden' or 'having the honor' of being a host nation. Host countries should coordinate their interests and their security assessment with the United States to prevent America from seeing its overseas troops only as power projection. Only then will NATO's solidarity, common commitment and strategic unity be demonstrated.

Cooperation mostly implies a division of labor between the participants. This can be done in three different ways: dividing roles, tasks, and/or geographic priorities.⁵⁸⁶ As already discussed, America is seen as having the leadership role. It is the strongest nation and nothing can be achieved against its will.

But U.S. leadership cannot be conducted as before. After the end of the Cold War other states no longer need U.S. protection as they did. The U.S. government must now lead more consistently and with a greater understanding for others than it did before.⁵⁸⁷

A division of labor within general roles is no longer always adequate due to the multiplicity of new challenges and tasks, and the need for all to share in responsibilities and contributions. 'Functional task sharing', on the other hand, might come more into the foreground. While America is still the keeper of global nuclear stability and has unique power-projection capabilities, there exist other allies which are, for example, especially trained in mine warfare, coastal water operations, or electronic combating. Thus, task

⁵⁸⁶ see: W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 24.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

sharing contributes to a decrease of redundancies, standardization, functional cooperation, and probably to a specialization with synergetic effects for all. There are, however, some consequences as eventually limitations to act alone, certain obligations to do something although it is not fully in the national interest, loss of the capability to be a 'lead nation', or just a need for differentiation in 'research and development'. Because of these negative consequences, it should, however, be possible to maintain certain core capabilities so that the necessary security of the national country and crucial lines of communications is guaranteed.

While the United States can and must retain its global responsibilities, Europeans are concentrating mostly on their continent and its surroundings. Therefore, there are supporters for a geographical division of labor:

A geographic division of labor is, therefore, in the making, with Western Europe assuming greater responsibility in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and North Africa, and the United States retaining global responsibilities and also concentrating more on Asia and the Americas.⁵⁸⁸

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has shown that Europeans are not yet capable of taking over some responsibilities of their own. A geographical division of labor has the disadvantage that cooperation between partners will decrease if their 'zone of effort' is not the same. Additionally, this might lead to commitments that are neither possible due to capacities or due to the lack of support of its citizens. „The division of labor must serve the 'national' interest, not jeopardize it“.⁵⁸⁹ Thus, the transatlantic community is often neither able nor willing to promote it.

Cooperation is essential to tackle problems mutually and to increase integration. This can be essentially done by binational or multinational forces and force structures. For example, to be embedded in a multinational structure is the root for a successful role within an alliance or an ad-hoc coalition in a crisis or conflict. NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW) and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) guarantee

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 35.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

a peacetime readiness which is valuable for all NATO partners. After the Cold War Western states have to learn what it means to deploy and command forces of many nations with different equipment and doctrines to achieve the right result. A deep integration within headquarters is a prerequisite to develop a common sense of handling these problems. The more there are forces used, trained to work and fight in an alliance or coalition the more successful they will be at accomplishing the mission. Interoperability and standardization in peacetime is one kind of life insurance on the battlefield. While the United States should be further engaged in these programs and in NATO's multinational troop contingents, the Europeans should make these capabilities more 'usable' when American interests are at stake. That does not mean a possible worldwide deployment and employment. It should however not exclude any possibilities from the start on.

Transatlantic cooperation is possible and essential in many cases and in different fields. Despite the necessity of promoting national industry and thus being 'tough on trade' it would be advantageous for all if the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) could be realized. As Newt Gingrich points out provocatively, the link over the Atlantic should not only be based on D-Day festivities.⁵⁹⁰ Furthermore, it would make sense and save money if the United States, and of course the European partners, were willing to cooperate in a spirit of partnership in the realm of arms sales, production, and development.

There is actually a feeling among European allies that the United States is only interested in selling black boxes, lacking stability and predictability, seeing others only as their 'junior partners', and promoting the exclusive 'buy American' principle.⁵⁹¹ It is thus not astonishing that the German Defense Minister demands to concentrate on European technological capabilities, to consolidate the European market and make it capable for competition with the United States.⁵⁹² It is even dangerous for the planning of future

⁵⁹⁰ N. Gingrich cited in: J. Koar, Brücke über den Atlantik für freien Handel, in: Tagesspiegel Berlin, Apr 21 1995.

⁵⁹¹ see: H.H. Mey, Extended Air Defense - Germany between European and Transatlantic Orientations, in: Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, Jan-Mar 1995, p. 82.

⁵⁹² see: V. Rühle, statement at the Western European Armament Group, Paris, Mar 23 1995.

transatlantic cooperation to threaten America's behavior with the prospect of a 'true European Monetary Union', having an even greater weight than the Deutsche Mark and allowing the United States no longer to set the tone for global trade negotiations.⁵⁹³ 'Buy American' should not be replaced by 'buy European' but by 'buy Transatlantic'. Especially if one takes budget constraints into consideration, European-United States financial, economic, and especially armament cooperation is an attractive option. This would make nations able to speak with one voice. For example, closely coordinating the spending of money and supply of assistance to Russia and other states for their weapons dismantlement and disarmament would eliminate needless duplications.⁵⁹⁴ It will be necessary in the future to spend more money and to engage more actively in the development of Third World countries in an attempt to limit the number of conflicts and the suffering of people. Since 'development' can neither be easily sold nor exported,⁵⁹⁵ it is necessary to tackle this problem with mutual, coordinated concepts and active engagement to have a chance for real development. It would be possible to produce much better results than in the past if the states of the transatlantic community were able to overcome partially their financial unilateralism. It is self-explanatory that in the same coordinated way the stabilization of the former Warsaw Pact region and especially of the former Soviet Union states and Russia could be conducted if America and the West European countries would 'pull on one string', politically, financially, and economically. Washington's proposal that in a regional approach it would care mainly about Russia while Germany stabilizes the Central and East European states towards the goal of becoming EU members⁵⁹⁶ is counterproductive to a real coordination and 'commonality' of Western approaches. The evading of political coordination discussions because of uncertain outcomes, national

⁵⁹³ see: W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1995, p. 31.

⁵⁹⁴ see: Department of Defense, *Cooperative Threat Reduction*, Apr 1995, p. 15.

⁵⁹⁵ B. Könitzer, *Wir müssen der Menschheit die Angst vor Reformen nehmen*, in: *Die Welt*, Sep 8 1995.

⁵⁹⁶ see: M. Reinhold, *USA und Deutschland im Einigungsprozess und nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*, in: *Rissener Rundbrief*, 4/1995, Hamburg, p. 138.

egoism, and decreased or non-available willingness to compromise, means to sacrifice Western effectiveness on the altar of national greatness and sovereignty.

There are many more dimensions of cooperation, like nuclear cooperation between the EU and the United States,⁵⁹⁷ environment protection, and common problem solving in normally internal affairs of states like health care, that cannot all be listed here. It is however essential to notice, that there is a huge 'open field' which must be tilled, if the harvest should be rich and valuable for all. The former United States Secretary of State James Baker had called this architecture for the future a 'New Atlanticism':

Working from shared ideals and common values, we form a set of mutual challenges, in economics, in foreign policies, the environment, science, and a host of other fields. So it makes sense for us to fashion our responses together as a matter of common course.⁵⁹⁸

As a response from the European side, Germany's Foreign Minister Kinkel had taken over these ideas, stressing that „the transatlantic agenda is not exclusively a matter of security policy, ...[but] economics as well, ... [and] must be intensified in cultural, scientific and human relations“.⁵⁹⁹

To sum up, in future the transatlantic community should mainly be constructed on four pillars: first, a political one, to let the United States participate in the European development and the Europeans become real partners of their American friends. This political cooperation is conducted best in a parallel process of bilateral agreements between the different states and between the European security organizations and the United States. Furthermore it should contribute to coordinate the policies of the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO. Second, the transatlantic connection should be based on organized and institutionalized economic relationships. The

⁵⁹⁷ see: German Information Center, EU und die USA vereinbaren atomare Zusammenarbeit, Nov 10 1995.

⁵⁹⁸ J.A. Baker, A New Europe - A New Atlanticism - Architecture for a New Era, cited in: Jacques Delors, European Integration and Security, in: Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, Mar/Apr 1991, p. 107.

⁵⁹⁹ K. Kinkel, Germany sees an evolving Agenda for a still much needed Alliance, in: International Herald Tribune, Mar 30 1995.

transatlantic economic common development is already on a positive and much promising track. Nevertheless, the 'Asian option' and the integration of the East will be a big challenge, which should be managed with mutual efforts and not in a way of 'first come, first serve'. The third pillar is the traditional one: security. The security pillar, since long established through NATO, is the backbone of the transatlantic community. New dangers, crisis management, preventive diplomacy, and eventual new coalitions for new tasks, make it necessary to keep in close contact, maintain the American presence on the European continent and to adapt all related matters. Nevertheless, the core function of NATO, collective defense, should not be a secondary topic. It is necessary to keep in close contact to recognize now the answers to future problems. Finally, a fourth lane of the 'transatlantic highway' should emphasize human relationships, cultural exchange, and mutual understanding on the individual level. On the one hand, America's stationing of troops on European soil has contributed to this over the last fifty years. But these contacts should be extended to civilians and the other side of the Atlantic. One sees a country from a completely different perspective, with more understanding for problems and chances, and without filtering glasses of the national press reports, if it is possible to live abroad for a certain amount of time.

The fourth part of the Joint United States-EU Action Plan within the New Transatlantic Agenda, 'Building Bridges across the Atlantic' is most important, if not the prerequisite for the first three parts which deal with worldwide challenges and developments.⁶⁰⁰ Commonly the erosion of the belief, that the West, as the richest and most modern portion of human society, has a special responsibility for itself and for the world as a whole, has to be stopped. Only with the basis of real mutual understanding over all levels of contact it is possible to build a transatlantic zone of stability which can, will, and probably must spread its achievements and ideals around the world.

⁶⁰⁰ „Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development 'around the world', Respond to 'global' challenges, Contributing to the Expansion of 'World' Trade and closer economic Relations“, see: United States-European Union Madrid Summit, The New Transatlantic Agenda, Dec 3 1995, in: U.S. Information & Texts, Dec 7 1995, pp. 10-18.

B. SPECIAL TRANSATLANTIC TREATIES

Although most Western politicians on both sides of the Atlantic agree that there should be a transatlantic partnership and „a system of interlocking institutions and relationships rooted in a common commitment to democracy, individual rights and the rule of law“, ⁶⁰¹ it is not equally obvious whether this should be underlined in a legally binding treaty or pact between the two continents. Objectors against the idea argue that there are too many differences between American and European opinions, not to speak of the difficulties to find a common opinion inside Western Europe itself. These differences would be made obvious if a transatlantic document was negotiated and then would eventually lead to an unsuccessful result. Closer European-American political harmonization, beside day-to-day business and case-by-case results, therefore would be something only for illusionists. ⁶⁰² Furthermore, a transatlantic pact would only make sense if it was signed by the European Union, the United States and additionally Canada. Since there is not yet a common foreign and security policy, or currency, it is difficult to bring 'meat to the bones' of such a treaty. As long as the Western European nation states are not really willing to 'pool' parts of their sovereignty, there cannot be any real progress in a EU-American common policy. Promoters of NATO and the WEU even try to keep the defense component out of the discussion about a transatlantic treaty because they fear possible damage to their well established organizations and because they underline that „economic policy and defense are jealously guarded separate bailiwicks in all national bureaucracies“. ⁶⁰³

In relation to proposals for a 'strategic partnership treaty' with Russia, there is an additional questionmark: if it is not conducted and negotiated cautiously, such a treaty

⁶⁰¹ Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, June 1995, p. 2.

⁶⁰² see: W. Weidenfeld, Plädoyer für einen transatlantischen Neubeginn, in: Neue Züricher Zeitung, Sep 16/17 1995.

⁶⁰³ J. Fitchett, Western Europe proposes new Trans-Atlantic Pact, in: International Herald Tribune, Feb 7 1995.

would stabilize the idea of 'two' linked security areas. The actual situation would be fixed, granting Russia free action in their 'sphere of influence'. A transatlantic treaty could eventually have likely dividing effects, delimiting America's interests and areas of responsibility from Western Europe's. An United States-Russian bilateralism can be imagined as one of the negative results.

Nevertheless, the same argument is used as a 'pro' for a transatlantic treaty. If carefully formulated and adequately set into practice, it would be the core for all common politics, preventing single states, the EU, and America from unilateral actions. Since in the past Western Europeans and Americans mostly have agreed on their national and international policies, as far as they were affected, it should be possible to do this in an increased effort in the future. The basis for this cooperation lies in the common understanding about basic values, democratic ideas and structures, pluralism, and market economy which, in the last fifty years, have been promoted and further developed commonly in both continents.⁶⁰⁴ A new transatlantic pact might keep in check the harsher economic competition between the United States and the EU which has emerged since the end of the Cold War. It could underwrite the transformation of the military structure from an anti-Soviet alliance to a more general purpose military organization, and it might help the governments, especially in the United States, to fight isolationist tendencies.⁶⁰⁵

It is no longer sufficient that there is a list of topics in which the transatlantic partners 'sit on the same side of the table'. Necessary is a binding mandate for mutual actions which gives guidelines and a reference point for the governments. In the near future, such a mandate would be very helpful when the EU members are discussing their future relationship during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. At least a small danger exists that this conference concentrates on EU-WEU relations, internal matters, and a revival of 'European economic nationalism' as a reaction to President Clinton's economic policy of 'being tough on trade', without giving a clear Euro-Atlantic signal to the United States. This could damage not only future developments but also established transatlantic

⁶⁰⁴ see: Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁰⁵ see: M. Woollacott, The great Atlantic Drift Away, in: The Guardian, Feb 10 1995.

links and the NATO partnership. Surely, there will be advocates in the Intergovernmental Conference for the American perspective. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have reliability in one's partners and clear, well defined relationships. This is best underlined and promoted by a clear contract under international law. This contract would be made valuable for future developments if the signatories were the EU, the United States, Canada, and NATO, despite the fact that every member state had to ratify it. A transatlantic treaty would not replace the present cooperation; but would put it into a new framework.⁶⁰⁶ It would keep NATO as the basic element of relations. The treaty would add questions and topics to the agenda which were not yet mentioned in 1949 but are essential today. It would provide a ratio for European-American friendship, which is no longer self-explanatory after the former potential enemy in the East has changed its outlook and might and after a generation of politicians has resigned for whose the relation over the Atlantic always had a symbolic embodiment of the 'free world'. Additionally such a treaty would prevent the Atlantic from becoming 'broader' due to economic and political competition. However, beside all treaties, it is 'human relations' which is most important.

The loss of purpose evident in both continents ... can hardly be repaired by piling additional alliance structures on those that are already weakening. How it can be renewed ... is a mystery that lies below the level at which diplomats and bureaucrats do their work.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁶ see: A. Dregger, Ein 'transatlantischer Vertrag' ist nötig, in: Die Welt, Feb 2 1995.

⁶⁰⁷ M. Woollacott, The great Atlantic drift away, in: The Guardian, Feb 10 1995.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The Western alliance must now defeat a force more powerful than the Soviet Union: the force of history. For history teaches that coalitions are as much threatened by victory as by defeat. Only the most careful dedication to common purpose and to coordinated policies can overcome that legacy.⁶⁰⁸

This fact is the reason why it has to be pointed out so frequently, so intensively, and to all sides that the transatlantic link is not 'just an option' but a continuing necessity. In the new security environment with uncertainties not only about the question where the real power lies, but also about who will be a future friend or foe, it is necessary to search for commonality, for equal belief and for value systems. On this basis, 'old' partnerships can be renewed and modernized, 'new' ones can be built. Looking back at the last fifty years, „the democracies of Europe and America, working together, have been one of history's most successful combinations“.⁶⁰⁹ They defeated Communism, thereby carrying the democratic principle safely into the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the Western states will face new dangers from external threats and from internal competition among each other. These challenges can be best met commonly, and „the world as a whole will be a steadier place if the 20th century's series of temporary liaisons between Europe and America is turned into a permanent marriage“.⁶¹⁰ Europe needs America. It lacks military means to project power to parts of the world, to protect itself, and to engage decisively in wars like the former Yugoslav conflict. It is on the way towards a closer Union, but still having not yet decided the complete goal and the way to reach this goal. Nevertheless, Western Europe will get new security partners from Central and Eastern Europe, while at the same time having to cope with the uncertain, but still big and powerful neighbor Russia. After the fall of Communism, America is necessary to give the basis for Europe on

⁶⁰⁸ W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 1995, p. 13.

⁶⁰⁹ *International Herald Tribune*, An Atlantic Community, Feb 14 1995.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*

which the future itself can be built. America equally needs Europe. Pointing out the common heritage, it is possible to find a reference for internal problems which seem to become overwhelmingly important in the near future. The United States will have European partners, if not 'the' European partner, if it needs 'partners in leadership' and a community which 'raise its eyes to other parts of the world', economically, politically, and, under certain circumstances, militarily. America, thus, has something to gain also from such a partnership. The major advantage for the transatlantic link is, that it combines political hardware with a long since developed 'spirit of commonality'. This goal will not be possible with Asian partners, although they may be attractive because of their economic rise and power. It is also necessary to keep close links to countries like Japan, however the 'dimensions' of cooperation will never reach the transatlantic link, if this bond is maintained and modernized.

Europe is, therefore, an essential security partner for America in every sense of the word. It has military force, economic strength, and diplomatic links throughout the world. Its interests broadly coincide with America's, although it may have different areas of concentration.⁶¹¹

Today, often people are used to being persuaded and influenced by keywords and symbolism rather than by rational arguments. The Western democracies thus are often concentrating more on symbolic actions and simple pictures than on explaining complex relationships and problems of reality. That a successful politician needs symbolism, was already clear to Macchiavelli.⁶¹² The danger is however, that it is no longer the goal to get a consensus over the possible and manageable in politics but to create an ostensible world, behind which the reality is no longer visible. The 'transatlantic community' is slowly on its way to becoming such an unreal world; more and more Americans point out that the common heritage and commonality between America and Europe is no longer of any value for the state.⁶¹³ Economic problems and expectations for the future make European

⁶¹¹ W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 1995, p. 19.

⁶¹² see: A. von Müller, *Handsclag für Deutschland*, in: *Das Sonntagsblatt*, No. 42, Oct 20 1995.

Union, and generally Western European states, concentrate more and more on their Eastern neighbors. Established transatlantic structures are no longer instruments that do of themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of politicians, economists, and citizens. To miss this trend would mean to pay a higher price in the future, when it is recognized that a transatlantic link has to be newly established and must be re-invented. This would be an enormous challenge and would probably only be manageable over decades. Therefore, it is necessary to engage actively, to name the problems, to try to find solutions, and to explain to the people why all this has to be done and why it has a real pay-off.

International order will in the end be brought about only by those who are prepared to make sacrifices to construct and enforce it.⁶¹⁴

This means, Europe has to come to grips with forming its identity of becoming an equal partner for the United States. America has to overcome isolationist and unilateralist tendencies and to lead where it is needed. It should remember „that those who don't lead are likely to be led. By whom?“⁶¹⁵ Common institutions must be established, as Jean Monnet emphasized: „Nothing is possible without the people, but nothing lasts long without institutions“.⁶¹⁶ These are the 'necessities' for future efficient transatlantic links. No state today, no matter how powerful, is able to manage the challenges of the modern world alone; cooperation with others is essential. „And because each state is different, they need to find formulas under which each can contribute that which it is best able to contribute“.⁶¹⁷ These formulas are rules how to divide labor, how to inform each other

⁶¹³ Especially America's west coast officials often see that a connection with Asia is even more advantageous than one with Europe.

⁶¹⁴ M. Wight, *The Balance of Power and International Order*, in: A. James, *The Bases of International Order*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 115.

⁶¹⁵ H. Jensen, *If it's foreign, we don't care*, in: *Monterey Herald*, Nov 28 1995, p. 9A.

⁶¹⁶ Jean Monnet cited in: R.C. Holbrooke, *Amerika bleibt eine europäische Macht*, in: *Die Zeit*, Mar 30 1995, (translated by the author).

⁶¹⁷ W.R. Smyser, *The Europe of Berlin*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 1995, p. 12.

about what one is doing separately, but also how to make common analyses, common approaches, and if possible common policies. „Such a program of ‘sufficient cooperation’ may well be what is needed to render the next period of European-American relations another success story“.⁶¹⁸

The difficulty for all the practical implementations is that the world in which we live so rarely allows any kind of reflection. The day-to-day business often is so overwhelming that things which do really matter are overlooked due to their long-term perspective and long-term planning necessities. However, wise policies, and to work on the transatlantic link is one of these, blossom from good historical analyses, from separating out what is important and what is not, and from trying to think about the relationships of all of the parts of the present to the whole. „It is a matter of getting calm in the midst of turmoil, and from that calmness, perspective“.⁶¹⁹ God might help our world to always have this perspective.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶¹⁹ see: J.L. Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 17.

⁶²⁰ W.P. Merrill, *Not Alone for Mighty Empire*, in: *The Armed Forces Chaplains Board, Book of Worship for United States Forces*, 1974, No. 195, p. 191.

Not alone for mighty empire stretching far o'er land and sea,
nor alone for bounteous harvests, lift we our hearts to thee.
Standing in the living present, memory and hope between,
Lord we would with deep thanks-giving praise thee more for things unseen.

Not for battleships and fortress, not for conquests of the sword,
but for conquests of the spirit give we thanks to thee, O Lord;
For the priceless gift of freedom, for the home, the church, the school,
for the open door to manhood, in a land the people rule.

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